The separate culture of RI's Chinese

The Culture of the Chinese Minority in Indonesia By Leo Suryadinata Times Book International, Singapore, 1997 276 pp.

JAKARTA (JP): The Chinese have always been the target of resentment, discrimination and riots in Indonesia on a scale not experienced in other Southeast Asian countries. At various stages of the giant archipelagic nation's recent history and political development, they have been implicated in power struggle conflicts.

The Chinese have also been blamed for some of Indonesia's socioeconomic problems, partly because of their status as a nonindigenous minority group perceived to have a disproportionate share of the nation's wealth.

As the Chinese -- who constitute a mere 3 percent of Indonesia's 200 million people -- are not only a visible, but also vulnerable minority, they have become an interesting subject for study not only in academic circles, but also increasingly among the layman.

Leo Suryadinata's book is the latest addition to the repository of works on the overseas Chinese in general, and the Indonesian Chinese in particular.

Suryadinata, an associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore, has chosen history and politics as tools of analysis in his treatment of this fascinating subject. He explains that history traces the development of the Chinese community in Indonesia, while politics dealing with concepts like the role of the state provides the framework in which their development is studied.

The author asserts that the Chinese minority in Indonesia is not a homogeneous group, but is in fact divided into Peranakan and Totok, though this distinction can be blurred at times. He explains that Peranakans are those Chinese who no longer speak Mandarin or any of the Chinese dialects as their first language. They speak Indonesian and are Indonesianized in their lives.

Totok, on the other hand, still speak their native dialects or Mandarin, and many are not proficient in Indonesian. They retain many aspects of Chinese culture, despite ongoing moves to integrate them into the wider Indonesian society.

Peranakan are mostly the descendants of those Chinese who settled in Indonesia at least 300 years ago. Early Chinese immigrants were men who married local women. Their children were brought up in the native customs although they retained Chinese names. Peranakan, who are in many ways similar to the Baba and Nyonya of Malacca in Malaysia, are mainly concentrated in Java.

Totok, on the other hand, are first-generation immigrants who moved prior to the communist takeover of China in 1949. Both men and women made up the bulk of the immigrants, and family units tend to be Chinese in their way of life. Although Totok are also found in Java, it would appear that most of them are found in areas like North Sumatra, Riau and Kalimantan, where usage of Chinese dialects and Mandarin is wider than in Java.

As a minority, the Chinese are obliged to integrate into the wider Indonesian society. Assimilation is the integrative tool and it has been gathering momentum, particularly after the abortive communist coup of 1965.

The Chinese have had to change their names to Indonesian ones. Their schools have been closed. They are not allowed to have signboards in front of their shops displaying Chinese characters. Chinese newspapers are no longer in circulation except for one which has the approval of the government.

In short, assimilation means that the Chinese would have to be completely absorbed into Indonesian society. Official circles feel that this can only be successful if the Chinese give up their culture and become completely Indonesian. It is hoped that by then hostilities against the community would have ceased.

Suryadinata argues that the peranakan would have no difficulty in assimilating into Indonesian society. But the totok, especially the older generation, find it harder to assimilate.

But Suryadinata points out that the younger generation from totok families is becoming more Indonesian in their outlook and speak Indonesian as a first language. On that score, there is a clear trend of the Chinese becoming Indonesianized as the younger Chinese from both peranakan and totok families become assimilated into Indonesian culture. This trend appears to be irreversible and is good for the Chinese themselves in the long run, if it leads to the eventual removal of the stigma of being Chinese.

The path toward full acceptance of the Chinese minority as Indonesian citizens appears to be strewn with obstacles, so long as they continue to be regarded as nonindigenous in a wider setting where nationalism is defined in indigenous terms. This explains why the distinction between pribumi (indigenous) and nonindigenous is still marked, and bodes that the Chinese will continue to experience discrimination even as the assimilation process gathers momentum.

In the chapter on "Religions", Suryadinata explains that the Chinese complied with the New Order government under the auspices of the Pancasila national ideology, which states Indonesians must profess a religion.

This happened shortly after the abortive coup of 1965, and was intended to combat atheism associated with the communists. While some Chinese converted to Christianity, many continued to identify with Confucianism and Buddhism.

But the authorities regard Confucianism as a philosophy, not a religion, and inseparable from Chinese culture. The government has therefore considered Confucianism to be under the wider ambit of Buddhism, which is not seen to be exclusively Chinese because it also has indigenous followers.

Suryadinata also mentions the Islamic dakwah movement by Chinese Moslem converts such as Junus Jahja (Lauw Chuan Tho), who believed that conversion to Islam would resolve the Chinese problem as an overwhelming majority of Indonesians are Moslems. The author notes that although such a move may appear practical, it could create friction rather than harmony in places like Minahasa and Maluku, where Islam is not the major religion.

Despite the presence of large numbers of poor Chinese living in urban slums, the community is still identified with business and commerce.

In an era when Indonesia's trade links with China are growing, it makes practical sense for Chinese businessmen to speak Mandarin and practice aspects of the Chinese culture to enhance such links. But such moves, which are also necessary for networking with other Chinese businessmen in Southeast Asia, conflict with their need to assimilate into Indonesian society.

The book's only shortcoming, if it can be called that, is that much of its information has been documented elsewhere, including Suryadinata's numerous earlier works on the Chinese in Indonesia. But the author's ability to update facts in a way not successfully done by many others is more than sufficient compensation to provide a comprehensive and coherent analysis of developments in the Chinese-Indonesian community.

The chapter on religions, which sheds more light on the complex issue of race and culture, is new material which Suryadinata has included because religion has become an important issue in Indonesia today, particularly in reaffirming the Chinese commitment to their Indonesian identity. Readers should also note that the book's strength lies in its Indonesian sources of information, which enhance the accuracy of the author's observations and analysis of developments in the Indonesian Chinese community.

-- David Chew

The reviewer is a Singapore-based freelance journalist.