The seminar could reopen old wounds of yesteryear

The government's plan to hold a seminar on Nawaksara, the late president Sukarno's accountability speech before the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) in 1966, has been further postponed until after next year's presidential election.

Nawaksara, which means nine points or topics, was rejected by the assembly and resulted in Sukarno's dismissal as president. The assembly named Soeharto acting president in 1967 and he became president a year later.

Skeptics have described the turn of events as a disguised coup d'etat, but President Soeharto has repeatedly denied this. Political scientist Arief Budiman, was one of the student activists at the time who publicly rejected Sukarno's speech. He talked to The Jakarta Post about looking at the issue from a wider perspective.

Question: What do you think of the government's latest decision to delay the seminar on Nawaksara until after the presidential election

Answer: For the sake of the president's and the government's interests, it's a good decision. It's also good for the sake of political stability. I did not think senior officials like Minister Moerdiono, or others, would let it happen.

Nevertheless, since the plan was widely known and people were very enthusiastic about it, it would be better not to delay it too long. Let the people have the seminar, with better preparation and if possible by getting scientists with expertise to discuss the topic.

Q: Are you trying to say there is a possibility of further postponements?

A: Yes. Who knows? I'm very skeptical about it. The topic, however, is still valid, politically. It's not yet history. It's a current political issue. It will be difficult, therefore, to look at it objectively. Remember, it's only the connection with today's life which differentiates politics from history. History is the past politics and politics is the present history.

Q: What did you think of the plan to hold a seminar on Nawaksara?

A: Bringing Nawaksara back into open discussion is nothing but opening an old wound caused by many controversies. I myself am happy to hear that the seminar will be held. It shows that there must be a problem with Nawaksara. President Soeharto, at least, feels there is a suspicion (among the community) that he grasped the presidency from first president Sukarno after a coup attempt in 1965.

For me, it's an interesting topic. From the New Order's pragmatic point of view, however, the discussion won't do any good. Had the seminar been held, it is possible that only pro- government speakers would have been invited and they would reconfirm that Nawaksara was not good and that it was rejected by the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly. This would not surprise me.

It would be difficult, therefore, to find discussion on, for example, how the assembly was formed. In fact, most of the members of the assembly were obviously appointed. Those who were members of the Communist Party or other left-wing groups were all replaced by new ones. The assembly was arranged in such a way that it had to say no to Nawaksara, no matter what the speech said.

Q: Are you saying that it was not the content of the speech that had made the Assembly reject it?

A: That's right. Everything was engineered to create the situation. That's why I wonder whether the government wants to re-open discussion on Nawaksara. It's a very weak loophole indeed for the New Order.

If it's true that looking for an objective truth is the moral of the decision (to hold the seminar), they should also invite a range of speakers, including those from abroad. Sources like Ben Anderson, for example, who do not fear intimidation, can give us important information. Although no one can guarantee the accuracy of his information, it would at least challenge others.

It's also important to invite local speakers who can talk objectively. Historians like Taufik Abdullah, for example, or Onghokham, may not be as outspoken as Ben Anderson, but they won't lie. They have integrity as well as historical data.

Q: As one of the students who staged rallies against Sukarno's government in 1966, you must have been well informed about the events surrounding Nawaksara...

A: I was indeed with those who were against Sukarno. He was very authoritarian at that time. Recommending the assembly reject Nawaksara was only one of our strategies (to dethrone Sukarno). We did a lot of campaigning and political manipulating to fight that.

As a matter of fact, one of the New Order's strategies (in getting rid of the Old Order) was fulfilling the formal constitution while at the same time manipulating the material. Soeharto, therefore, was not supposed to take the position of president away from Sukarno without being appointed by the assembly. The New Order was very careful to abide by the formal constitution.

That was why (to make Soeharto president) we had to first do something to the assembly (replace unfavorable members) so that it would reject Sukarno's speech and dismiss him.

It was not surprising, therefore, that we knew Nawaksara would be rejected by the assembly even before it was delivered in front of it.

Q: If that was the case, is it right to say that constitutionally there was no coup d'etat at that time?

