The tricky road to a legitimate government

The tricky road to a legitimate government

By Jusuf Wanandi

JAKARTA (JP): The expectations that the recent general
election would solve the Indonesian crisis were premature. It
does not recognize the complexities of the crisis and the state
of political development of the country resulting from 32 years
of former president Soeharto's authoritarian regime.

It is, however, an important milestone in Indonesia's
political development. If a legitimate government can be
established in the near future, then a basis will be laid down
for Indonesia to start anew.

What are the chances of that happening? As it stands now three
months after the elections, the slow vote count, the almost
chaotic operations of the General Elections Commission (KPU), the
bickering of political parties, the scandals of the Habibie
regime -- among other things, the Bank Bali scandal, and the
abominable way Habibie got rid of East Timor as well as its
possible impact on Aceh and the rest of Indonesia -- do not
point to anything promising in that prospect.

The outlook is dicey, full of uncertainty, and the real
economy has not moved forward because the restructuring efforts
were mishandled due to politics or corruption from the beginning.
In bank restructuring, there is no transparency at all in the
Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), and there is
particularly no control exercised by either the legislature or
media on what it is doing. That is why the Bank Bali scandal
happened.

What else can one expect from the Habibie government which is
essentially an extension of the Soeharto regime, but without the
former strongman? The finance minister, the central bank governor
and the IBRA chairman may all have been involved in the bank
scandal, even though they could have acted under pressure or
instruction from the President or his most trusted lieutenants.

As a presidential candidate, Habibie's chances are almost
diminished. His entourage will try very hard to still get him
elected, but trust has been lost by a majority of the political
elite and the public.

The problem is whether Golkar under Akbar Tandjung and Marzuki
Darusman can get rid of him before the coming General Session of
the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), since only then can
Golkar be considered a partner in forming a new government.
Habibie's track record on human rights and political development,
which was lauded by Western observers and governments, does not
stand up to close scrutiny.

What he has done was mainly due to internal or external
pressure. He does not care about democracy or human rights, which
he ignored as the right-hand man of Soeharto for more than 20
years. He has not resolved one single case in a series of
political killings and kidnappings. He completely missed the main
issue of East Timor's political solution and has opened up the
possibility of civil war. The handling of East Timor will
definitely have an impact on Aceh and the rest of the country.

If there are still doubts over this, one should look at
Habibie's proposal for limiting media coverage, which was opposed
and subsequently revoked, and the legislation on security
emergencies that is now being debated in the legislature. One
also should not overlook the ways in which he was using the
police and the Attorney General's Office to put pressure on his
political opponents.

On all accounts, the malaise that everybody observed in
Indonesia today is in large part due to the regime's failures.
One should also blame this on the poor performance of reformist
leaders.

Megawati Soekarnoputri, who has lead the Indonesian Democratic
Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) to victory in the general
election, is expected by many to lead in the formation of a
coalition to establish a new government, which has to be elected
by the MPR in November at the latest. A coalition has to be
established before MPR members are installed on Oct. 1.

It is necessary for her to do that to mobilize sufficient
votes in the MPR to decide on the direction of government
policies as well as on the rules of procedures, including the
election of president.

But so far she has not been willing to take a proactive role
in forming a majority. The failure to do so has not only created
a void in Indonesia's national politics, but more so has invited
a lot of political jockeying, which has resulted in total
confusion. Habibie is doing all he can to fill the void, but his
chances have rapidly dwindled.

Amien Rais of the National Mandate Party (PAN), feeling left
out in the cold by Megawati, is also trying very hard to
establish a new coalition called the "axis force" to prevent a
confrontation he thought could happen between Habibie's and
Megawati's supporters. He is basing his coalition on all the
Islamic-based parties, and is also willing to bring in Golkar
minus Habibie.

Amien proposed Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid, chairman of the
largest Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, to become their
presidential candidate because he felt that Gus Dur is a national
leader acceptable to all, including nationalists and minorities.

Amien's other rationale is that after 50 years of three
"abangan" (non-pious Muslims) or "nationalist" figures as
Indonesia's President, it is time now for a "santri" (pious
Muslim) to be elected as the fourth.

But there are real lacunas in his effort. First, the National
Awakening Party (PKB) might not be on board because they gave
support earlier to Megawati. Second, Gus Dur's willingness to
accept the presidential candidacy is of uncertain quality because
it has been motivated mainly by Megawati's passivity in the face
of so many challenges at the coming MPR and by the nation at
large. Third, it could create a real confrontation between two
big forces in Indonesian politics, namely the nationalists and
Muslims, which are both popular and having certain legitimacy.

Therefore, Megawati cannot sit back and let things take their
own course. She started a month ago with a very statesman-like
speech on the state of the nation. Now she has to show that she
can follow that up with the formation of a national coalition,
necessary in this period of crisis, which is certainly the most
critical for the nation since 1965.

That means that Golkar has to withhold its support of
Habibie's candidacy. There is still a struggle within Golkar and
therefore the outcome is uncertain, although the Akbar-Marzuki
faction is becoming stronger.

Gus Dur has to be convinced of Megawati's ability to lead and
he has to stop being ambivalent. Amien should be persuaded to
reduce his politicking and, as such, create no more confusion in
the future.

Progressive elements within the United Development Party (PPP)
could be persuaded to join the national coalition. In the end,
the Indonesian Military (TNI) has to support a national
government for its own survival.

Is this all a real possibility? Megawati has to find that out
by trying and starting efforts soon, otherwise it will become a
messy MPR and by default a "bad" coalition will have to be taken
into calculation, because this was not an impossibility in
Indonesian politics before.

If Megawati is not able to provide the leadership to form a
national coalition or a majority coalition which is reformist in
nature, then Amien's idea of the axis force coalition to be
established with Gus Dur as the presidential candidate warrants a
second look.

However, there are the negative aspects of this alternative
that will have to be dealt with to make it a realistic proposal.
At this stage of development, each member of the political elite
who has Indonesia's interest at heart has to first support a
national coalition to be established for Indonesia's revival and
future.

The writer is a director of the Jakarta-based Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).