Thoughts on Indonesia after MPR session

By Bahtiar Effendy

JAKARTA (JP): The new administration of President Abdurrahman Wahid has been in a roller-coaster situation since its formation in October 1999. A honeymoon period was hardly in sight before the new government encountered predicaments.

Limited resources and political euphoria have not been sufficient to run a country plagued by severe socio-cultural, economic, and political crises.

Unfortunately, the new government has evolved in a way which does not seem to please a sizable portion of society and most legislators. However, it would be wrong to suggest that the government does not have a sense of crises, a sense of urgency.

On the contrary, the present situation is a product of the new regime's commitment to disentangle the seemingly unsolvable problems. And yet, it is the inability of the government to move appropriately, to balance the resources at its disposal to complete the task it is entrusted with, which has led to these agonies.

It is not unusual for a new regime to be different in style or substance from its predecessor and for Indonesia this is a must. Yet even a serious and honest endeavor to create a distinctive regime is not in itself without political motivations.

The new administration is also motivated by the necessity to assert its political power -- the capacity to run the state. To borrow from Samuel Huntington, where "equality of political participation is growing much more rapidly than the art of associating together," creating a strong and effective government is not an easy task.

To "create government that can govern" the President has chosen to abandon the unwritten negotiated agreements among the political elite who brought him to power by deserting them in policies of great importance.

Such agreements saw the participation of political forces represented by Megawati Soekarnoputri, Akbar Tandjung, Amien Rais, Wiranto, and Hamzah Haz in the initial cabinet.

The President's decision to forsake such deals was marked by the removal of Hamzah Haz, Wiranto, Laksamana Sukardi, and Yusuf Kalla from their respective ministerial posts.

Similarly, the President's execution of his discretionary power often leads to policies which bring him in contradiction with other political elites.

The President's "habit" to issue controversial statements; his seemingly unchangeable decision to withdraw the 1966 decree of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly on communism; his confrontation with the Central Bank Governor; and his inability to prioritize domestic issues over international traveling are a few examples which have invited criticism, and even cynicism.

What has made other political elite, especially those in the legislature, even more displeased is that this administration does not seem to represent a complete break from the past, haunted as it is by corruption, collusion, and cronyism.

The decision by the House of Representatives, passed by a sizable margin of 332 against 63, to question the President's decision to remove Laksamana Sukardi and Yusuf Kalla from the cabinet posts is a symbolic gesture.

Growing mistrust among lawmakers toward the President is also indicated by a plan for the House to look into the alleged corruption of the National Logistics Agency and the "personal assistance" of US$2 million to the President from the Sultan of Brunei.

Those issues could hardly have been damaging to the President's political reputation, had the General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly not been scheduled for August.

On that occasion, the President is due to deliver a progress report on how he has executed the State Guidelines. The address is not an accountability speech but given the situation nowadays it could well put the President in a very difficult position.

Despite more un-presidential, disturbing remarks on troublemakers (biang kerok) in the legislature, which he has retracted, he might well survive politically -- assuming nothing more of great negative significance occurs during July.

If the House's decision to question the President on his removal of Laksamana Sukardi and Yusuf Kalla from their cabinet posts can be used as an indication, the response to the progress report will surely be negative.

If that is the case, with the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, Golkar and the Islamic parties behind such a reaction, it still would not turn the meeting into a special session. Nevertheless such a reaction would be damaging to the President as he will be considered a failure.

It is not terribly important to ask what the President would do in that situation. As savvy a political actor as he is, he will do anything within his power to survive. The pressure is on him, not on any other political practitioner.

Having read the activism and idealism of Abdurrahman Wahid over the past two decades, especially during his 15 years with the Nahdlatul Ulama's central leadership, it is difficult for this writer to imagine that he will change either his political outlook or leadership style. He will remain a strong and dominating figure which requires others to adjust -- and not the other way around.

Then how far will legislators' tolerances go? Some politicians have said that Indonesia is racing against time, so the voice of the House will be even louder, intensifying the scope and level of the animosity between the President and the legislative body.

Cabinet reshuffling is not entirely useful. It may spark some hope, but it will not help the administrations' political performance.

As many have argued, the crux of the matter does not lie in the President's configuration of political appointees, but more on the structure, style, and substance of his leadership.

Questions have been raised whether the current leadership has anything to do with the culture and tradition of Islamic boarding schools or pesantren -- the socio-religious educational institutions in which the President has had the luxury to be intimate with.

Even though a pesantren always places the kyai or religious figures in a very central position, other factors have to be taken into account regarding his leadership style.

What sociologists have termed as a patron-client relationship as well as traditional authority relationship seem to play a great role in leadership style and social relations. In an ascriptive society, where respect is gained from family lines, for instance, rather than merit, the role of these sociological theories is even greater.

The fact that the President comes from a highly respected family -- socially, religiously, and politically -- and has an intellectual capacity which many consider is imbued with "divine" elements, has led his constituents to be highly dependent on him.

That his 15 years of leadership at the Nahdlatul Ulama was virtually uncontested only reasserts his dominant capacity.

His ability to honor the negotiated settlements with the political elite could change the uneasiness between them.

And yet, given the structure and style of the President's leadership, it is unlikely that this honoring of deals will ever take place. Therefore, Indonesia's political situation will continue to be characterized by an uneasy relationship between the President and other political elite, including legislators.

This would be the looming challenge in any agenda to pave the way to economic recovery, political stability, and social integration.

The writer teaches at the postgraduate study program at the State Institute for Islamic Studies in Jakarta and studied Abdurrahman Wahid's political thoughts and actions for his Masters thesis and doctoral dissertation in political science.