Time is of the essence in U.S.-led war on Iraq

Time is of the essence in U.S.-led war on Iraq

Juwono Sudarsono, School of Social and Political Sciences,
University of Indonesia, Jakarta

The first casualty of the war in Iraq was not truth nor the
appropriateness of broadcasting the war on "reality TV". It was
not the credibility of the Bush administration's motives for
wanting to "take out" Saddam Hussein; nor was it the cynicism of
the French, German and Russian governments in their commitment to
the United Nations (UN) inspection process as a viable
alternative to war.

The first casualty was also not the disarray of the UN nor the
fracturing of the NATO alliance; nor was it the incapacity of the
Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Conference or the Non-
Aligned Movement to make any significant effort to prevent or to
halt the war.

The first real casualty, in fact, was the credibility of the
think tanks that worked with Pentagon planners who had been
enthused by the vaunted "transformation" of the American
military.

Flushed with optimism about the advances in military
technology that the American defense industries had developed
since the 1991 Gulf War, the think tanks, like their management
consultancy cousins, thought up new buzz words to apply to the
impending war against Iraq.

There was the "shock and awe" strategy conceived at the
Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
There was talk about advances in precision-guided weapons and
munitions which would be so accurate as to "immediately
demoralize" the enemy force's "will to fight".

There was enthusiasm for "surgical strikes" even more
devastating than the Afghan campaign against the Taliban in late
2001. Laser-guided weapons with geo-positioning satellite
tracking would enable units to strike enemy formations with
precision and efficiency.

It would be a "cake walk" of a war, with a "rolling start"
attack that would lead to the "immediate implosion" of the Iraqi
regime after the first "decisive" land battle. There would be
mass surrender across the country as the Baghdad government lost
command and control, and the war would culminate with liberated
Iraqi citizens celebrating and greeting American troops entering
the streets of Baghdad.

One of the more enduring phrases that the American think tanks
will particularly regret making public prior to March 20, was
that the war in Iraq would be "swift, short and decisive." Based
on their assessment of the Iraqi military's depleted defense
equipment and weaponry, these think-tank enthusiasts were sold on
the idea that the Iraqi campaign would be somewhat similar to the
six-day Israeli-Arab war in June 1967.

Yet, after a week of hostilities across Iraqi territory, the
war has not turned out to be swift, short nor decisive.

What went wrong? The immediate evidence so far is that the
Americans miscalculated the shifting weight of Iraqi political
power on the ground. The Iraqi army and its irregular forces put
up a stiff fight.

Meanwhile, the Iraqi population do not share a common
platform against the purported level of repression by the Iraqi
government.

There may have been differing levels of perceptions of
revulsion, hostility and fear about the Iraqi leadership, which
can be broken down into four segments: Saddam Hussein's family,
the Revolutionary Command Council, the Baath Party, and the all-
important Army, itself divided along divisional and factional
interests.

However, the attack by American, British and Australian forces
provided an important propagandistic dimension not lost on the
Iraqi leadership: The trials and tribulations of the underdog.

Baghdad skillfully appealed over the heads of the Arab League
governments to individual constituents of "Arab Street" across
the Middle East. Arab pride was at stake, irrespective of
feelings about Saddam Hussein. Most tellingly, Baghdad castigated
the pathetic Kofi Annan for preparing a post-conflict UN
humanitarian assistance program, on the implicit assumption that
American-led coalition forces would have immediate control over
Iraq.

To the greater developing world in Africa and Asia, the
American-British forces were cleverly depicted as colonial,
imperialistic mercenaries.

The longer the Iraqi leadership sustains its hold on and
around Baghdad, the less likely it is that the war will be swift,
short and decisive. Even assuming that these psychological
concepts and tactics could be stretched from a week to two weeks,
the American public would be less willing to maintain their
current level of support for President George W. Bush and for
their forces on the ground.

A prolonged and bloody battle for Baghdad, or even a
"humanitarian" approach to a protracted siege of the city, would
painfully test the patience of the general public of the
coalition nations.

In guerrilla warfare parlance, the longer the Iraqi government
survives, the greater its political triumph. Conversely, the
longer it takes the coalition forces to overcome and gain final
control over Baghdad, the more bitter their military victory.

For protagonists on both sides of the divide, time is of the
essence.

The writer is a former defense minister.