Thorough maritime foreign policy needed

Thorough maritime foreign policy needed

Siswo Pramono, Deputy Director for Global Politics,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta

Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, an American historian and
naval strategist, inferred in 1890, that whoever controlled the
sea would likewise control global politics. If his theory
applies to Indonesia, the world largest archipelago, then we need
a comprehensive maritime policy.

And if geopolitics is meant to be a tool of analysis for the
making of such policies, then, for Indonesia, location, size,
demography, and natural resources matter. As such, the strategic
questions are these.

What is the strategic significance of the Indonesian
archipelago, which is located in Asian continent, with the
dawning powers of China and India, and Australian -- with an
increasingly assertive government portraying itself as an
important link with the "old" Anglo-American alliance -- for the
national and regional security?

As Australia is now openly willing to support the U.S.
ballistic missile defense program, and despite the existing
Southeast Asian nuclear weapon free-zone treaty (although none of
the nuclear weapon states has signed its protocol), do we have
the capacity to control the transit passages of warships through
our waters, with some of them, perhaps, having nuclear weapons on
board? Are we prepared for the consequence of incidents, or
accidents, in our region, involving foreign warships with nuclear
weapons?

In other words, what is the strategic significance of being
located at the point connecting the Indian Ocean (with extensions
to conflict prone water ways such as the Strait of Hormus, the
Red Sea, and the Suez Canal) and the Pacific Ocean (with the
troubled waters of the South China Sea)?

What is the significance of being a nation of 210 million
people residing in such a strategic location? Are we creative,
educated, and determined enough to explore and exploit this
advantage? Or, are we so indifferent or uneducated that all of
the aforementioned factors turn into our strategic disadvantages?

Do (or when will) we have the capacity to defend our some
17,000 islands, or patrol a surface of 5, 193,025 square
kilometers?

The facts are ironic. For instance, out of 6.3 million metric
tons of fish -- our annual maximum sustainable yield -- and a
total annual allowable catch of some 5 million tons, we only
manage to catch about 1 million tons of fish. Some 1.5 million
tons of fish are pilfered by our "friends" in the region.

Amid our struggle for economic recovery, we loose two to four
billion dollars a year as a consequence of poaching.

We should not ignore the fact that countries in our region
have developed their respective maritime capacities. In Southeast
Asia, Thailand and the Philippines are now asserting their status
as distant water fishing nations.

In the South and South West Pacific, the fishing industry has
become a main component of the economy of Australia, New Zealand,
and the small island states.

In East Asia, China is increasingly able to project its power
over the South China Sea. And, in South Asia, India increasingly
enhances its naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

While, in Southeast Asia, interstate wars have been absent for
almost three decades, and thus military invasion in the near
future is unlikely, historically any invasion of Indonesia has
involved naval operations.

With the same token, and also from a military perspective,
Indonesia cannot win its war against the secessionists unless it
has the capacity to deploy an effective naval blockade in the
affected regions (or islands).

In either case, while refraining from involvement in the
possible regional arms race, an effective navy has an important
role in the defense of our archipelago.

Do our maritime policies lack vision? In fact, through the
Djuanda Declaration of 1956, Indonesia "invented" the concept of
archipelagic outlook. This concept followed decades of diplomatic
struggle and was eventually elevated as an important principle of
the international law of the sea.

But, it is another irony, that our amended Constitution, while
asserting in Article 25 that our unitary state is archipelagic in
nature, refrains from further elaboration on our maritime
geopolitics. Law No 37/1999 on Foreign Relations, too, is silent
on our maritime foreign policy.

Our future is at sea. We will increasingly deal with various
international aspects of maritime affairs:

o Since the open sea has no boundaries, our foreign policy
will increasingly deal with transnational issues on the use of
oceans, including the protection of the marine environment.

o Since most of our borders are sea borders, and we share sea
borders with, at least, ten neighbors -- India, Thailand,
Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines, Palau, Papua New
Guinea, Australia, and East Timor -- our foreign policy will be
beset with the task of preventing or resolving possible border
disputes. Worse, we do not have a law on state borders, nor even
a comprehensive maritime map.

o Since most illegal fishing is committed by fishermen from
neighboring countries, in particular Thailand, the Philippines,
Vietnam, and China, our foreign policy should be aimed at finding
a regional solution.

o Since our archipelago is vulnerable to military invasion,
infiltration, secessionist movements, and transnational crimes
(i.e., terrorism, people smuggling, drug trafficking, piracy,
illegal trafficking of weapons, etc), our foreign policy should
help promote maritime cooperation that sustains regional security
and resilience.

o Since our naval capability is poor, our foreign policy is
beset with the task of finding foreign partners to help
strengthen our navy and coast guards.

o Most importantly, since our archipelago, exclusive economic
zone, and continental shelf are rich in natural resources, our
foreign policy should be bent toward transferring the foreign
technology, know-how, and capital, that are badly needed to
develop the economic potential of our maritime zone.

It is time to build a more comprehensive foundation of
maritime geopolitics into our Constitution. Maritime geopolitics,
in the existing law dealing with foreign relations, should also
be elaborated further.

Our maritime policy should be implemented through the
concerted efforts of maritime diplomacy under the coordination of
the Department of Foreign Affairs. And, as a matter of
technicality, it is thus important for the Department of Foreign
Affairs to establish a special operational unit with the sole
task of coordinating the various aspects of maritime foreign
affairs.

The opinions stated above are solely those of the author.