A: Coup d'etat means using violence to take control of a state. It is usually done by military forces directly against the head of the state, without the people's participation. Thus, if the process of taking control is done in a democratic way, through a general election, in which all the people are involved in the process, there is no way to call it a coup d'etat.

In this case, what the New Order did was a Javanese style "coup d'etat". The formal process, in fact, was done democratically in the sense that the president (Soeharto) was elected by the assembly. But the members of the assembly were appointed, not elected.

I was one of those who supported the assembly's election of Soeharto as president. We supported the New Order's political engineering. We hoped the New Order (Soeharto) -- along with the military force that backed it -- would bring democracy to the country. As I said, by the end of his reign, Sukarno was very dictatorial. That's why I thought that any change, no matter who did it, would be good.

Q: Could you explain how the members of the assembly were replaced?

A: Those who were members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) or involved in PKI activities were all ousted from the assembly, and so were the left-wing generals. Their seats were then given to people appointed by Soeharto after the historical Supersemar (the 11 March, 1966, letter issued by Sukarno authorizing Soeharto to restore order after PKI's failed 1965 coup attempt).

Q: How many members were replaced at the time?

A: I'm not sure about the number but it was a substantial one. The PKI was the fourth largest party at the time. That excluded members of other left-wing parties, including the Indonesian National Party's (PNI) and Moerba's members.

Q: What actually was the content of Nawaksara that was rejected by the assembly?

A: I myself hardly remember it. It happened a long time ago and Nawaksara was not that important. As I said the rejection had nothing to do with the content. Whatever the content was, it had to be rejected anyway. Rejecting it was a part of the scenario.

One of the reasons pointed out by the assembly was Sukarno's refusal to liquidate the PKI. If I'm not mistaken, Sukarno repeatedly said that the political settlement was completely under his authority and that the PKI incident was just a small ripple on a big ocean.

He also said that PKI had a share in the nation's struggle for independence. In another of his accountability speeches, Nasakom, he even said the state would be crippled if there was no unity between nationalist, religious and communist groups.

There was also a time when Sukarno tried to get communists in cabinet but he never succeeded. At that time communist party members were given cabinet positions without portfolios, for example as coordinating ministers.

Q: If it was not the content that made the assembly reject Nawaksara, what is the relevance of talking about it?

A: That is also my question. It would certainly do more harm than good (to the present government). People had apparently forgotten it. Now everyone is talking about it. I myself see it as a good point in the sense that the seminar will, at least, draw reaction from other sources (who are not invited to the seminar) and bring them into a (public) debate.

Q: Can we say that the government's idea to hold the seminar was irrelevant?

A: It depends on whose interest. To me, for example, it's good, important and very relevant. It's certainly not to the government. Doing it is like opening Pandora's box for them. The New Order's legitimacy (to rule the country) will be questioned in the seminar. It could even be easily driven to a discussion of Supersemar which, according to me, makes the New Order's legitimacy status much more vulnerable. It's subject to different interpretations.

Thus, to answer the question of whether the New Order was a result of a coup d'etat or was a natural change that all the people wanted, now becomes our problem. It's a very important matter for the whole nation, but not for the present government.

Q: From some government officials' statements, it appears the seminar was intended to show that there was nothing wrong with the New Order's step to power...

A: The objective (of holding the seminar) is to legitimate the government's authority over the country during 1966-1967. The idea of holding the seminar, however, cannot be separated from the accusations that surfaced recently. One of those remarks came from Soebadio -- in his newly-launched book -- who said that the New Order did not have the license to govern the country.

One of the reasons given by Soebadio was the last clause of the Supersemar which said that Soeharto was given (only) the function (authority) to restore order and to report it to the Armed Forces Top Commander (Sukarno). The letter didn't give him the power to govern the nation. Saying that Supersemar is a letter of transfer of authority, therefore, is only exaggerating the meaning of the statement itself.

Q: Do you accept Soebadio's argument?

A: It's very acceptable. It can be clearly seen from the statement in the clause.

Q: Some people say that Supersemar is actually a disguised coup d'etat. Are they right?

A: Yes, they are. But that's only my opinion, anyway. There are others who have different opinions and arguments. That's why a discussion is needed to look at the matter objectively. There, everyone will be able to supply strong arguments and proofs to support his or her opinions. (swa)