The Soeharto fortune

The Soeharto fortune

After months of clamoring for the Habibie administration to be
earnest in making true its stated determination to stamp out
corruption, collusion and nepotism at all levels of society, the
government's announcement yesterday that it would form a team to
investigate former president Soeharto "in the next few days" for
his alleged illegal accumulation of personal wealth over past
decades should have come as a welcome turn of events to
Indonesians.

The truth is that while many Indonesians have indeed welcomed
the move, as announced yesterday by the Coordinating Minister for
Development Supervision and State Administrative Reforms
Hartarto, as a step in the right direction, more than a few
people have cautioned the public against harboring too much hope
that the team will be able to come up with anything substantial
in the near future.

Indeed, many Indonesians take ex-president Soeharto's
challenge -- made in a surprise televised appearance earlier this
month -- for anyone accusing him of stashing away ill-acquired
wealth in foreign banks to come up with proof, as a distasteful
act of mockery aimed at the public. Indonesians find it difficult
to accept that the ex-president owns "not a single cent" in bank
accounts, either here or abroad, as he claimed during his
televised speech.

Obviously, by common reasoning, any person who can afford to
run the sprawling Tapos ranch in the Bogor foothills, or build
himself a palatial mansion costing some Rp 28 billion near Taman
Mini Indonesia Indah in East Jakarta -- not to mention owning a
plush Jakarta home and other luxuries -- must be at least a
little better off than the average Indonesian man on the street.

The difficulty in uncovering the truth about the alleged
Soeharto fortune is in providing solid evidence that a legal
process demands. Of course, the best and easiest way to prove
corruption, or at least obtain a persuasive indication of it, is
to compare the ex-president's current assets against those he
owned before he took office 32 years ago and ask him to explain
how he acquired those holdings. Unfortunately, such a reversal of
the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the accused is unknown
in Indonesia.

However, as people tend to focus their attention on Soeharto's
personal wealth, one fundamental fact concerning the practice of
corruption under Soeharto's New Order regime tends to be
forgotten. In past years, when allegations of corruption and
injustices committed under the New Order regime were already
rife, Soeharto personally was never a main target. Rather, it was
the preferential allocation of economic resources and
opportunities by Soeharto and his regime to benefit the
president's immediate family and cronies that sparked resentment.

Of course, there can be little doubt that such preferential
treatment of the president's close kin and associates inevitably
led to corrupt practices and economic distortions. That Soeharto
himself also reaped considerable benefits from such a situation
also seems indisputable. The ex-president's and his family's
regal lifestyles as witnessed by television viewers of the time
supports such an assumption.

As far as Soeharto personally is concerned, however, it could
well turn out that the evidence against him, as far as corruption
as defined by the law is concerned, will always remain
circumstantial. That is, of course, unless the investigators can
come up with solid evidence of his wrongdoings. Considering all
this, it is important that the investigations that are about to
take place cover not only Soeharto, but also include his family
and close connections.

In the public's minds, the case against the Soeharto clan is
clear enough, given the past display of opulence indulged in by
the New Order's first family. Now that the government has taken
the irreversible decision to investigate Soeharto as the public
demands, it is evidently finding itself in a difficult position:
It must come up with something to substantiate the indications of
dishonesty practiced by the Soeharto clan, or run the risk that
its efforts will be regarded as merely cosmetic to rally greater
support for the Habibie government.