Time for Golkar to reform itself

By Aleksius Jemadu

BANDUNG (JP): As it turns out, the departure of Soeharto has caused major trouble for the dominant party, Golkar. Suddenly, Golkar seems to have a dark future.

Problems like disintegration in its traditional constituencies, its seemingly unpreparedness to become a fully independent political party, and Harmoko's ineffective leadership have crippled Golkar's prospect to repeat its success in the coming election.

Why then has Golkar's existence become so fragile? Can we identify the roots of its failure? Can it survive without support from the government and the military? Such questions need to be answered honestly before Golkar can design new strategies in an new era of political reform.

It is often argued that, as a young nation, Indonesia really needs the presence of a strong political party with a wide spectrum of popular support. Such a party is needed to ensure political stability in a relatively long term. Strong political parties like Malaysia's UMNO, Mexico's PRI, or Singapore's PAP are necessary as a converging force amid the revolution of rising expectations which, in the short term, cannot be adequately accommodated by the political system.

From the very beginning, Golkar has not really been a fully independent party that fits into the definition of text books in political science.

Instead of becoming the people's instrument to participate in politics, Golkar has tended to be the ruling elite's mechanism to restrict genuine political participation. Golkar was a result of political mobilization by the ruling elite and, as such, it did not represent a genuine political participation.

Golkar was established by the Army in 1964 as an instrument to counterbalance the growing influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). After the PKI was legally banned and Soeharto's New Order government focused more on economic development, Golkar became an effective machine under Soeharto's full control to win politically engineered elections and secure formal legitimacy for his rule.

Neither its leaders nor its constituencies were really committed to Golkar's original mission as an agent of political democratization. The main concern of its leaders from one election to another was how to distribute bureaucratic positions both at the central and local level and how to ensure their economic appropriation.

The distribution of political and economic benefits was a sensitive issue within this organization. Such an issue has become a source of internal conflict among the leaders and it is the main cause of Golkar's disintegration. Thus, what matters most is not so much what they could do for Golkar but what benefits they could obtain.

Periods before and after elections was particularly opportune for Golkar's leaders. Conglomerates and state enterprises would be asked to contribute to Golkar's treasury in exchange for lucrative projects and contracts from the government. Production of jackets and T-shirts during the campaign period was said to be a lucrative business for some Golkar leaders who ran textile industries.

The "doctrine" of Soeharto's infallibility as chairman of Golkar's Supervisory Council was, in fact, a liability for this political party. It is considered by many as a practice of feudalism in Indonesian politics.

Moreover, Soeharto often encouraged competition among his subordinates in order to strengthen his own position. Harmoko has rare expertise in how to please his boss. Thus, when Soeharto asked Golkar to investigate whether or not Indonesians would support his seventh term, Harmoko immediately knew what to do.

It was not clear whether Harmoko did conduct such an investigation thoroughly. Harmoko came to the conclusion that the majority of Indonesians would support Soeharto's candidacy.

As it turned out on May 21, Harmoko had told a lie to his boss and, therefore, should be held responsible for the latter's downfall.

The only way for Golkar to survive now is to conduct total reform. One of Golkar's strong points compared to the other two political parties, the United Development Party and the Indonesian Democratic Party, is that it has long experience in combining political stability and economic growth.

The combination of the two equally important goals remains essential for the nation in the foreseeable future. Golkar's strength also stems from the fact it can stand above any divisions in our society. Amid a growing tendency to go back to the political sectarianism of the 1950s such qualifications can be a real asset for Golkar.

Notwithstanding its fragility and failure, Golkar still has an opportunity to reform itself. Given the presence of a new leadership with moral integrity, Golkar can improve its negative image.

Some concrete suggestions are worth considering. First, Golkar should take an initiative to formulate drafts of new political laws which accommodate people's demand for total reform in the governing process.

Second, Golkar could propose new economic policies which could lead the nation out of the present economic crisis.

Last but not least, Golkar has to change its name. The old name gives an impression that people have to work only and stay away from politics. This principle is against democracy.

People's participation in politics can never be made taboo by the ruling elite. With a new name, Golkar can become a real political party with full rights to participate in politics for the benefit of the whole nation.

The writer is the head of the school of international relations at the Catholic University of Parahyangan, Bandung. He is also a researcher at the Parahyangan Center for International Studies at the same university.