The role of intelligence and counterinsurgency

The role of intelligence and counterinsurgency

Kusnanto Anggoro, Senior Researcher, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, (CSIS), Jakarta

The importance of espionage in military affairs has been
recognized since the beginning of recorded history. The Egyptians
had a well-developed secret service, and spying and subversion
are mentioned in the Iliad and in the Bible. The ancient Chinese
treatise on the art of war devotes much attention to deception
and intelligence gathering, arguing that all war is based on
deception. In the modern age, Joseph Fouche is credited with
developing the first modern political espionage system, and
Frederick II of Prussia is regarded as the founder of modern
military intelligence.

Any textbook on counterinsurgency describes the importance of
intelligence, in which espionage is one important aspect. Ask
people on the streets, and some would likely say that Indonesia's
intelligence is unprofessional. They may be well equipped with
the worst-case scenario and the essentials of preventive and/or
preemptive strategy. But they simply miss the real target in most
cases, suggesting a wide gap between strategic zealot and
operational competence.

Indeed, intelligence everywhere tends to be zealous officers,
as was the case with Mexican counterinsurgency against the
Zapatista rebels and the Colombians in their counter-narcotics
operation. Post Sept. 11 the police and intelligence community in
the U.S. appeared to replicate the zeal with which, for instance,
the principally white officers undertook their jobs against
African-Americans after the urban riots of the 1960s.

But this could well be problematic in the absence of checks
and balance and unity of command. These two are the biggest
riddles of the intelligence service. During Soeharto's era,
intelligence operatives were given carte blanche to crush the
armed rebellion instigated by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). And
despite pulling out from Aceh in 1999, many more from the
Indonesian Military (TNI) remained, mainly as intelligence
officers operating out of uniform.

The result was the alleged forming of militias in, among other
areas, Takengon, Meulaboh, South Aceh and Singkel (The Jakarta
Post, May 15). The tendency of mobilizing them for either
political parties or to create conflict with other groups in
society could well be enormously strong, especially considering
many military personnel now in charge in Aceh had backgrounds in
intelligence and included veterans of special anti-terror units
in some areas, including in East Timor.

One has to be skeptical, without being pessimistic, with
respect to Indonesian intelligence. The military remain in
control of a surveillance network and have the capacity to
intervene by whatever means deemed necessary. Nonetheless, the
regional command in Aceh does not appear to perform passive
security measures such as registry information and source of
control or even prepared plans and estimates.

More seriously, they may be somewhat ignorant during what
became the later stages of insurgent activities. Should all these
intelligence function properly, then, they would have been able
to detect how GAM were going to respond to TNI deployments in
Aceh, and hundreds of schools might have been prevented from
destruction. Interestingly, just one day before the deployment,
the military had claimed to know the strength of GAM and their
contingency plan for the possible total failure of the Cessation
of Hostilities Agreement.

For the intelligence to have missed an operation of this
magnitude indicates how intelligence agencies have seemingly
become worn down over the last three years. Perhaps, separation
of the National Police from the armed forces has become their
major obstacle for fulfilling their intended roles in state
security. This may be of relevance to the cases of bombing of
churches across Indonesia on Christmas Eve of 2000, which
military intelligence knew of in advance, but certainly not in
the case of Aceh when the region was already declared a state of
military emergency.

Professional intelligence is a matter of adequate outlook,
effective use of resources, and appropriate targeting -- and
there is a great demand for change in such respects. First is in
the hearts and minds of intelligence officers. Dominated by a
militaristic culture, they remain in a statist point of view, and
tend to regard any "anti-regime"-sounding party as an enemy of
the state. To them GAM comprises not only the military-wing of
the separatist movement but also those who adopt political means,
including students and NGO activists.

Second, they should not rely on the destruction of particular
immediate targets as the primary goal, while relying on the
intention to create generalized terror as they did against
alleged criminals in 1983-1985, simply to scare prominent
opponents of the Soeharto regime, or in East Timor in the wake of
the referendum in 1999 when the plan was intended to domesticate
local leaders and supporters of the Fretilin guerrillas.

Third is unity of command. This is another serious challenge
for the government. The relationship among agencies, for example
between the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) and the Armed Forces
Strategic Intelligence (BAIS), has been shifting constantly.
During the New Order, everybody just centered on Soeharto as each
and every military commander was responsible to him on a more or
less personal level. In post-Soeharto Indonesia, the intelligence
community was thrown into disarray. It appears that they have
always been more a player than a servant of its master.

Thus it is a serious question whether we can rely on
intelligence for the success of the military operation in Aceh.
Sure, technical competence is important, but, considering the
available intelligence resources, the challenge insurgency poses
to the intelligence community is wider than other types of
conflict.

In counterinsurgency operations, intelligence must be on alert
at all stages of insurgency, mostly by using psychological
instruments rather than force and violence methods. When
insurgent groups form, intelligence agencies should identify them
and make recommendations for future surveillance or
neutralization operations. Later, the use of intelligence also
calls for the identification of all issues around which the
insurgents mobilize and to which groups respond.

It is now the time for the intelligence services to prove
their competence; and both the government and the commander in
the field to make the best of it. Limiting civilian casualties
requires minimum use of forces and appropriate targeting. For the
intelligence, identifying wrong targets and using harsh methods
will only mean the continuation and almost certainly the
intensification of massive human rights abuses.

The intelligence headquarters in Jakarta should not follow the
experience of the U.S. "black operation" in South Vietnam (the
Phoenix Program) and Nicaragua. No one can win the hearts and
minds of the people by using terror.

The writer also lectures in Strategic and Security Studies at
the post-graduate program at the University of Indonesia,
Jakarta.