The United Nations in the post Cold War era (2)

The following is an article based on a transcript of a speech given by Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie at the Military Staff College in Kuala Lumpur recently. This is the second of three articles in a series.

KUALA LUMPUR: What was the main issue in relation to the use of the two bombs if there was no military or strategic demand?

After the defeat of Nazi Germany, with Eastern Europe being the focal point for consideration, the USSR, for the sake of Russian security, insisted on a new frontier for Germany, which would remove Russia's disturbing fears of attacks through Poland, as had been done twice by Germany in recent times.

Moscow succeeded in this because neither the UK nor the U.S. wanted the USSR to be concerned with Japan and East Asia after the defeat of Japan. They felt that the USSR must be denied any claim to a greater share of control over China and Manchuria.

The U.S., with the agreement of Britain, was given the sole control over Japan and East Asia. And the USSR's "spherism" over Eastern Europe and much of Germany was seen as something unacceptable to "universalism" which must be frustrated. That could only be done through diplomatic pressure, for which there had to be some leverage.

Truman then decided to deploy his "master card", the atom bomb, to demonstrate its power to the USSR so that in any future diplomatic confrontation with the USSR over Eastern Europe and its policy of "spherism", that state would be overawed by the might of the bomb and allow to be dictated to.

In April 1945, then secretary of state, Brynes, advised Truman that the atomic bomb would permit the U.S. "to dictate our terms at the end of the war." The bomb was no longer mandatory to save lives of Allied Forces.

With the atomic power in hand, Truman, according to Churchill, "generally bossed the whole meeting" at Potsdam. Truman told Stalin during a break at the Potsdam Conference that the U.S. had a weapon of unusual force.

Stalin, without showing surprise, simply expressed his hope that the U.S. would use the weapon against Japan. The dropping of Fat Man and Little Boy over the two Japanese cities, therefore was intended primarily to strengthen the Anglo-American alliance against the USSR in determining the new world order. The atomic bomb was later successfully developed by the USSR, although never used.

If we follow this scenario carefully we cannot fail to see that the ovule of the Cold War is to be found in the wide difference in the visions of the allies with regard to the post- war era.

On the side ruled by the fear of economic depression, such as that which followed the end of World War I -- the U.S. and UK alliance -- the policy of hegemonic "universalism" was embraced so that the world markets would be open to them as well as to the political systems and values which they advocated. Critics would brand this policy "neo-colonialism."

On the other side, the USSR, fearing the security of Russia would again be threatened, favored a policy which eventually was recognized as a "sphere of hegemony" when Moscow advocated the spread of communism ala Stalin everywhere as enunciated by Zhdanov.

It is difficult to see how the respective policies of the allies in World War II could be reconciled. Each side had begun, even before the war ended in Asia, the game of rivalry with all its implications.

Each side would be setting out the rules of the game, while pretending they both agreed on the semantics of such concepts as democracy or human rights inserted into the Charter of the United Nations, which would later be interpreted on the basis of the Humpty Dumpty principle.

At first the frosty confrontation was confined to personalities and direct participants with words exchanged in polite euphemisms.

The Cold War exploded into the open after Churchill lost his job and went to Missouri, the U.S., where he made his "iron curtain" address, in the presence of President Truman, at a public meeting at Fulton on March 5, 1946. Churchill accused the USSR for having let down an iron curtain from Stettin in the Baltic for Trieste in the Adriatic.

Churchill urged the use of the principles of the Charter of the UN, "supported by the whole strength of the English-speaking world and all its connections," to prevent any molestation by the Soviets.

Churchill advocated that the doctrine of the balance of power was unsound since it had to work on narrow margins. Please note his reference to the exclusivism of the English speaking world.

On March 14, 1946, Stalin responded sharply that Churchill's speech was dangerous and "calculated to sow the seed of discord among the allied governments."

Thus began an open war of words between the U.S./UK allies and the USSR, supported by the mass media, depending on their respective affiliation, commitment or conviction.

With that began the arms race with the upgrading of the development of nuclear capability and other diabolical weapons of mass destruction so formidable as to impose effective deterrents upon their employment.

Both sides were in a state of preparedness as a sure guarantee of security, with the two most powerful groups each regarding itself as weak in the face of the other. It was a mutuality of madness, each side requiring the armament reduction game to be played according to its own rules, thus leading to a deadlock.

The United Nations became an arena where the Cold War was fought. In fact, there were two spots in this amphitheater. One was the Security Council, with veto power held by the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France and China as permanent members.

This veto power has made the Security Council the cemetery of good intentions, contrary to the concept of democracy. The other spot in this United Nations amphitheater is the General Assembly and the various specialized agencies.

Here each member of the organization and its agencies is free to express its own mind. Hence, members of the UN became targets to be won over by each side in the Cold War, through financial aid, flattery, bribery, even blackmail.

When one of its specialized agencies could not serve the purpose of one side, that agency would suffer a boycott and be deprived of funds. The noble concepts and high ideals contained in the Charter of the UN and of the Specialized Agencies were to serve as tools to chisel out the kind of world the victors of World War II wanted.

As part of the Cold War tactics, the USSR walked out of the Berlin Control Council and set the stage for the Berlin blockade, which was responded to by the U.S./UK alliance in the great Berlin, airlift, which saved the West from expulsion from Berlin.

The West then started to consolidate, as a response to the various activities of the USSR, by creating NATO and establishing the Federal Republic of Germany to include the Western Zone of Berlin for economic purposes. This signaled to the USSR that any further expansion of its "spherism" would be resisted.

However, the U.S., having no overarching ideology to combat communism, could only resort to "containment."

As the Cold War raged on, the arms race, with the plan for the development of Strategic Defense Initiative, became more intense.

Each side regarded the arms build up of the other as beyond defense with an element of aggressive intent. It was financially exhausting to both sides.

The Korean War, which was at once a hot and a cold war, did not see the use of the atomic weapon. Until today that peninsula remains divided.

Once I went to Panmunjom and witnessed one of the greatest anomalies of the United Nations. On the UN side, the chairman was always from among U.S. troops. There was no rotation of its chairmanship.

It could, therefore, could hardly be regarded as a force belonging to the international community. On the North Korean side, the chairman was always a North Korean, but seated as his adviser was a Chinese officer form the Peoples' Liberation Army.

I found it hard to reconcile that China, then already a member of the Security Council, should continue to sit opposite the so- called forces of the UN. The scene was mind-boggling and the UN appeared completely out of place, where I thought its raison d'etre and role could be made most effective.

Stalin was confident that the USSR could expand its sphere of hegemony by using Cold War methods. He had tasted the fruit of his agreement with the U.S./UK alliance by discontinuing support for the Greek guerrilla war.

In return the USSR would have a free hand in Rumania, Bulgaria and the Balkans. That concession by the U.S./UK alliance legitimated the "spherism." The Cold War also gave USSR the opportunity to instigate communist uprisings outside Europe in Burma, Indochina, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, while in Japan and India, the communist parties were given support and encouragement.

The Asian strategy was worked out together between Stalin and Mao. That strategy suffered a severe setback when the USSR and China had serious ideological differences.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) came into being after some countries saw the danger of taking sides. For what it was worth, NAM did help to blunt some of the edges of conflict even if NAM itself quite often became the target of the Cold Warriors of both sides on the basis of "if you are not with me you are against me."

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