Thoughts on Indonesia after MPR session

Thoughts on Indonesia after MPR session

By Bahtiar Effendy

JAKARTA (JP): The new administration of President Abdurrahman
Wahid has been in a roller-coaster situation since its formation
in October 1999. A honeymoon period was hardly in sight before
the new government encountered predicaments.

Limited resources and political euphoria have not been
sufficient to run a country plagued by severe socio-cultural,
economic, and political crises.

Unfortunately, the new government has evolved in a way which
does not seem to please a sizable portion of society and most
legislators. However, it would be wrong to suggest that the
government does not have a sense of crises, a sense of urgency.

On the contrary, the present situation is a product of the new
regime's commitment to disentangle the seemingly unsolvable
problems. And yet, it is the inability of the government to move
appropriately, to balance the resources at its disposal to
complete the task it is entrusted with, which has led to these
agonies.

It is not unusual for a new regime to be different in style or
substance from its predecessor and for Indonesia this is a must.
Yet even a serious and honest endeavor to create a distinctive
regime is not in itself without political motivations.

The new administration is also motivated by the necessity to
assert its political power -- the capacity to run the state. To
borrow from Samuel Huntington, where "equality of political
participation is growing much more rapidly than the art of
associating together," creating a strong and effective government
is not an easy task.

To "create government that can govern" the President has
chosen to abandon the unwritten negotiated agreements among the
political elite who brought him to power by deserting them in
policies of great importance.

Such agreements saw the participation of political forces
represented by Megawati Soekarnoputri, Akbar Tandjung, Amien
Rais, Wiranto, and Hamzah Haz in the initial cabinet.

The President's decision to forsake such deals was marked by
the removal of Hamzah Haz, Wiranto, Laksamana Sukardi, and Yusuf
Kalla from their respective ministerial posts.

Similarly, the President's execution of his discretionary
power often leads to policies which bring him in contradiction
with other political elites.

The President's "habit" to issue controversial statements; his
seemingly unchangeable decision to withdraw the 1966 decree
of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly on communism;
his confrontation with the Central Bank Governor; and his
inability to prioritize domestic issues over international
traveling are a few examples which have invited criticism, and
even cynicism.

What has made other political elite, especially those in the
legislature, even more displeased is that this administration
does not seem to represent a complete break from the past,
haunted as it is by corruption, collusion, and cronyism.

The decision by the House of Representatives, passed by a
sizable margin of 332 against 63, to question the President's
decision to remove Laksamana Sukardi and Yusuf Kalla from the
cabinet posts is a symbolic gesture.

Growing mistrust among lawmakers toward the President is also
indicated by a plan for the House to look into the alleged
corruption of the National Logistics Agency and the "personal
assistance" of US$2 million to the President from the Sultan of
Brunei.

Those issues could hardly have been damaging to the
President's political reputation, had the General Session of the
People's Consultative Assembly not been scheduled for August.

On that occasion, the President is due to deliver a progress
report on how he has executed the State Guidelines. The address
is not an accountability speech but given the situation nowadays
it could well put the President in a very difficult position.

Despite more un-presidential, disturbing remarks on
troublemakers (biang kerok) in the legislature, which he has
retracted, he might well survive politically -- assuming nothing
more of great negative significance occurs during July.

If the House's decision to question the President on his
removal of Laksamana Sukardi and Yusuf Kalla from their cabinet
posts can be used as an indication, the response to the progress
report will surely be negative.

If that is the case, with the Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle, Golkar and the Islamic parties behind such a reaction,
it still would not turn the meeting into a special session.
Nevertheless such a reaction would be damaging to the President
as he will be considered a failure.

It is not terribly important to ask what the President would
do in that situation. As savvy a political actor as he is, he
will do anything within his power to survive. The pressure is on
him, not on any other political practitioner.

Having read the activism and idealism of Abdurrahman Wahid
over the past two decades, especially during his 15 years with
the Nahdlatul Ulama's central leadership, it is difficult for
this writer to imagine that he will change either his political
outlook or leadership style. He will remain a strong and
dominating figure which requires others to adjust -- and not the
other way around.

Then how far will legislators' tolerances go? Some politicians
have said that Indonesia is racing against time, so the voice of
the House will be even louder, intensifying the scope and level
of the animosity between the President and the legislative body.

Cabinet reshuffling is not entirely useful. It may spark some
hope, but it will not help the administrations' political
performance.

As many have argued, the crux of the matter does not lie in
the President's configuration of political appointees, but more
on the structure, style, and substance of his leadership.

Questions have been raised whether the current leadership has
anything to do with the culture and tradition of Islamic boarding
schools or pesantren -- the socio-religious educational
institutions in which the President has had the luxury to be
intimate with.

Even though a pesantren always places the kyai or religious
figures in a very central position, other factors have to be
taken into account regarding his leadership style.

What sociologists have termed as a patron-client relationship
as well as traditional authority relationship seem to play a
great role in leadership style and social relations. In an
ascriptive society, where respect is gained from family lines,
for instance, rather than merit, the role of these sociological
theories is even greater.

The fact that the President comes from a highly respected
family -- socially, religiously, and politically -- and has an
intellectual capacity which many consider is imbued with "divine"
elements, has led his constituents to be highly dependent on him.

That his 15 years of leadership at the Nahdlatul Ulama was
virtually uncontested only reasserts his dominant capacity.

His ability to honor the negotiated settlements with the
political elite could change the uneasiness between them.

And yet, given the structure and style of the President's
leadership, it is unlikely that this honoring of deals will ever
take place. Therefore, Indonesia's political situation will
continue to be characterized by an uneasy relationship between
the President and other political elite, including legislators.

This would be the looming challenge in any agenda to pave the
way to economic recovery, political stability, and social
integration.

The writer teaches at the postgraduate study program at the
State Institute for Islamic Studies in Jakarta and studied
Abdurrahman Wahid's political thoughts and actions for his
Masters thesis and doctoral dissertation in political science.