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The same old story: Military in security business

| Source: JP

The same old story: Military in security business

Imanuddin Razak, Staff Writer, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta
iman@thejakartapost.com

The July 19, 2003 shooting spree in a North Jakarta, in which
a computer businessman and his military bodyguard were murdered,
promptly made headlines in national media, although the motive
for the murders seems to have been nothing new.

What the population found captivating about the news was that
the businessman had been guarded, not by "an ordinary person,"
but by First Sgt. Edy Siyet, a member of the Army's Special
Forces (Kopassus).

Edy was shot once in the head while the businessman,
Boedyharto Angsono, was shot six times in the head and back.

The incident was curious in that the assassin did not attempt
to conceal his face by wearing a mask or sunglasses, making it
easy for Boedyharto's driver Darjan, the only survivor, to
identify or at least visualize the shooter's face before the
police's sketch artist.

The Jakarta Police have been busy with the investigation,
focusing mainly on possible vengeful acts by Boedyharto's former
son-in-law Gunawan Santoso, who had been convicted to two years
and seven months imprisonment after being found guilty in a Rp 25
billion (US$3.05 million) embezzlement case, while he was a
supervisor in Boedyharto's business.

Police have been slow in providing alternative suspects nor
have they identified the assassin, despite the optimum position
of the key witness, Darjan.

If the assassin's identity was revealed, the investigation
would surely uncover the motives behind the murder.

The case once again reveals the Indonesian Military's (TNI)
involvement in business, in this case the security business.

It hasn't been forgotten that business tycoon Liem Sioe Liong,
who maintained a long and good relationship with then president
Soeharto, also had some Kopassus members as his bodyguards,

National Police Detective chief Comr. Gen. Erwin Mappaseng
recently confirmed the existence of many assassins for hire in
Indonesia, but claimed they were not organized and they were not
commonly hired to kill.

The general, however, failed to elaborate on the identities of
the assassins, or the depth of their skill at using firearms or
in martial arts.

Meanwhile, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu failed
to indicate whether Army troops were moonlighting as hired
assassins for extra money.

"It has never been our policy to allow soldiers to work with
other parties and receive payment for their services. Never. It
is a violation of military discipline," Ryamizard said recently.

The general claimed that Edy was a friend of Boedyharto's son
and not his bodyguard. "And I can't prevent my troops from
establishing relationship with others. They (the troops) are free
to meet anyone and make friends."

The involvement in business -- as part of an attempt to
finance its operations and its troops -- is not a new episode in
the history of the Indonesian military.

Books and publications indicate that this has been going on
since the early years of Indonesia's independence.

The military's active involvement in business, in various
forms, has continued until the present day. Obvious examples are
units of the military and police, which have their "own quota" in
the provision of security services at night spots and
entertainment centers.

On a smaller scale, illegal parking activities -- at a number
of locations in Jakarta at night -- are evidence of rampant
"security protection services" in the capital city.

Some of the operators of the "illegal parking" admit that
officers in "green uniforms" and "brown uniforms" ask for
protection money from them every evening.

On a larger scale, a statement by giant mining company PT
Freeport Indonesia, in the restive Papua province, admitted to
the payment of protection money to the military and police since
1996 and confirmed the military's involvement in the business.

TNI spokesman Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin also acknowledged
that the military had received money from giant U.S.-based oil
company ExxonMobile (operating in the strife-torn province of
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam).

An official written confirmation was provided by the Army
Headquarters, which stipulated, in its 2002 paper on the
"Restructuring of the (Army-owned) Kartika Eka Paksi Foundation
and Its Business Units," that resulting from the limited budget
provided by the government, Army leaders have established an
institution to help provide for the necessities of the Army and
its troops.

Meanwhile, research by Indria Samego from the Indonesian
Institute of Sciences (LIPI), reveals that similar practice, i.e.
establishing business units, have been exercised by the other two
military forces -- the Navy and the Air Force -- and the National
Police.

But Indria warned that such practices would cause internal
friction in military and police institutions, which would in turn
disrupt their ability to tend to state duties. "The practice
could also cultivate collusion among soldiers and private
companies or individuals," he added.

There have been many armed disputes between military units or
between those of the military and the police, but despite the
repeated conflicts the military's and police's rivalry in
business remains unresolved.

Analysts have provided a wide variety of solutions to the
problem in response to the officers' classic answer -- concerning
the moonlighting of their subordinates -- that they had to resort
to such activities for additional money as the state failed to
provide them with an adequate income.

And such off-duty activities are indeed problematic as they
require no accountability and no audit. It remains unclear where
the money from the moonlighting activities goes -- whether to the
military institution or to the pockets of the officers
themselves.

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