The U.S., China and Asia

The following are excerpts of a speech given by former U.S. secretary of state Dr. Henry Kissinger at the 21st Century Forum in Beijing.

BEIJING: The United Sates has a vital interest in peace and stability in Asia and in constructive relations with the nations bordering the Pacific. When American policy-makers think about how to achieve these objectives, they generally focus on Asia's economic dynamism. Asia is indeed the fastest-growing region in the world, containing half the world's Gross National Product (GNP) and population.

But American interests in Asia go far beyond the economic realm. All the major wars which America has been involved in during the postwar period had their origins in Asia.

World peace depends on the relationship of the nations of Asia to each other and to the rest of the world. All the changes taking place in the countries of Asia have certain common features:

* Tension between the internationalism required by global economies and communication and the nationalism which, in some countries, is the essence of political cohesion.

* An important difference between the nations of Europe and those of Asia. Whatever their differences, military conflict between the nations of Europe is inconceivable; strategic considerations are a negligible aspect of the conduct of their relations with each other. The opposite is true in Asia. Several nations in Asia perceive each other partly as strategic rivals and potential threats (excluding the relations of the Association of Southeast Asian (ASEAN) nations -- except perhaps Vietnam -- to each other). They are at least as conscious of their mutual rivalries as they are of common purposes.

* A perception in every Asian nation that American policy is itself in a state of flux and that their leaders are not always predictable.

This state of affairs has required the U.S. to adapt its role in Asia since World War II. Unlike in Europe, the U.S. has done so through a series of bilateral security and political arrangements which, if discarded, could collapse the whole structure, and which make bilateral relations a subject of special sensitivity.

Let me illustrate this with the examples of three emerging great powers. Japan is in the process of transforming its political institutions and probably the orientation of its postwar foreign policy. The electoral system is changing, with as yet unpredictable consequences. When the process is completed, after one or two more elections, it is likely that a new dominant political party will appear. But its character will change from what has heretofore been familiar.

The postwar generation of Japanese leaders lived with the trauma of defeat, sheltered its foreign policy under the American security treaty and emphasized the economic rebuilding of the shattered country. But the period of political self-abnegations is clearly ending. Japan's policy is bound to become more national and, above all, more political.

India is shifting towards a greater readiness to embrace market economics and a more active foreign policy. As India emerges into great power status, it can be expected to return to the policies of the British Raj which were, after all, conceived by the Indian civil service under the viceroys located first in Calcutta and, towards the end of British rule, in New Delhi.

It will seek an influential role in the area extending from Aden to Singapore. This will produce a need for adjustments with China in Tibet and Myanmar and with Indonesia, Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, China over Southeast Asia. In issues of nuclear proliferation, it is increasingly clear that Indian and American approaches are far from parallel.

The key country is China. For over 20 years after 1949, China and the U.S. had no relations at all. Between 1971 and 1989, they achieved something approaching a strategic partnership. Since then, relations declined steadily -- the result first of the impact of Congressional pressures for human rights and, more recently, a cycle of action and reaction over Taiwan.

Some in America watching China's rise to industrial strength are calling for a containment policy of China. This is an illusion. Unlike the containment policy of a generation ago, it will have no takers. It will force every nation of Asia to take sides, with uncertain outcomes and with a guaranteed enhancement of Asian nationalism.

America's ability to influence Japan will dramatically decline. Korea may turn into a tinderbox. Nations with hegemonical aspirations -- or even territorial claims -- will sense new opportunities.

In the last month, the visit to China of Mr Tony Lake, President Clinton's security adviser, has opened hopeful new perspectives for cooperation. There is growing recognition in both American parties that stability in Asia is most likely if both China and the U.S. participate in shaping Asia's future.

Conflict with China would tempt both countries to organize the rest of Asia against the other, encouraging virulent nationalism. Nothing in the contemporary world calls for a policy of isolating China; the weight of our interest is in precisely the direction of cooperation.

In recent years, the U.S. has too often permitted itself to become embroiled in conflicts with many of the key Asian nations that should be its friends. These conflicts are often generated by domestic pressures on Congress unrelated to a long-term strategy.

Relations with both Japan and China have been characterized by far too many confrontations. On many of these, the American position has had much merit.

It is surely a legitimate objective of the U.S. government to gain greater access to the Asian market. And a nation founded by people who turned their backs on their birthplace, believing their values to be universally applicable, will always to some extent carry on its tradition of commitment to democracy and freedom.

But America has sometimes lost track of the equally important interest in developing political state-to-state relations with our Asian friends as a key element of Asian stability.

Foreign policy always involves trade-offs. Giving excessive weight either to the economic side or to human rights had produced a confrontational style that accentuates the impression of potentially clashing national interests and is frequently self-defeating.

This will haunt us as both Japan and China increasingly articulate their own global policy and if they come to view America as domineering. In the future, America must pay much greater attention to the elaboration of parallel political strategies on which close American-Japanese and American-Chinese relations will increasingly depend.

This is a particular challenge in America's relationship with China. For the foreseeable future, America and China have a parallel interest in equilibrium in Asia. Both countries have their reasons for opposing the domination of Asia by a single power, what the Shanghai Communique called hegemony.

China wants the U.S. as part of its relationships with powerful neighbors and to contribute to China's growth. America needs Chinese cooperation on these matters as well, on nuclear proliferation, on the transfer of weapons technology, and on establishing a free global trading system.

These are the sort of issues which should be key elements of the Sino-American dialogue at least for the next decade. If they moved to the center of the Sino-American relationship, they would facilitate dealing with other, so-called "soft" issues by providing a strategic context.

In the course of China's long history, its leaders have frequently taken account of the special psychologies and values of their counterparts, provided such an action also served Chinese interests. What they will not accept is the implication that America bestows its cooperation as a special in a reciprocal basis, to be withdrawn at will, and that it uses what should be its cooperation as a form of blackmail.

The central issues now looming before the two governments are proliferation, human rights and Taiwan.

With respect to human rights, any American administration of either party will be concerned about values shared by most Americans.

The time has come to pursue these goals by normal diplomatic methods and to end the pressures of sanctions or the threat of sanctions.

With respect to non-proliferation, I believe that the Chinese leaders are sufficiently experienced and sophisticated to realize that China is as endangered by unrestricted proliferation as any other country, including the U.S.

Rather than deal with this as a matter of unilateral American legislation, it is time for a high-level dialogue to give expression to this common interest. It is my impression that progress is being made in that direction.

The Taiwanese issue had been quiescent for several decades until the crises of the past year. From their first contact with America in 1971, Chinese leaders have insisted that Taiwan is a domestic Chinese issue and that they are determined to maintain the territorial integrity of China.

They have also informed us that they are patient about final solutions and have several times offered negotiations to Taiwan. Six American presidents have affirmed that they recognize only one China and that they will not support a two-China or a one- China, one-Taiwan policy. These pledges remain valid.

They have expressed their hope for a peaceful solution and welcomed initiatives for negotiations between the Chinese parties which had been offered on a number of occasions by the Chinese government.

If this framework is respected, it should permit a constructive evolution which enables both sides to work together to create conditions in Asia in which their overriding common interest can be affirmed.

The U.S. and China have a common stake in the stability and progress of Asia. The nations of the world can only benefit from a prospering Asia and an American commitment to its future. A conference such as this will surely contribute to this important task.