The seminar could reopen old wounds of yesteryear

The seminar could reopen old wounds of yesteryear

The government's plan to hold a seminar on Nawaksara, the late
president Sukarno's accountability speech before the Provisional
People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) in 1966, has been further
postponed until after next year's presidential election.

Nawaksara, which means nine points or topics, was rejected by
the assembly and resulted in Sukarno's dismissal as president.
The assembly named Soeharto acting president in 1967 and he
became president a year later.

Skeptics have described the turn of events as a disguised coup
d'etat, but President Soeharto has repeatedly denied this.
Political scientist Arief Budiman, was one of the student
activists at the time who publicly rejected Sukarno's speech. He
talked to The Jakarta Post about looking at the issue from a
wider perspective.

Question: What do you think of the government's latest
decision to delay the seminar on Nawaksara until after the
presidential election

Answer: For the sake of the president's and the government's
interests, it's a good decision. It's also good for the sake of
political stability. I did not think senior officials like
Minister Moerdiono, or others, would let it happen.

Nevertheless, since the plan was widely known and people were
very enthusiastic about it, it would be better not to delay it
too long. Let the people have the seminar, with better
preparation and if possible by getting scientists with expertise
to discuss the topic.

Q: Are you trying to say there is a possibility of further
postponements?

A: Yes. Who knows? I'm very skeptical about it. The topic,
however, is still valid, politically. It's not yet history. It's
a current political issue. It will be difficult, therefore, to
look at it objectively. Remember, it's only the connection with
today's life which differentiates politics from history. History
is the past politics and politics is the present history.

Q: What did you think of the plan to hold a seminar on Nawaksara?

A: Bringing Nawaksara back into open discussion is nothing but
opening an old wound caused by many controversies. I myself am
happy to hear that the seminar will be held. It shows that there
must be a problem with Nawaksara. President Soeharto, at least,
feels there is a suspicion (among the community) that he grasped
the presidency from first president Sukarno after a coup attempt
in 1965.

For me, it's an interesting topic. From the New Order's
pragmatic point of view, however, the discussion won't do any
good. Had the seminar been held, it is possible that only pro-
government speakers would have been invited and they would
reconfirm that Nawaksara was not good and that it was rejected by
the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly. This would not
surprise me.

It would be difficult, therefore, to find discussion on, for
example, how the assembly was formed. In fact, most of the
members of the assembly were obviously appointed. Those who were
members of the Communist Party or other left-wing groups were all
replaced by new ones. The assembly was arranged in such a way
that it had to say no to Nawaksara, no matter what the speech
said.

Q: Are you saying that it was not the content of the speech that
had made the Assembly reject it?

A: That's right. Everything was engineered to create the
situation. That's why I wonder whether the government wants to
re-open discussion on Nawaksara. It's a very weak loophole indeed
for the New Order.

If it's true that looking for an objective truth is the moral
of the decision (to hold the seminar), they should also invite a
range of speakers, including those from abroad. Sources like Ben
Anderson, for example, who do not fear intimidation, can give us
important information. Although no one can guarantee the accuracy
of his information, it would at least challenge others.

It's also important to invite local speakers who can talk
objectively. Historians like Taufik Abdullah, for example, or
Onghokham, may not be as outspoken as Ben Anderson, but they
won't lie. They have integrity as well as historical data.

Q: As one of the students who staged rallies against Sukarno's
government in 1966, you must have been well informed about the
events surrounding Nawaksara...

A: I was indeed with those who were against Sukarno. He was very
authoritarian at that time. Recommending the assembly reject
Nawaksara was only one of our strategies (to dethrone Sukarno).
We did a lot of campaigning and political manipulating to fight
that.

As a matter of fact, one of the New Order's strategies (in
getting rid of the Old Order) was fulfilling the formal
constitution while at the same time manipulating the material.
Soeharto, therefore, was not supposed to take the position of
president away from Sukarno without being appointed by the
assembly. The New Order was very careful to abide by the formal
constitution.

That was why (to make Soeharto president) we had to first do
something to the assembly (replace unfavorable members) so that
it would reject Sukarno's speech and dismiss him.

It was not surprising, therefore, that we knew Nawaksara would
be rejected by the assembly even before it was delivered in front
of it.

Q: If that was the case, is it right to say that constitutionally
there was no coup d'etat at that time?

