The UN's former role in Irian Jaya

The UN's former role in Irian Jaya

By John Saltford

LONDON (JP): Recently declassified United Nations documents
shed new light on an episode from the 1960s which should serve as
a warning to the organization today.

The UN's recent monitoring exercise in East Timor took place
exactly 30 years after a similar exercise in Indonesian-
controlled West New Guinea (which became Irian Jaya in 1963)
ended in violence and controversy.

The people of West New Guinea -- which President Abdurrahman
Wahid has now proposed to be renamed Papua -- were promised
independence by their Dutch rulers, but Indonesia claimed the
territory and threatened to invade.

To avoid this, the Netherlands signed an agreement in 1962
transferring control to the UN on condition that the people would
have self-determination within six years. In reality, this was
little more then a face-saving device for the Dutch. Within seven
months, without any consultation with the habitants, the UN had
pulled out leaving Indonesia in charge.

Even during the brief UN administration, Indonesian troops
were permitted to operate as part of the international security
force. As a consequence, the international administrators could
only function with the cooperation of Jakarta.

In a situation echoed recently in East Timor, the Indonesian
military was then free to intimidate the population and organize
pro-Jakarta militias throughout the whole UN period.

In confidential reports, senior UN administrators expressed
cynicism and despondency about their mission. One remarked that
the Irianese had a misplaced and "pathetic trust" in the UN to
safeguard their rights.

A second observed, "I have yet to meet any thinking, sober,
generally responsible Irianese who sees any good in the coming
link with Indonesia." Another advised that in the event of local
unrest; "we have sufficient forces to control the situation -- a
whiff of grapeshot can easily control things if that is what the
UN wants".

With regard to their long-term commitment to the Irianese
people, one newly arrived senior UN official predicted; "That
there will ultimately be quite serious resistance to the
Indonesians is, I think certain, therefore from the point of view
of expediency it behooves the UN to depart as soon as the
Indonesians are in fact thick enough on the ground".

By the time the UN returned in 1968 to prepare for the
promised "act of free choice," the Irianese had already
experienced five years of Indonesian rule.

Economic mismanagement and military brutality ensured that
opposition to Jakarta was widespread. In 1969 Gen. Sarwo Edhie,
Irian Jaya's military commander, remarked to a British official
that the Irianese had been spoiled by the Dutch and "badly need
civilizing". They were also "lazy and half were naked".

At the same time an American diplomat visiting the territory
noted that; "The Indonesians have tried everything from bombing
them with B 26's, to shelling and mortaring them, but a
continuous state of semi-rebellion persists".

Jakarta, however, was determined that this opposition would
play no part in the "act of free choice". To ensure this, they
declared that a referendum was impractical because of the
"primitiveness" of the people.

Ortiz Sanz, head of the UN mission, agreed with them. Instead,
he proposed a "mixed" system which would allow direct voting in
towns, while other areas relied on some form of "collective
consultation". This, he advised the authorities, "represents the
minimum requirement to satisfy world public opinion".

Jakarta was unimpressed and replied that "collective
consultation" would be adopted throughout the whole territory.
Although UN Secretary-General U Thant refused to condone such an
undemocratic system, the UN and the Dutch had secretly endorsed
this method in 1963.

At this point, the UN should have pulled out, declaring that
they could no longer be associated with such an openly
undemocratic process. This might have encouraged Soeharto to
think again. At the very least it would have denied him the
legitimacy that UN participation gave.

Instead, Sanz and his team remained while the Indonesians
began selecting "people's representatives" for the "collective
consultation." At the same time, Soeharto warned publicly that
any vote against Indonesia would be "treason".

During their stay, the UN team received numerous petitions
from Irianese denouncing the whole exercise and calling for a
proper referendum, but Sanz was unimpressed.

In a confidential report to his superiors, he questioned the
relevance of such views; "as you are very well aware, only a very
insignificant percentage of the population is capable or has
interest in any political actions or even thoughts".

His attitude seemed to reflect a deliberate ploy by the UN
leadership to justify their collaboration with Jakarta. In
support of it, they were even prepared to mislead the UN General
Assembly, claiming in the official secretary-general's report
that most petitions received were pro-Indonesian. UN documents
now prove that the opposite was true.

As the vote drew closer, Sanz realized that Indonesia was not
going to permit even the appearance of a democratic process. In
May 1969, he cabled the UN secretary-general to plead for a
postponement of the vote until the political freedoms and human
rights situation improved -- he was told no.

In June, he tried to arrange a meeting with Soeharto, in what
he described would be a "last chance" to create democratic
conditions in the territory. Soeharto, however, was too busy to
see him. Meanwhile, an armed rebellion continued as thousands of
Irianese tribesmen rose up in an attempt to drive the Indonesians
out.

Finally, in July and August, Indonesia assembled about 1,000
carefully selected "representatives" for a series of voting
ceremonies. Foreign diplomats and a few journalists were then
invited and food and music was laid on. Once everyone was in
place, Indonesian generals and officials were paraded shoulder
high by Irianese in a carefully rehearsed display of loyalty and
obedience.

Then one by one, a selection of the "representatives" came
forward to declare their love for Indonesia. It says something
about the arrogance of Soeharto that he saw no need to permit
even one dissenting voice. Instead, the authorities announced
that the final result was an unanimous decision by the Irianese
to remain with Indonesia.

In November of that year, Sanz's report to the UN General
Assembly concluded that an act of free choice had taken place;
"in accordance with Indonesian practice," despite Jakarta's
failure to protect the rights and freedoms of the Irianese. The
Assembly passed a resolution "taking note" of the result by 84
votes to none, with 30 abstentions. An African-backed amendment,
calling for a second act of Irianese self-determination was
rejected.

A secret British document at the time commented that UN
members wanted the issue "cleared out of the way with the minimum
of fuss." The UN Secretariat, it added; "is only too anxious to
get shot of the problem as quickly as possible". The organization
then got on with other business and West New Guinea disappeared
from the international stage.

It is inconceivable that the present secretary-general would
allow the organization to be associated with such a crudely
orchestrated denial of political and human rights. In East Timor,
about 1,000 UN officials were in place for the vote, compared
with a purely token 16 who were present in West New Guinea.

One can argue that Indonesia, like all states, was simply
pursuing what it considered to be its own national interest. The
UN, however, is supposed to have higher standards of behavior.
Thirty years later, it is time for a re-examination of U Thant's
role in the denial of Irianese self-determination.

The writer is a Ph.D student at the Department of Politics and
Asian Studies, University of Hull in the United Kingdom, and a
RISD Southeast Asian specialist at the Public Record Office in
Kew Surrey.