The terrorrists' videos: A new tactic or a propaganda ploy?

The terrorrists' videos: A new tactic or a propaganda ploy?

Rohaiza Ahmad Asi, The Straits Times, Asia News Network/Singapore

The discovery of three videotapes by the Indonesian police
during raids on hideouts of the now-deceased Azahari Husin is a
significant development.

No group in the region has, thus far, been known to film
suicide bombers before the act. Nor has the leader of the group
appeared in a video, issuing threats against the West. Thus, this
is a new phenomenon. Why has the Jamaah Islamiah (JI) switched
tactics?

The first video shows a militant, Tedi, believed to have been
trained by Azahari, giving step-by-step instructions on how to
use various explosives and fabricate detonators from different
devices, including a mobile phone.

The second video shows the three suicide bombers in last
month's Bali bombings explaining their motivations, followed by a
warning from a hooded man, reported to be Noordin Mohamed Top,
who is still at large, warning the United States, Britain and
Australia of more attacks to come. The third video shows masked
men practicing shooting and jumping from moving vehicles at an
unnamed training camp.

All these portrayals may be common practice among radical
Islamic groups in the Middle East but had never been used in this
region. Clearly, terrorists learn from one another but, more
importantly, why is JI doing this now?

Most terrorist groups are aware that violence alone is no
longer sufficient. The use of propaganda -- thus the issuing of
such videotapes -- may be just as effective in spreading terror
and could even have a more profound impact, psychologically
speaking.

JI has been heavily constrained by a series of arrests and
raids that the Indonesian authorities have conducted. Its freedom
to operate has also been curtailed as a result of intense
surveillance by the authorities. Also, fissures have deepened
between the pro-bombing factions such as those led by Noordin and
Azahari, and those factions that believe more in long-term
proselytisation.

These two factors together make it harder for JI to find
recruits. Recent developments indicated that JI has been trying
to recruit from other Islamist militant groups in Indonesia such
as Darul Islam as well. In this context, the videotapes may well
be propaganda to attract recruits besides providing motivation to
existing members.

After all, in their video, the three suicide bombers also
issued a call for more volunteers to sign up as suicide bombers.
Saying that they were dying for a "noble cause", they portrayed
suicide bombing as being worthy of emulation. The videos could
have easily been copied and passed around within the Muslim
community. Perhaps the morale of JI members may have been waning
with the arrests and raids, so the videos were also meant to keep
the jihad spirit among members burning.

Having said that, JI certainly wants a larger audience. Why
else would Noordin -- the Indonesian authorities seem convinced
that he is the masked man in the video -- make threats against
the West? He clearly wanted the message seen and heard widely.
This also reflects JI's lack of access to the mass media.

True, there are many jihadist websites based in Indonesia but
none of these JI videos has been posted on them. Recently, an
Indonesian-language website set up to teach tactics on how and
where to kill foreigners in Jakarta also included messages from
Ustadz Mukhlas on how Muslims should conduct themselves. He is
likely to be Mukhlas, alias Ali Ghufron, who was sentenced to
death for his role in the October 2002 Bali bombings. The website
was removed shortly after it was discovered by the authorities.

Unlike its more sophisticated cousins in the Middle East, JI
does not have its own television channels and radio stations.
This constrains JI's reach, and raises another possibility that
the videos could have been left behind intentionally to see if
the security forces have discovered its safe houses. If the tapes
are discovered and broadcast, the cell involved will know which
safe house has been compromised.

This assumes that the occupants of a particular safe house are
able to escape capture. Not so in Azahari's case. In any case,
the group's messages do become known to a wider audience through
reports in the mass media. This could be yet another reason for
leaving the videos where they can be found. That is, JI could be
trying to use the police as its mouthpiece in a roundabout way.

Since JI has no channel to release its videos that can garner
the world's attention, the Indonesian authorities could be
playing right into its hands by publicizing its videos and
messages. After all, no publicity is bad publicity.

In existence since at least 1993, JI gained notoriety
following the October 2002 Bali bombings. But the fact that it
has only now resorted to video-taping its message implies an
important internal development. Its military capability has waned
in recent years with the discovery of training camps in the
country, increased raids and intense surveillance by the
authorities.

Thus, these videos signal a significant tactical shift from a
heavy emphasis on bombings to the active use of propaganda to
keep the JI ideology alive. That is, if JI is no longer as able
to sow terror through large-scale attacks, such videos can help
keep its campaign alive.

As such, Muslim groups must get together to condemn such JI
propaganda. The showing of the videos to religious leaders in
Indonesia and the plan to distribute them to other ASEAN
authorities so they can enlist the help of Muslim clerics in
their countries are important countermoves being taken. The
authorities also need to be more proactive in educating the
public so that suspicious activities do not go unreported. All
must act in concert to cut JI off from its supply lines of new
recruits since its shift in tactics is now clear for all to see.

The writer is a research analyst at the Institute of Defense
and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University.