TNI and East Timor

TNI and East Timor

The statement on Monday of Commander of the Indonesian
Military (TNI) Gen. Wiranto before the House of Representatives,
clarifying why the government consented to let multinational
forces into East Timor and pull back most of the Indonesian
troops stationed there, reveals interesting dissimilarities
between how Indonesian and UN officials view the situation in the
troubled territory.

They are interesting to contemplate not only because they help
explain Indonesia's initial reluctance to accept any sort of what
it regards as foreign intervention in this country's internal
affairs. They are also important -- this is perhaps of even
greater relevance for the present -- because they could still to
some degree influence any decisions that have to be made later to
allow the self-determination process to take its course in East
Timor.

According to Wiranto, four major considerations led the
government to acquiesce to UN demands. They were: First, the
situation in East Timor, by the time the decision was taken, was
secure enough for the step to be taken, "due to the successful
suppression of the anarchic acts conducted by both camps involved
in the conflict".

Second: Indonesia, being a part of the international community
of nations, could not simply ignore the wishes of the rest of the
world lest it become isolated. Third: Indonesian troops
experienced psychological difficulties confronting "fellow
Indonesians who felt they were being treated unfairly". Finally,
there were differences in the way Indonesian security authorities
and officials from the United Nations Mission in East Timor
(UNAMET) viewed indicators of security and how they considered
that violations of the law should be met.

Concerning the first point, it can, of course, be noted that
Jakarta's version regarding what happened in East Timor in the
weeks since the Aug. 30 ballot totally diverges from the one
maintained by most foreign observers. The latter account, which
is also supported by some refugees, said that there was no civil
war in East Timor but rather a one-sided terror campaign launched
by pro-Indonesia militias. Far from trying to suppress the terror
campaign, the military, according to the foreign version, backed
the militias.

All that could forebode of possible complications ahead --
pro-Jakarta militia leader Eurico Guterres, for one, insists on
partitioning East Timor into separate independent East Timorese
and Indonesian territories. But the second point of Wiranto's
statement spells out Indonesia's acceptance of the reality that
it must play by universally accepted rules of international
conduct if it wants to continue to be accepted as a trusted
member of the world community of nations.

The existence of "psychological difficulties" affecting the
military's capability to deal effectively with the rampaging
militias is well known. So are the differences between the TNI
and the UN in regard to viewing the security situation in East
Timor.

Obviously, TNI's leadership is meeting a good deal of
criticism and displeasure from within its own ranks concerning
developments in East Timor. After all, as Wiranto has pointed
out, about 3,700 Indonesian soldiers gave their lives for East
Timor's "integration" with Indonesia, not to mention the money
Jakarta spent on developing the territory's infrastructure during
its 24-year administration.

With those matters considered, TNI's apparent readiness now to
cooperate with the UN to bring about peace in the territory must
be appreciated by all who want the best for the people of East
Timor. It is to be hoped that the peace and order that appear to
have begun to return to the territory with the arrival of the
peacekeepers can be maintained.