The role of EAS in an East Asian community

The role of EAS in an East Asian community

Makmur Keliat, Jakarta

What are the future prospects for regional integration in East
Asia? This question is pertinent because the ASEAN Foreign
Ministers (AFM) meeting held in Cebu two months ago seems to have
failed to map out a role for the East Asia Summit (EAS) in
realizing the idea of future regional integration in East Asia.

Though the AFM meeting in Cebu was held to follow up on a
strategic decision made during the ASEAN+3 Summit in Vientiane
last year, in which all member countries of ASEAN+3 agreed to
hold the EAS in Kuala Lumpur by the end of this year, it only
succeeded in reaching a minimal consensus on the modality of the
EAS. Based on the idea of inclusiveness, it was thought ASEAN
would agree to invite other countries beyond the ASEAN+3
framework to participate in the EAS.

In line with this modality, the AFM meeting formulated three
basic criteria for the eligibility of applicant countries to join
the EAS: countries have to become full dialog partners of ASEAN,
have substantial relations with ASEAN and have acceded or have
agreed to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.

On the grounds that it dissipated the divergent views of
member countries of ASEAN on the membership of the EAS, some
regarded the consensus as a significant breakthrough. However,
the agreed modality seems to have also conveyed confusing signals
on the future direction of East Asia regional integration.

First, by focusing on the issue of membership, it is difficult
to erase the impression that the idea of East Asian regional
integration seems to have shifted and become more directed toward
addressing the question of broadening and engaging more actors.

Little attention has been paid to coping with the question of
how to deepen the cooperations already put on the agenda, as
recommended by the East Asia Study Group (EASG) in 2001.

There are two main factors that may have driven ASEAN to pay
more attention to the question of broadening compared to that of
deepening. The first factor may relate to the complexity of the
globalization process. There are those who argue that member
countries of ASEAN might be aware that under the objective nature
of globalization, the agendas for functional cooperation, ranging
from trade, finance and investment to energy, would be infective
if evolved through a closed regional cooperation framework.

Those who are proponents of this view also point out that
countries beyond the ASEAN+3 framework, such as India, Australia
and New Zealand, have already left their footprints in the
economic, political and security dynamics of the East Asian
region.

The second factor may relate to strategic compulsions. There
has been a fear that the idea of limiting East Asia cooperation
to the ASEAN+3 framework would create difficulty in realizing
East Asia as a true community.

This difficulty is said to have arisen from traditionally
hostile relations between China and Japan. It is argued that
under these circumstances, ASEAN could possibly become entangled
in Sino-Japanese animosity which in turn could divide the
solidity of ASEAN as a group. Almost similar to this view, there
has been speculation that the United States would give a negative
response if the idea of accomplishing East Asia regional
integration was conducted through an exclusive framework.

It is worth mentioning that there have been 17 sectors and 48
meetings already carried out under the ASEAN+3 process with a
view to strengthening cooperation in East Asia.

Nonetheless, most of the meetings have been held at the
ministerial, senior official and general director levels.

Meetings at the level of working groups so far have been held
only in three sectors: finance, macroeconomy and energy. Related
to this, it is also worth noting that 17 short-term measures
recommended by the EASG have not been fully implemented. On the
other hand, the EAS, under which are placed basically medium and
long-term measures, is to be implemented this year.

Indeed, if the membership of EAS is conceptualized as
different and larger than that of the ASEAN+3, then as a logical
consequence there is an urgent need for the ASEAN Secretariat to
establish a new specific section beyond the ASEAN+3 unit.

If this is not done, it would be natural to pose the question
of which unit of the ASEAN Secretariat will be responsible for
following up the outcome of the coming EAS in Kuala Lumpur?

Member countries of ASEAN need to answer this question since
there has been speculation that in the future there will be an
opportunity to establish a specific secretariat outside ASEAN to
deal with the outcome of the EAS. It is also for this reason that
member countries of ASEAN should take innovative steps to reach a
consensus on the agenda for the EAS.

If ASEAN really wants to play its role in the driver's seat,
the member countries of the regional organization should also
show its capacity to steer the meeting agenda for the EAS. In
this regard, the most important component of the agenda would lie
in the following question: what role and authority will the EAS
have in the entire process of regional integration in East Asia?

Would it be a momentous starting point to realize the idea of
East Asian regional integration or alternatively would it be an
ending point for the idea?

If it is presumed to be a momentous starting point, then there
is a need for ASEAN to sincerely transform the EAS into a special
forum with a stronger mandate and authority to realize East Asian
regional integration.

On the other hand, if it is regarded as the end product and
ultimate goal of East Asian regional integration, then the member
countries of ASEAN will be obliged to display their extraordinary
diplomatic acumen in setting the meeting agenda for the coming
EAS to the effect that there will be no possibility to issue a
declaration to speed up regional integration in East Asia.

For Indonesia the most viable strategic option to come out of
this complexity should be based on how the country defines its
national interests.

In brief, foreign policymakers in Indonesia are bound to
explain to the public the linkage between the idea of East Asian
regional integration and the government's policies to cope with
domestic problems inherited from the financial crisis in 1998.

The writer is the executive director of East Asian Cooperation
Studies (CEACoS) at the University of Indonesia. This article is
an excerpt of a paper discussed at a recent bimonthly meeting
hosted by The Jakarta Post in cooperation with CEACoS.