Time to call a spade a spade

Amando Doronila, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Asia News Network

The Balikatan 02-1 joint RP-U.S. military exercises, launched last January, are nearly halfway through their six-month time frame, but the troops have not been involved in serious encounters with the Abu Sayyaf.

The slow progress of the operations is fueling a public demand for action and also the perception that the exercises have developed into a "phony war." From American sources who have visited the Basilan "front," the objective seems to be to spring the three hostages held by the Abu Sayyaf -- an American couple and a Filipino -- following which the troops would pour in to flush out the Abu Sayyaf.

In this scenario, it is considered important for the Americans to show results and deliver the message not only to Filipino groups but also foreign groups linked to the al-Qaeda terrorist networks that sure retribution follows attacks on the U.S. heartland, as well as American citizens anywhere in the world -- a reminder of the protection the Roman empire accorded Roman citizens in its far-flung conquered territories.

The time, however, for staying on the periphery of combat zones is running out. If no decisive action is taken within a few weeks, the public support for Balikatan 02-1 will erode.

Despite the euphemism of "training exercises," few Filipinos are fooled by this description; they consider them as war or combat primarily designed to eradicate the Abu Sayyaf and secondarily only to improve the fighting ability of Filipino soldiers aided by American high-tech weaponry.

Let's call a spade a spade. The public favors the American military presence in Basilan for a limited and focused objective. The exercises are targeted at live enemies and are not just a display of new weaponry. Public opinion has ignored the criticisms raised by nationalists and the Left over issues of sovereignty and the specter of a prolonged American military presence in Mindanao.

The test is the result in wiping out the Abu Sayyaf armed component, following which civic action projects could follow to attack the root causes of outlawry and terrorism.

Once the exercises can deliver swift military victory, all the criticisms against the exercises and the semantical description of the exercises will just die.

The government's initiative in allowing U.S. military intervention in the Abu Sayyaf campaign has the benefit of public opinion momentum.

If the exercises fail to produce a military victory, they would end up as a paper exhibition of military technology and troop movements.

Even as the special forces and Filipino troops are probing into the heart of the Abu Sayyaf positions, there is already talk of expanding the Balikatan 02-1 into Balikatan 02-2, with more troops and shifting the venue to Luzon. Also, the defense department is planning for expanded multinational exercises, in which troops from other countries will participate.

There's nothing wrong with forward military planning as a continuity of Balikatan 02-1, but the next Balikatan and the expanded multinational exercises will require the amendment of the terms of reference that now govern the current Basilan exercises.

Already, the contemplated expansion of the Balikatan exercises involving a larger number of U.S. troops than the 600 now involved in the Basilan operations is fueling criticism and suspicion of American intentions to use the Philippines as a staging ground for anti-terrorist actions in neighboring countries tagged by President George W. Bush as sanctuaries of al-Qaeda terrorist cells.

The defense department, as well as its U.S. sponsors, is biting morsels too large to swallow. The current exercises should first deliver military results to pave the way for public acceptance and support of expanded exercises. The build-up on Balikatan 02-1 has whetted the public appetite for action. If it succeeds, it would be easier to justify the expanded exercises. Nothing validates foreign policy initiatives better than success.