The same old story: Military in security business
Imanuddin Razak, Staff Writer, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta iman@thejakartapost.com
The July 19, 2003 shooting spree in a North Jakarta, in which a computer businessman and his military bodyguard were murdered, promptly made headlines in national media, although the motive for the murders seems to have been nothing new.
What the population found captivating about the news was that the businessman had been guarded, not by "an ordinary person," but by First Sgt. Edy Siyet, a member of the Army's Special Forces (Kopassus).
Edy was shot once in the head while the businessman, Boedyharto Angsono, was shot six times in the head and back.
The incident was curious in that the assassin did not attempt to conceal his face by wearing a mask or sunglasses, making it easy for Boedyharto's driver Darjan, the only survivor, to identify or at least visualize the shooter's face before the police's sketch artist.
The Jakarta Police have been busy with the investigation, focusing mainly on possible vengeful acts by Boedyharto's former son-in-law Gunawan Santoso, who had been convicted to two years and seven months imprisonment after being found guilty in a Rp 25 billion (US$3.05 million) embezzlement case, while he was a supervisor in Boedyharto's business.
Police have been slow in providing alternative suspects nor have they identified the assassin, despite the optimum position of the key witness, Darjan.
If the assassin's identity was revealed, the investigation would surely uncover the motives behind the murder.
The case once again reveals the Indonesian Military's (TNI) involvement in business, in this case the security business.
It hasn't been forgotten that business tycoon Liem Sioe Liong, who maintained a long and good relationship with then president Soeharto, also had some Kopassus members as his bodyguards,
National Police Detective chief Comr. Gen. Erwin Mappaseng recently confirmed the existence of many assassins for hire in Indonesia, but claimed they were not organized and they were not commonly hired to kill.
The general, however, failed to elaborate on the identities of the assassins, or the depth of their skill at using firearms or in martial arts.
Meanwhile, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu failed to indicate whether Army troops were moonlighting as hired assassins for extra money.
"It has never been our policy to allow soldiers to work with other parties and receive payment for their services. Never. It is a violation of military discipline," Ryamizard said recently.
The general claimed that Edy was a friend of Boedyharto's son and not his bodyguard. "And I can't prevent my troops from establishing relationship with others. They (the troops) are free to meet anyone and make friends."
The involvement in business -- as part of an attempt to finance its operations and its troops -- is not a new episode in the history of the Indonesian military.
Books and publications indicate that this has been going on since the early years of Indonesia's independence.
The military's active involvement in business, in various forms, has continued until the present day. Obvious examples are units of the military and police, which have their "own quota" in the provision of security services at night spots and entertainment centers.
On a smaller scale, illegal parking activities -- at a number of locations in Jakarta at night -- are evidence of rampant "security protection services" in the capital city.
Some of the operators of the "illegal parking" admit that officers in "green uniforms" and "brown uniforms" ask for protection money from them every evening.
On a larger scale, a statement by giant mining company PT Freeport Indonesia, in the restive Papua province, admitted to the payment of protection money to the military and police since 1996 and confirmed the military's involvement in the business.
TNI spokesman Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin also acknowledged that the military had received money from giant U.S.-based oil company ExxonMobile (operating in the strife-torn province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam).
An official written confirmation was provided by the Army Headquarters, which stipulated, in its 2002 paper on the "Restructuring of the (Army-owned) Kartika Eka Paksi Foundation and Its Business Units," that resulting from the limited budget provided by the government, Army leaders have established an institution to help provide for the necessities of the Army and its troops.
Meanwhile, research by Indria Samego from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), reveals that similar practice, i.e. establishing business units, have been exercised by the other two military forces -- the Navy and the Air Force -- and the National Police.
But Indria warned that such practices would cause internal friction in military and police institutions, which would in turn disrupt their ability to tend to state duties. "The practice could also cultivate collusion among soldiers and private companies or individuals," he added.
There have been many armed disputes between military units or between those of the military and the police, but despite the repeated conflicts the military's and police's rivalry in business remains unresolved.
Analysts have provided a wide variety of solutions to the problem in response to the officers' classic answer -- concerning the moonlighting of their subordinates -- that they had to resort to such activities for additional money as the state failed to provide them with an adequate income.
And such off-duty activities are indeed problematic as they require no accountability and no audit. It remains unclear where the money from the moonlighting activities goes -- whether to the military institution or to the pockets of the officers themselves.