The tricky road to a legitimate government

By Jusuf Wanandi

JAKARTA (JP): The expectations that the recent general election would solve the Indonesian crisis were premature. It does not recognize the complexities of the crisis and the state of political development of the country resulting from 32 years of former president Soeharto's authoritarian regime.

It is, however, an important milestone in Indonesia's political development. If a legitimate government can be established in the near future, then a basis will be laid down for Indonesia to start anew.

What are the chances of that happening? As it stands now three months after the elections, the slow vote count, the almost chaotic operations of the General Elections Commission (KPU), the bickering of political parties, the scandals of the Habibie regime -- among other things, the Bank Bali scandal, and the abominable way Habibie got rid of East Timor as well as its possible impact on Aceh and the rest of Indonesia -- do not point to anything promising in that prospect.

The outlook is dicey, full of uncertainty, and the real economy has not moved forward because the restructuring efforts were mishandled due to politics or corruption from the beginning. In bank restructuring, there is no transparency at all in the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), and there is particularly no control exercised by either the legislature or media on what it is doing. That is why the Bank Bali scandal happened.

What else can one expect from the Habibie government which is essentially an extension of the Soeharto regime, but without the former strongman? The finance minister, the central bank governor and the IBRA chairman may all have been involved in the bank scandal, even though they could have acted under pressure or instruction from the President or his most trusted lieutenants.

As a presidential candidate, Habibie's chances are almost diminished. His entourage will try very hard to still get him elected, but trust has been lost by a majority of the political elite and the public.

The problem is whether Golkar under Akbar Tandjung and Marzuki Darusman can get rid of him before the coming General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), since only then can Golkar be considered a partner in forming a new government. Habibie's track record on human rights and political development, which was lauded by Western observers and governments, does not stand up to close scrutiny.

What he has done was mainly due to internal or external pressure. He does not care about democracy or human rights, which he ignored as the right-hand man of Soeharto for more than 20 years. He has not resolved one single case in a series of political killings and kidnappings. He completely missed the main issue of East Timor's political solution and has opened up the possibility of civil war. The handling of East Timor will definitely have an impact on Aceh and the rest of the country.

If there are still doubts over this, one should look at Habibie's proposal for limiting media coverage, which was opposed and subsequently revoked, and the legislation on security emergencies that is now being debated in the legislature. One also should not overlook the ways in which he was using the police and the Attorney General's Office to put pressure on his political opponents.

On all accounts, the malaise that everybody observed in Indonesia today is in large part due to the regime's failures. One should also blame this on the poor performance of reformist leaders.

Megawati Soekarnoputri, who has lead the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) to victory in the general election, is expected by many to lead in the formation of a coalition to establish a new government, which has to be elected by the MPR in November at the latest. A coalition has to be established before MPR members are installed on Oct. 1.

It is necessary for her to do that to mobilize sufficient votes in the MPR to decide on the direction of government policies as well as on the rules of procedures, including the election of president.

But so far she has not been willing to take a proactive role in forming a majority. The failure to do so has not only created a void in Indonesia's national politics, but more so has invited a lot of political jockeying, which has resulted in total confusion. Habibie is doing all he can to fill the void, but his chances have rapidly dwindled.

Amien Rais of the National Mandate Party (PAN), feeling left out in the cold by Megawati, is also trying very hard to establish a new coalition called the "axis force" to prevent a confrontation he thought could happen between Habibie's and Megawati's supporters. He is basing his coalition on all the Islamic-based parties, and is also willing to bring in Golkar minus Habibie.

Amien proposed Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid, chairman of the largest Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, to become their presidential candidate because he felt that Gus Dur is a national leader acceptable to all, including nationalists and minorities.

Amien's other rationale is that after 50 years of three "abangan" (non-pious Muslims) or "nationalist" figures as Indonesia's President, it is time now for a "santri" (pious Muslim) to be elected as the fourth.

But there are real lacunas in his effort. First, the National Awakening Party (PKB) might not be on board because they gave support earlier to Megawati. Second, Gus Dur's willingness to accept the presidential candidacy is of uncertain quality because it has been motivated mainly by Megawati's passivity in the face of so many challenges at the coming MPR and by the nation at large. Third, it could create a real confrontation between two big forces in Indonesian politics, namely the nationalists and Muslims, which are both popular and having certain legitimacy.

Therefore, Megawati cannot sit back and let things take their own course. She started a month ago with a very statesman-like speech on the state of the nation. Now she has to show that she can follow that up with the formation of a national coalition, necessary in this period of crisis, which is certainly the most critical for the nation since 1965.

That means that Golkar has to withhold its support of Habibie's candidacy. There is still a struggle within Golkar and therefore the outcome is uncertain, although the Akbar-Marzuki faction is becoming stronger.

Gus Dur has to be convinced of Megawati's ability to lead and he has to stop being ambivalent. Amien should be persuaded to reduce his politicking and, as such, create no more confusion in the future.

Progressive elements within the United Development Party (PPP) could be persuaded to join the national coalition. In the end, the Indonesian Military (TNI) has to support a national government for its own survival.

Is this all a real possibility? Megawati has to find that out by trying and starting efforts soon, otherwise it will become a messy MPR and by default a "bad" coalition will have to be taken into calculation, because this was not an impossibility in Indonesian politics before.

If Megawati is not able to provide the leadership to form a national coalition or a majority coalition which is reformist in nature, then Amien's idea of the axis force coalition to be established with Gus Dur as the presidential candidate warrants a second look.

However, there are the negative aspects of this alternative that will have to be dealt with to make it a realistic proposal. At this stage of development, each member of the political elite who has Indonesia's interest at heart has to first support a national coalition to be established for Indonesia's revival and future.

The writer is a director of the Jakarta-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).