The role of intelligence and counterinsurgency
Kusnanto Anggoro, Senior Researcher, Center for Strategic and International Studies, (CSIS), Jakarta
The importance of espionage in military affairs has been recognized since the beginning of recorded history. The Egyptians had a well-developed secret service, and spying and subversion are mentioned in the Iliad and in the Bible. The ancient Chinese treatise on the art of war devotes much attention to deception and intelligence gathering, arguing that all war is based on deception. In the modern age, Joseph Fouche is credited with developing the first modern political espionage system, and Frederick II of Prussia is regarded as the founder of modern military intelligence.
Any textbook on counterinsurgency describes the importance of intelligence, in which espionage is one important aspect. Ask people on the streets, and some would likely say that Indonesia's intelligence is unprofessional. They may be well equipped with the worst-case scenario and the essentials of preventive and/or preemptive strategy. But they simply miss the real target in most cases, suggesting a wide gap between strategic zealot and operational competence.
Indeed, intelligence everywhere tends to be zealous officers, as was the case with Mexican counterinsurgency against the Zapatista rebels and the Colombians in their counter-narcotics operation. Post Sept. 11 the police and intelligence community in the U.S. appeared to replicate the zeal with which, for instance, the principally white officers undertook their jobs against African-Americans after the urban riots of the 1960s.
But this could well be problematic in the absence of checks and balance and unity of command. These two are the biggest riddles of the intelligence service. During Soeharto's era, intelligence operatives were given carte blanche to crush the armed rebellion instigated by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). And despite pulling out from Aceh in 1999, many more from the Indonesian Military (TNI) remained, mainly as intelligence officers operating out of uniform.
The result was the alleged forming of militias in, among other areas, Takengon, Meulaboh, South Aceh and Singkel (The Jakarta Post, May 15). The tendency of mobilizing them for either political parties or to create conflict with other groups in society could well be enormously strong, especially considering many military personnel now in charge in Aceh had backgrounds in intelligence and included veterans of special anti-terror units in some areas, including in East Timor.
One has to be skeptical, without being pessimistic, with respect to Indonesian intelligence. The military remain in control of a surveillance network and have the capacity to intervene by whatever means deemed necessary. Nonetheless, the regional command in Aceh does not appear to perform passive security measures such as registry information and source of control or even prepared plans and estimates.
More seriously, they may be somewhat ignorant during what became the later stages of insurgent activities. Should all these intelligence function properly, then, they would have been able to detect how GAM were going to respond to TNI deployments in Aceh, and hundreds of schools might have been prevented from destruction. Interestingly, just one day before the deployment, the military had claimed to know the strength of GAM and their contingency plan for the possible total failure of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.
For the intelligence to have missed an operation of this magnitude indicates how intelligence agencies have seemingly become worn down over the last three years. Perhaps, separation of the National Police from the armed forces has become their major obstacle for fulfilling their intended roles in state security. This may be of relevance to the cases of bombing of churches across Indonesia on Christmas Eve of 2000, which military intelligence knew of in advance, but certainly not in the case of Aceh when the region was already declared a state of military emergency.
Professional intelligence is a matter of adequate outlook, effective use of resources, and appropriate targeting -- and there is a great demand for change in such respects. First is in the hearts and minds of intelligence officers. Dominated by a militaristic culture, they remain in a statist point of view, and tend to regard any "anti-regime"-sounding party as an enemy of the state. To them GAM comprises not only the military-wing of the separatist movement but also those who adopt political means, including students and NGO activists.
Second, they should not rely on the destruction of particular immediate targets as the primary goal, while relying on the intention to create generalized terror as they did against alleged criminals in 1983-1985, simply to scare prominent opponents of the Soeharto regime, or in East Timor in the wake of the referendum in 1999 when the plan was intended to domesticate local leaders and supporters of the Fretilin guerrillas.
Third is unity of command. This is another serious challenge for the government. The relationship among agencies, for example between the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) and the Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence (BAIS), has been shifting constantly. During the New Order, everybody just centered on Soeharto as each and every military commander was responsible to him on a more or less personal level. In post-Soeharto Indonesia, the intelligence community was thrown into disarray. It appears that they have always been more a player than a servant of its master.
Thus it is a serious question whether we can rely on intelligence for the success of the military operation in Aceh. Sure, technical competence is important, but, considering the available intelligence resources, the challenge insurgency poses to the intelligence community is wider than other types of conflict.
In counterinsurgency operations, intelligence must be on alert at all stages of insurgency, mostly by using psychological instruments rather than force and violence methods. When insurgent groups form, intelligence agencies should identify them and make recommendations for future surveillance or neutralization operations. Later, the use of intelligence also calls for the identification of all issues around which the insurgents mobilize and to which groups respond.
It is now the time for the intelligence services to prove their competence; and both the government and the commander in the field to make the best of it. Limiting civilian casualties requires minimum use of forces and appropriate targeting. For the intelligence, identifying wrong targets and using harsh methods will only mean the continuation and almost certainly the intensification of massive human rights abuses.
The intelligence headquarters in Jakarta should not follow the experience of the U.S. "black operation" in South Vietnam (the Phoenix Program) and Nicaragua. No one can win the hearts and minds of the people by using terror.
The writer also lectures in Strategic and Security Studies at the post-graduate program at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta.