The role of EAS in an East Asian community

Makmur Keliat, Jakarta

What are the future prospects for regional integration in East Asia? This question is pertinent because the ASEAN Foreign Ministers (AFM) meeting held in Cebu two months ago seems to have failed to map out a role for the East Asia Summit (EAS) in realizing the idea of future regional integration in East Asia.

Though the AFM meeting in Cebu was held to follow up on a strategic decision made during the ASEAN+3 Summit in Vientiane last year, in which all member countries of ASEAN+3 agreed to hold the EAS in Kuala Lumpur by the end of this year, it only succeeded in reaching a minimal consensus on the modality of the EAS. Based on the idea of inclusiveness, it was thought ASEAN would agree to invite other countries beyond the ASEAN+3 framework to participate in the EAS.

In line with this modality, the AFM meeting formulated three basic criteria for the eligibility of applicant countries to join the EAS: countries have to become full dialog partners of ASEAN, have substantial relations with ASEAN and have acceded or have agreed to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.

On the grounds that it dissipated the divergent views of member countries of ASEAN on the membership of the EAS, some regarded the consensus as a significant breakthrough. However, the agreed modality seems to have also conveyed confusing signals on the future direction of East Asia regional integration.

First, by focusing on the issue of membership, it is difficult to erase the impression that the idea of East Asian regional integration seems to have shifted and become more directed toward addressing the question of broadening and engaging more actors.

Little attention has been paid to coping with the question of how to deepen the cooperations already put on the agenda, as recommended by the East Asia Study Group (EASG) in 2001.

There are two main factors that may have driven ASEAN to pay more attention to the question of broadening compared to that of deepening. The first factor may relate to the complexity of the globalization process. There are those who argue that member countries of ASEAN might be aware that under the objective nature of globalization, the agendas for functional cooperation, ranging from trade, finance and investment to energy, would be infective if evolved through a closed regional cooperation framework.

Those who are proponents of this view also point out that countries beyond the ASEAN+3 framework, such as India, Australia and New Zealand, have already left their footprints in the economic, political and security dynamics of the East Asian region.

The second factor may relate to strategic compulsions. There has been a fear that the idea of limiting East Asia cooperation to the ASEAN+3 framework would create difficulty in realizing East Asia as a true community.

This difficulty is said to have arisen from traditionally hostile relations between China and Japan. It is argued that under these circumstances, ASEAN could possibly become entangled in Sino-Japanese animosity which in turn could divide the solidity of ASEAN as a group. Almost similar to this view, there has been speculation that the United States would give a negative response if the idea of accomplishing East Asia regional integration was conducted through an exclusive framework.

It is worth mentioning that there have been 17 sectors and 48 meetings already carried out under the ASEAN+3 process with a view to strengthening cooperation in East Asia.

Nonetheless, most of the meetings have been held at the ministerial, senior official and general director levels.

Meetings at the level of working groups so far have been held only in three sectors: finance, macroeconomy and energy. Related to this, it is also worth noting that 17 short-term measures recommended by the EASG have not been fully implemented. On the other hand, the EAS, under which are placed basically medium and long-term measures, is to be implemented this year.

Indeed, if the membership of EAS is conceptualized as different and larger than that of the ASEAN+3, then as a logical consequence there is an urgent need for the ASEAN Secretariat to establish a new specific section beyond the ASEAN+3 unit.

If this is not done, it would be natural to pose the question of which unit of the ASEAN Secretariat will be responsible for following up the outcome of the coming EAS in Kuala Lumpur?

Member countries of ASEAN need to answer this question since there has been speculation that in the future there will be an opportunity to establish a specific secretariat outside ASEAN to deal with the outcome of the EAS. It is also for this reason that member countries of ASEAN should take innovative steps to reach a consensus on the agenda for the EAS.

If ASEAN really wants to play its role in the driver's seat, the member countries of the regional organization should also show its capacity to steer the meeting agenda for the EAS. In this regard, the most important component of the agenda would lie in the following question: what role and authority will the EAS have in the entire process of regional integration in East Asia?

Would it be a momentous starting point to realize the idea of East Asian regional integration or alternatively would it be an ending point for the idea?

If it is presumed to be a momentous starting point, then there is a need for ASEAN to sincerely transform the EAS into a special forum with a stronger mandate and authority to realize East Asian regional integration.

On the other hand, if it is regarded as the end product and ultimate goal of East Asian regional integration, then the member countries of ASEAN will be obliged to display their extraordinary diplomatic acumen in setting the meeting agenda for the coming EAS to the effect that there will be no possibility to issue a declaration to speed up regional integration in East Asia.

For Indonesia the most viable strategic option to come out of this complexity should be based on how the country defines its national interests.

In brief, foreign policymakers in Indonesia are bound to explain to the public the linkage between the idea of East Asian regional integration and the government's policies to cope with domestic problems inherited from the financial crisis in 1998.

The writer is the executive director of East Asian Cooperation Studies (CEACoS) at the University of Indonesia. This article is an excerpt of a paper discussed at a recent bimonthly meeting hosted by The Jakarta Post in cooperation with CEACoS.