Thinking we can do it ourselves

Jay Taylor, The Washington Post

The real war in Afghanistan is over. The American role in crushing the Taliban and in promoting the subsequent effort at nation-building has been impressive. And last week, the loya jirga, or Afghan grand council, seemed to reconcile the will of the country's people with that of the international community when it elected interim leader Hamid Karzai by an overwhelming majority to be the country's president for the next 18 months.

But now, in the ill-defined mopping up stage of the military endeavor, the United States is making the tragic mistake of taking upon itself the key role in the ground war. It is flailing about in the same fog that was its tactical undoing in rural Vietnam and that brought ruin upon the Soviets in Afghanistan -- not knowing who is friend, who is foe.

Our combat personnel have proven themselves brave and professional. But they are operating in an enormous, geographically forbidding country in the midst of an alien, proud and fractious society they cannot possibly understand.

It is a serious error to assume that U.S. and other Western units -- with limited time in-country and by relying on feuding warlords for local political intelligence -- can be effective as the main force against entrenched guerrilla fighters.

Soon after the collapse of the Taliban, U.S. operations became ensnared in a series of mistaken attacks on friendly or neutral Afghans because of faulty intelligence. Exact death tolls are hard to come by; the following information comes from official reports and newspaper articles.

On Dec. 20, American planes killed 50 to 60 people in a convoy that Karzai later said consisted of tribal leaders headed for his inauguration as interim president. Afghan officials claimed the Americans had been duped by a local warlord into calling in air attacks on his enemies. Similar charges were made about a Jan. 24 raid by American Special Forces on Hazar Qadam in southern Afghanistan, which killed either 16 people (the Pentagon's figure) or 21 (the Afghan figure).

On May 13, American soldiers and aircraft killed five Afghans in Deh Rawud in southern Afghanistan, all of whom local officials said had no ties to the terrorists, according to the New York Times.

On May 24, according to the Times, U.S. airborne troops assaulted the village of Bandi Temur near Kandahar, killing a tribal elder thought to be 100 years old. According to district officials none of those killed or detained had ties to the Taliban. On May 31, in a predawn raid near Gardez, American Special Forces killed three friendly Afghan soldiers.

Understandably, provincial and district officials loyal to the Kabul government are expressing dismay at these mistaken raids. One senior Afghan commander said villagers are comparing the current tactics of the American-led coalition to the Soviet Army's brutal raids in the 1980s.

Karzai and his senior officials are alarmed by the tragic stream of deadly errors, and the support this gives to pro- Taliban and other Islamic militants opposed to the new government. As in South Vietnam 30 years ago, however, the central authorities are reluctant to voice criticism of the Americans on whose economic and military support they depend.

Unfortunate mistakes aside, what are the current ground operations by U.S. and other Western forces accomplishing? Judging from the comments of Afghan commanders and American troops and reporters in the field -- as well as what Pentagon briefers say (and don't say) -- this year American-led operations on the ground have apparently neither killed nor captured significant numbers of Taliban or al-Qaeda members, never mind their leaders.

The Western allies that have joined in the U.S.-led ground operations have a similar track record. The Australians recently destroyed a huge arms cache in the mountains near Pakistan but a local warlord claimed the material belonged to him. During the month of May, Australian, British and Canadian troops scoured the mountains in several operations, which in Vietnam were called "search and destroy" missions, but apparently found no enemy personnel. The Canadians, having lost four soldiers to "friendly fire," recently went home.

There are probably several reasons why, after the Taliban collapse, the Pentagon decided to take over the main combat role from our Afghan allies. The spectacular success of a handful of very small U.S. special operations teams -- working with the Northern Alliance during the early days of the war -- no doubt encouraged the decision.

The public image of Special Operations was at an all-time high. U.S. military commanders, in both Special Forces and infantry, clearly wanted to give on-the-ground experience to as many service personnel as possible -- the best type of training.

There were also political factors. In the early stages of the conflict, civilian unilateralists in the Pentagon and the media were insisting we could not depend on the Northern Alliance or, for that matter, on any Muslim ally. They believed we could only win in Afghanistan by doing much of the ground fighting ourselves.

Whatever the reasons for this decision, there is now an urgent need for a reappraisal. Among other things, the Pentagon and the CIA should cease their dependence on quarreling warlords for political and tactical information.

On the military side, America's emphasis should be on building up the central Afghan army under Karzai. The Americans are, of course, training and arming this new national Afghan army, but according to news reports the funds for this project are limited, the weapons provided outdated, and the recruits mostly non- Pashtuns -- whose home areas are where the Taliban and al-Qaeda holdouts are ensconced.

What the Afghan army needs are adequate funds, good weapons, and U.S. tactical air support and technical intelligence. If, with such backing, the Afghans cannot themselves root out the terrorist remnants among the thousands of villages and the colossal mountain ranges of their own country, the Americans, British and Australians will never do so. With the success of the loya jirga last week, we now have what many thought to be impossible only a few months ago -- a truly legitimate and moderate government in Kabul.

We must be careful not to undermine popular support for this government with an American military presence in the countryside that wears out its welcome.

The writer is a former U.S. Marine and was a deputy secretary of state for intelligence and research in the Reagan administration.