TNI and East Timor

The statement on Monday of Commander of the Indonesian Military (TNI) Gen. Wiranto before the House of Representatives, clarifying why the government consented to let multinational forces into East Timor and pull back most of the Indonesian troops stationed there, reveals interesting dissimilarities between how Indonesian and UN officials view the situation in the troubled territory.

They are interesting to contemplate not only because they help explain Indonesia's initial reluctance to accept any sort of what it regards as foreign intervention in this country's internal affairs. They are also important -- this is perhaps of even greater relevance for the present -- because they could still to some degree influence any decisions that have to be made later to allow the self-determination process to take its course in East Timor.

According to Wiranto, four major considerations led the government to acquiesce to UN demands. They were: First, the situation in East Timor, by the time the decision was taken, was secure enough for the step to be taken, "due to the successful suppression of the anarchic acts conducted by both camps involved in the conflict".

Second: Indonesia, being a part of the international community of nations, could not simply ignore the wishes of the rest of the world lest it become isolated. Third: Indonesian troops experienced psychological difficulties confronting "fellow Indonesians who felt they were being treated unfairly". Finally, there were differences in the way Indonesian security authorities and officials from the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) viewed indicators of security and how they considered that violations of the law should be met.

Concerning the first point, it can, of course, be noted that Jakarta's version regarding what happened in East Timor in the weeks since the Aug. 30 ballot totally diverges from the one maintained by most foreign observers. The latter account, which is also supported by some refugees, said that there was no civil war in East Timor but rather a one-sided terror campaign launched by pro-Indonesia militias. Far from trying to suppress the terror campaign, the military, according to the foreign version, backed the militias.

All that could forebode of possible complications ahead -- pro-Jakarta militia leader Eurico Guterres, for one, insists on partitioning East Timor into separate independent East Timorese and Indonesian territories. But the second point of Wiranto's statement spells out Indonesia's acceptance of the reality that it must play by universally accepted rules of international conduct if it wants to continue to be accepted as a trusted member of the world community of nations.

The existence of "psychological difficulties" affecting the military's capability to deal effectively with the rampaging militias is well known. So are the differences between the TNI and the UN in regard to viewing the security situation in East Timor.

Obviously, TNI's leadership is meeting a good deal of criticism and displeasure from within its own ranks concerning developments in East Timor. After all, as Wiranto has pointed out, about 3,700 Indonesian soldiers gave their lives for East Timor's "integration" with Indonesia, not to mention the money Jakarta spent on developing the territory's infrastructure during its 24-year administration.

With those matters considered, TNI's apparent readiness now to cooperate with the UN to bring about peace in the territory must be appreciated by all who want the best for the people of East Timor. It is to be hoped that the peace and order that appear to have begun to return to the territory with the arrival of the peacekeepers can be maintained.