A: Coup d'etat means using violence to take control of a state.
It is usually done by military forces directly against the head
of the state, without the people's participation. Thus, if the
process of taking control is done in a democratic way, through a
general election, in which all the people are involved in the
process, there is no way to call it a coup d'etat.

In this case, what the New Order did was a Javanese style
"coup d'etat". The formal process, in fact, was done
democratically in the sense that the president (Soeharto) was
elected by the assembly. But the members of the assembly were
appointed, not elected.

I was one of those who supported the assembly's election of
Soeharto as president. We supported the New Order's political
engineering. We hoped the New Order (Soeharto) -- along with the
military force that backed it -- would bring democracy to the
country. As I said, by the end of his reign, Sukarno was very
dictatorial. That's why I thought that any change, no matter who
did it, would be good.

Q: Could you explain how the members of the assembly were
replaced?

A: Those who were members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)
or involved in PKI activities were all ousted from the assembly,
and so were the left-wing generals. Their seats were then given
to people appointed by Soeharto after the historical Supersemar
(the 11 March, 1966, letter issued by Sukarno authorizing
Soeharto to restore order after PKI's failed 1965 coup attempt).

Q: How many members were replaced at the time?

A: I'm not sure about the number but it was a substantial one.
The PKI was the fourth largest party at the time. That excluded
members of other left-wing parties, including the Indonesian
National Party's (PNI) and Moerba's members.

Q: What actually was the content of Nawaksara that was rejected
by the assembly?

A: I myself hardly remember it. It happened a long time ago and
Nawaksara was not that important. As I said the rejection had
nothing to do with the content. Whatever the content was, it had
to be rejected anyway. Rejecting it was a part of the scenario.

One of the reasons pointed out by the assembly was Sukarno's
refusal to liquidate the PKI. If I'm not mistaken, Sukarno
repeatedly said that the political settlement was completely
under his authority and that the PKI incident was just a small
ripple on a big ocean.

He also said that PKI had a share in the nation's struggle for
independence. In another of his accountability speeches, Nasakom,
he even said the state would be crippled if there was no unity
between nationalist, religious and communist groups.

There was also a time when Sukarno tried to get communists in
cabinet but he never succeeded. At that time communist party
members were given cabinet positions without portfolios, for
example as coordinating ministers.

Q: If it was not the content that made the assembly reject
Nawaksara, what is the relevance of talking about it?

A: That is also my question. It would certainly do more harm than
good (to the present government). People had apparently forgotten
it. Now everyone is talking about it. I myself see it as a good
point in the sense that the seminar will, at least, draw reaction
from other sources (who are not invited to the seminar) and bring
them into a (public) debate.

Q: Can we say that the government's idea to hold the seminar was
irrelevant?

A: It depends on whose interest. To me, for example, it's good,
important and very relevant. It's certainly not to the
government. Doing it is like opening Pandora's box for them. The
New Order's legitimacy (to rule the country) will be questioned
in the seminar. It could even be easily driven to a discussion of
Supersemar which, according to me, makes the New Order's
legitimacy status much more vulnerable. It's subject to different
interpretations.

Thus, to answer the question of whether the New Order was a
result of a coup d'etat or was a natural change that all the
people wanted, now becomes our problem. It's a very important
matter for the whole nation, but not for the present government.

Q: From some government officials' statements, it appears the
seminar was intended to show that there was nothing wrong with
the New Order's step to power...

A: The objective (of holding the seminar) is to legitimate the
government's authority over the country during 1966-1967. The
idea of holding the seminar, however, cannot be separated from
the accusations that surfaced recently. One of those remarks came
from Soebadio -- in his newly-launched book -- who said that the
New Order did not have the license to govern the country.

One of the reasons given by Soebadio was the last clause of
the Supersemar which said that Soeharto was given (only) the
function (authority) to restore order and to report it to the
Armed Forces Top Commander (Sukarno). The letter didn't give him
the power to govern the nation. Saying that Supersemar is a
letter of transfer of authority, therefore, is only exaggerating
the meaning of the statement itself.

Q: Do you accept Soebadio's argument?

A: It's very acceptable. It can be clearly seen from the
statement in the clause.

Q: Some people say that Supersemar is actually a disguised coup
d'etat. Are they right?

A: Yes, they are. But that's only my opinion, anyway. There are
others who have different opinions and arguments. That's why a
discussion is needed to look at the matter objectively. There,
everyone will be able to supply strong arguments and proofs to
support his or her opinions. (swa)