The terrorrists' videos: A new tactic or a propaganda ploy?

Rohaiza Ahmad Asi, The Straits Times, Asia News Network/Singapore

The discovery of three videotapes by the Indonesian police during raids on hideouts of the now-deceased Azahari Husin is a significant development.

No group in the region has, thus far, been known to film suicide bombers before the act. Nor has the leader of the group appeared in a video, issuing threats against the West. Thus, this is a new phenomenon. Why has the Jamaah Islamiah (JI) switched tactics?

The first video shows a militant, Tedi, believed to have been trained by Azahari, giving step-by-step instructions on how to use various explosives and fabricate detonators from different devices, including a mobile phone.

The second video shows the three suicide bombers in last month's Bali bombings explaining their motivations, followed by a warning from a hooded man, reported to be Noordin Mohamed Top, who is still at large, warning the United States, Britain and Australia of more attacks to come. The third video shows masked men practicing shooting and jumping from moving vehicles at an unnamed training camp.

All these portrayals may be common practice among radical Islamic groups in the Middle East but had never been used in this region. Clearly, terrorists learn from one another but, more importantly, why is JI doing this now?

Most terrorist groups are aware that violence alone is no longer sufficient. The use of propaganda -- thus the issuing of such videotapes -- may be just as effective in spreading terror and could even have a more profound impact, psychologically speaking.

JI has been heavily constrained by a series of arrests and raids that the Indonesian authorities have conducted. Its freedom to operate has also been curtailed as a result of intense surveillance by the authorities. Also, fissures have deepened between the pro-bombing factions such as those led by Noordin and Azahari, and those factions that believe more in long-term proselytisation.

These two factors together make it harder for JI to find recruits. Recent developments indicated that JI has been trying to recruit from other Islamist militant groups in Indonesia such as Darul Islam as well. In this context, the videotapes may well be propaganda to attract recruits besides providing motivation to existing members.

After all, in their video, the three suicide bombers also issued a call for more volunteers to sign up as suicide bombers. Saying that they were dying for a "noble cause", they portrayed suicide bombing as being worthy of emulation. The videos could have easily been copied and passed around within the Muslim community. Perhaps the morale of JI members may have been waning with the arrests and raids, so the videos were also meant to keep the jihad spirit among members burning.

Having said that, JI certainly wants a larger audience. Why else would Noordin -- the Indonesian authorities seem convinced that he is the masked man in the video -- make threats against the West? He clearly wanted the message seen and heard widely. This also reflects JI's lack of access to the mass media.

True, there are many jihadist websites based in Indonesia but none of these JI videos has been posted on them. Recently, an Indonesian-language website set up to teach tactics on how and where to kill foreigners in Jakarta also included messages from Ustadz Mukhlas on how Muslims should conduct themselves. He is likely to be Mukhlas, alias Ali Ghufron, who was sentenced to death for his role in the October 2002 Bali bombings. The website was removed shortly after it was discovered by the authorities.

Unlike its more sophisticated cousins in the Middle East, JI does not have its own television channels and radio stations. This constrains JI's reach, and raises another possibility that the videos could have been left behind intentionally to see if the security forces have discovered its safe houses. If the tapes are discovered and broadcast, the cell involved will know which safe house has been compromised.

This assumes that the occupants of a particular safe house are able to escape capture. Not so in Azahari's case. In any case, the group's messages do become known to a wider audience through reports in the mass media. This could be yet another reason for leaving the videos where they can be found. That is, JI could be trying to use the police as its mouthpiece in a roundabout way.

Since JI has no channel to release its videos that can garner the world's attention, the Indonesian authorities could be playing right into its hands by publicizing its videos and messages. After all, no publicity is bad publicity.

In existence since at least 1993, JI gained notoriety following the October 2002 Bali bombings. But the fact that it has only now resorted to video-taping its message implies an important internal development. Its military capability has waned in recent years with the discovery of training camps in the country, increased raids and intense surveillance by the authorities.

Thus, these videos signal a significant tactical shift from a heavy emphasis on bombings to the active use of propaganda to keep the JI ideology alive. That is, if JI is no longer as able to sow terror through large-scale attacks, such videos can help keep its campaign alive.

As such, Muslim groups must get together to condemn such JI propaganda. The showing of the videos to religious leaders in Indonesia and the plan to distribute them to other ASEAN authorities so they can enlist the help of Muslim clerics in their countries are important countermoves being taken. The authorities also need to be more proactive in educating the public so that suspicious activities do not go unreported. All must act in concert to cut JI off from its supply lines of new recruits since its shift in tactics is now clear for all to see.

The writer is a research analyst at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University.