The Soeharto factor

Abdurrahman Wahid, often known for going against the current of public opinion, stunned the nation once again over the weekend when he suggested the inclusion of former president Soeharto in a national dialog. As we know, Gus Dur, as the chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) is popularly known, is campaigning for a national dialog to resolve the cumulative crises facing Indonesia, which he said bordered on a social revolution.

Gus Dur argues that Soeharto remains a force to reckon with in Indonesian politics and, as such, cannot be excluded in any efforts to bring the political crisis to an end.

No one disputes Gus Dur's claim of the former president's massive political power and influence. Soeharto still commands loyal support from many followers and supporters, an inevitable legacy from more than three decades in power. He also has financial clout, if not through the funds that he directly commands, then the wealth his children and cronies have amassed.

One of the reasons why Gus Dur was prompted to bring Soeharto back into the loop, if not the fold, is the swirling allegation the former president or his supporters were behind some of the massive security disruptions in Indonesia in recent months. The authorities have been unable (or unwilling) to satisfactorily explain the killings of black magic practitioners and Muslim clerics in East Java, the shooting of student protesters, or the incitement of people to burn churches in Jakarta and mosques in Kupang. As the popular conspiracy theory goes, the conflicts were sowed and disruptions designed to pave the way for the Soehartoists to return to power.

It is one thing to recognize Soeharto's immense power and influence in this country, and it is completely another to give him legitimacy, which is what Gus Dur essentially proposes by including Soeharto in his planned national dialog.

Soeharto was one of the three components that made up the repressive New Order regime, along with Golkar, his political machine, and the Armed Forces (ABRI) through its sociopolitical role. Together, the three forces kept the nation in perpetual ignorance and tyrannical repression for more than 30 years.

The reform movement has removed Soeharto from that equation, but the other two factors remain. ABRI is slowly, but reluctantly, giving up some of its political privileges, while Golkar has been fighting hard to fend off challenges from within and without to stay in power. Both are cloaking themselves in the reform mantle, with ABRI announcing a new paradigm, and Golkar belatedly taking up the reform torch under the leadership of Akbar Tandjung. But both still have to prove their commitment to reform amid the strong public suspicion they are simply vestiges of the old Soeharto regime.

Given that the leadership of both Golkar and ABRI are closely identified with Soeharto, it is not surprising the suspicions abound. Unfortunately, recent events and actions by both Golkar and ABRI have reinforced rather than dispelled the suspicion. This explains why the reform movement, led by university students, has intensified rather than ebbed in recent months to keep up the pressure on those in power to ensure that the nation will not go back to repressive practices of the old regime and will indeed move towards a civil society.

Putting Soeharto back into the equation, as Gus Dur proposes, will simply strengthen grasping hands of those old forces of the New Order. Even without Soeharto, Golkar and ABRI still call most of the shots and determine the national political agenda. It will be a major setback for the reform movement but it won't kill it. Gus Dur's proposal is an insult to those who have given their blood, sweat, tears, and lives, in the quest for reform.

Irrespective of the outcome of Gus Dur's campaign, Soeharto's return in whatever form will not likely break the spirit of the reform movement. On the contrary, the realization of Soeharto's still immense political power and influence will further strengthen the resolve of the reform campaigners. At the very least, they realize they face a tall but not insurmountable wall. This realization has also redefined the reform objectives. The main challenge to the reform movement is to remove the last vestiges of power of all those New Order forces, and not just Soeharto, once and for all.