The separate culture of RI's Chinese

The separate culture of RI's Chinese

The Culture of the Chinese Minority in Indonesia
By Leo Suryadinata
Times Book International, Singapore, 1997
276 pp.

JAKARTA (JP): The Chinese have always been the target of
resentment, discrimination and riots in Indonesia on a scale not
experienced in other Southeast Asian countries. At various stages
of the giant archipelagic nation's recent history and political
development, they have been implicated in power struggle
conflicts.

The Chinese have also been blamed for some of Indonesia's
socioeconomic problems, partly because of their status as a
nonindigenous minority group perceived to have a disproportionate
share of the nation's wealth.

As the Chinese -- who constitute a mere 3 percent of
Indonesia's 200 million people -- are not only a visible, but
also vulnerable minority, they have become an interesting subject
for study not only in academic circles, but also increasingly
among the layman.

Leo Suryadinata's book is the latest addition to the
repository of works on the overseas Chinese in general, and the
Indonesian Chinese in particular.

Suryadinata, an associate professor of political science at
the National University of Singapore, has chosen history and
politics as tools of analysis in his treatment of this
fascinating subject. He explains that history traces the
development of the Chinese community in Indonesia, while politics
dealing with concepts like the role of the state provides the
framework in which their development is studied.

The author asserts that the Chinese minority in Indonesia is
not a homogeneous group, but is in fact divided into Peranakan
and Totok, though this distinction can be blurred at times. He
explains that Peranakans are those Chinese who no longer speak
Mandarin or any of the Chinese dialects as their first language.
They speak Indonesian and are Indonesianized in their lives.

Totok, on the other hand, still speak their native dialects or
Mandarin, and many are not proficient in Indonesian. They retain
many aspects of Chinese culture, despite ongoing moves to
integrate them into the wider Indonesian society.

Peranakan are mostly the descendants of those Chinese who
settled in Indonesia at least 300 years ago. Early Chinese
immigrants were men who married local women. Their children were
brought up in the native customs although they retained Chinese
names. Peranakan, who are in many ways similar to the Baba and
Nyonya of Malacca in Malaysia, are mainly concentrated in Java.

Totok, on the other hand, are first-generation immigrants who
moved prior to the communist takeover of China in 1949. Both men
and women made up the bulk of the immigrants, and family units
tend to be Chinese in their way of life. Although Totok are also
found in Java, it would appear that most of them are found in
areas like North Sumatra, Riau and Kalimantan, where usage of
Chinese dialects and Mandarin is wider than in Java.

As a minority, the Chinese are obliged to integrate into the
wider Indonesian society. Assimilation is the integrative tool
and it has been gathering momentum, particularly after the
abortive communist coup of 1965.

The Chinese have had to change their names to Indonesian ones.
Their schools have been closed. They are not allowed to have
signboards in front of their shops displaying Chinese characters.
Chinese newspapers are no longer in circulation except for one
which has the approval of the government.

In short, assimilation means that the Chinese would have to be
completely absorbed into Indonesian society. Official circles
feel that this can only be successful if the Chinese give up
their culture and become completely Indonesian. It is hoped that
by then hostilities against the community would have ceased.

Suryadinata argues that the peranakan would have no difficulty
in assimilating into Indonesian society. But the totok,
especially the older generation, find it harder to assimilate.

But Suryadinata points out that the younger generation from
totok families is becoming more Indonesian in their outlook and
speak Indonesian as a first language. On that score, there is a
clear trend of the Chinese becoming Indonesianized as the younger
Chinese from both peranakan and totok families become assimilated
into Indonesian culture. This trend appears to be irreversible
and is good for the Chinese themselves in the long run, if it
leads to the eventual removal of the stigma of being Chinese.

The path toward full acceptance of the Chinese minority as
Indonesian citizens appears to be strewn with obstacles, so long
as they continue to be regarded as nonindigenous in a wider
setting where nationalism is defined in indigenous terms. This
explains why the distinction between pribumi (indigenous) and
nonindigenous is still marked, and bodes that the Chinese will
continue to experience discrimination even as the assimilation
process gathers momentum.

In the chapter on "Religions", Suryadinata explains that the
Chinese complied with the New Order government under the auspices
of the Pancasila national ideology, which states Indonesians must
profess a religion.

This happened shortly after the abortive coup of 1965, and was
intended to combat atheism associated with the communists. While
some Chinese converted to Christianity, many continued to
identify with Confucianism and Buddhism.

But the authorities regard Confucianism as a philosophy, not a
religion, and inseparable from Chinese culture. The government
has therefore considered Confucianism to be under the wider ambit
of Buddhism, which is not seen to be exclusively Chinese because
it also has indigenous followers.

Suryadinata also mentions the Islamic dakwah movement by
Chinese Moslem converts such as Junus Jahja (Lauw Chuan Tho), who
believed that conversion to Islam would resolve the Chinese
problem as an overwhelming majority of Indonesians are Moslems.
The author notes that although such a move may appear practical,
it could create friction rather than harmony in places like
Minahasa and Maluku, where Islam is not the major religion.

Despite the presence of large numbers of poor Chinese living
in urban slums, the community is still identified with business
and commerce.

In an era when Indonesia's trade links with China are growing,
it makes practical sense for Chinese businessmen to speak
Mandarin and practice aspects of the Chinese culture to enhance
such links. But such moves, which are also necessary for
networking with other Chinese businessmen in Southeast Asia,
conflict with their need to assimilate into Indonesian society.

The book's only shortcoming, if it can be called that, is that
much of its information has been documented elsewhere, including
Suryadinata's numerous earlier works on the Chinese in Indonesia.
But the author's ability to update facts in a way not
successfully done by many others is more than sufficient
compensation to provide a comprehensive and coherent analysis of
developments in the Chinese-Indonesian community.

The chapter on religions, which sheds more light on the
complex issue of race and culture, is new material which
Suryadinata has included because religion has become an important
issue in Indonesia today, particularly in reaffirming the Chinese
commitment to their Indonesian identity. Readers should also note
that the book's strength lies in its Indonesian sources of
information, which enhance the accuracy of the author's
observations and analysis of developments in the Indonesian
Chinese community.

-- David Chew

The reviewer is a Singapore-based freelance journalist.