Time for Golkar to reform itself

Time for Golkar to reform itself

By Aleksius Jemadu

BANDUNG (JP): As it turns out, the departure of Soeharto has
caused major trouble for the dominant party, Golkar. Suddenly,
Golkar seems to have a dark future.

Problems like disintegration in its traditional
constituencies, its seemingly unpreparedness to become a fully
independent political party, and Harmoko's ineffective leadership
have crippled Golkar's prospect to repeat its success in the
coming election.

Why then has Golkar's existence become so fragile? Can we
identify the roots of its failure? Can it survive without support
from the government and the military? Such questions need to be
answered honestly before Golkar can design new strategies in an
new era of political reform.

It is often argued that, as a young nation, Indonesia really
needs the presence of a strong political party with a wide
spectrum of popular support. Such a party is needed to ensure
political stability in a relatively long term. Strong political
parties like Malaysia's UMNO, Mexico's PRI, or Singapore's PAP
are necessary as a converging force amid the revolution of rising
expectations which, in the short term, cannot be adequately
accommodated by the political system.

From the very beginning, Golkar has not really been a fully
independent party that fits into the definition of text books in
political science.

Instead of becoming the people's instrument to participate in
politics, Golkar has tended to be the ruling elite's mechanism to
restrict genuine political participation. Golkar was a result of
political mobilization by the ruling elite and, as such, it did
not represent a genuine political participation.

Golkar was established by the Army in 1964 as an instrument to
counterbalance the growing influence of the Indonesian Communist
Party (PKI). After the PKI was legally banned and Soeharto's New
Order government focused more on economic development, Golkar
became an effective machine under Soeharto's full control to win
politically engineered elections and secure formal legitimacy for
his rule.

Neither its leaders nor its constituencies were really
committed to Golkar's original mission as an agent of political
democratization. The main concern of its leaders from one
election to another was how to distribute bureaucratic positions
both at the central and local level and how to ensure their
economic appropriation.

The distribution of political and economic benefits was a
sensitive issue within this organization. Such an issue has
become a source of internal conflict among the leaders and it is
the main cause of Golkar's disintegration. Thus, what matters
most is not so much what they could do for Golkar but what
benefits they could obtain.

Periods before and after elections was particularly opportune
for Golkar's leaders. Conglomerates and state enterprises would
be asked to contribute to Golkar's treasury in exchange for
lucrative projects and contracts from the government. Production
of jackets and T-shirts during the campaign period was said to be
a lucrative business for some Golkar leaders who ran textile
industries.

The "doctrine" of Soeharto's infallibility as chairman of
Golkar's Supervisory Council was, in fact, a liability for this
political party. It is considered by many as a practice of
feudalism in Indonesian politics.

Moreover, Soeharto often encouraged competition among his
subordinates in order to strengthen his own position. Harmoko has
rare expertise in how to please his boss. Thus, when Soeharto
asked Golkar to investigate whether or not Indonesians would
support his seventh term, Harmoko immediately knew what to do.

It was not clear whether Harmoko did conduct such an
investigation thoroughly. Harmoko came to the conclusion that the
majority of Indonesians would support Soeharto's candidacy.

As it turned out on May 21, Harmoko had told a lie to his boss
and, therefore, should be held responsible for the latter's
downfall.

The only way for Golkar to survive now is to conduct total
reform. One of Golkar's strong points compared to the other two
political parties, the United Development Party and the
Indonesian Democratic Party, is that it has long experience in
combining political stability and economic growth.

The combination of the two equally important goals remains
essential for the nation in the foreseeable future. Golkar's
strength also stems from the fact it can stand above any
divisions in our society. Amid a growing tendency to go back to
the political sectarianism of the 1950s such qualifications can
be a real asset for Golkar.

Notwithstanding its fragility and failure, Golkar still has an
opportunity to reform itself. Given the presence of a new
leadership with moral integrity, Golkar can improve its negative
image.

Some concrete suggestions are worth considering. First, Golkar
should take an initiative to formulate drafts of new political
laws which accommodate people's demand for total reform in the
governing process.

Second, Golkar could propose new economic policies which could
lead the nation out of the present economic crisis.

Last but not least, Golkar has to change its name. The old
name gives an impression that people have to work only and stay
away from politics. This principle is against democracy.

People's participation in politics can never be made taboo by
the ruling elite. With a new name, Golkar can become a real
political party with full rights to participate in politics for
the benefit of the whole nation.

The writer is the head of the school of international
relations at the Catholic University of Parahyangan, Bandung. He
is also a researcher at the Parahyangan Center for International
Studies at the same university.