The road to peace in Aceh must start with justice
The road to peace in Aceh must start with justice
Usman Hamid, Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence,
(Kontras), Jakarta
President Megawati Soekarnoputri reportedly instructed the
Indonesian Military (TNI) and the National Police on April 7 to
ready themselves for a security operation, prompting a number of
foreign representatives here to seek official clarification of
the report.
Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono later stressed that a military operation
would be the last resort for the government, and that a peaceful
route was still open in dealing with the Free Aceh Movement
(GAM).
For now, the government and GAM have agreed to meet on Friday
and Saturday in Geneva where they are expected to discuss alleged
violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA),
sined in the same town last Dec. 9.
Foreign countries, particularly Japan, the United States and
those in the European Union, are taking part in the planned
reconstruction of infrastructure in Aceh. They have reiterated
their support for an amicable solution to the Aceh issue.
Many have protested the government's stance, which appears to
be in favor of a military operation. During her visit to Russia,
however, the President dismissed such speculation, saying that
there was only a "contingency plan".
Critics have said that a security approach would only increase
collateral damage. Further, human rights violations committed
during the military operation period of 1989 to August 1998 are
yet to be accounted for.
The government has repeatedly urged that an emergency meeting
of the Joint Council be held to evaluate the implementation of
the peace pact. The Joint Council is the highest forum in the
COHA. Through this meeting the government hopes to see GAM's
earnestness in "returning to the original commitment". Failure to
see this would surely cause the government to launch a military
operation.
Meanwhile, violence has continued. A 10-year-old girl, Ina
Rahmati, was killed and her friend Fitriana, 12, was seriously
injured during an exchange of fire in Bireun on April 12.
Earlier, Nurjannah, 54, the wife of Zulkifli Hanafia, the
chairman of the Golkar Party's North Aceh chapter, was shot dead
by an unidentified group in Lhokseumawe.
About 100 monitoring members of the Joint Security Committee
(JSC) were withdrawn from field offices, following the damage
done to the JSC office in Takengon, the arson of the JSC office
in Langsa, the rejection of the JSC in a number of areas and
increased threats made toward JSC members.
The agreement is in deep trouble. This has often been
attributed to the fact that GAM made use of the two months in the
first phase of the deal to conduct a campaign in the villages,
telling locals that the agreement was the first step toward
independence. The first phase was intended for confidence
building.
GAM also conducted a campaign saying that UN support would be
forthcoming, including the resumption of control over government-
held villages in a number of areas in Aceh and the reorganization
of GAM's armed forces.
All this has made the TNI lose its patience, and military
members have reportedly been mobilizing an anti-GAM civilian
force to attack the monitoring offices set up in accordance with
the peace pact and demand that the committee be dissolved for its
failure to stop violations by GAM. This pattern was visible
earlier, although the military has denied any such suggestions.
What GAM did in the two months of the first phase is
deplorable and cannot be justified. GAM has to be responsible for
and accept all the consequences arising from the agreement.
However, under whatever pretext, the anti-GAM mass mobilization
by the TNI is not justifiable, either.
Of course, the two sides will blame each other for what has
happened. The Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) faces a challenge as the
mediator in handling this problem through a joint forum involving
the government, GAM and international independent monitoring
parties.
A more fundamental problem is that both sides do not seem to
have a strategic interest in the peace pact. Many within the TNI
may feel it is not necessary to conduct strategic negotiations
with a rebel group; separatism can only be crushed with arms. As
for GAM, it obviously has no interest in the special autonomy
status.
GAM is still convinced that sooner or later Indonesia will
collapse and that they only have to wait for that time to come.
The government's efforts to make tactical compromises will only
be a small incentive for GAM to take part in a political process.
Megawati's administration, for example, has closed all the doors
for GAM to set up a local political party.
To build peace in Aceh, it is important to ensure that the
functions of accountability and the role of justice run properly.
In this context, the norm of justice has to be well formulated on
the basis of mutual agreement, including an agreement from the
Acehnese themselves.
First, in the context of peace building, the essence of
justice is truth, fairness, rectitude and requital. Truth relates
to the understanding and record of the root causes of the Aceh
conflict, for example, which side of the agreement is responsible
for which action and which side of the agreement, including
individuals, can be categorized as victims or even perpetrators
(including the possibility that both sides are to be considered
perpetrators).
Of course, in the future, the function of the JSC can be
geared toward the realization of these aspects to ensure that the
consequences to arise from each violent act or violation will be
clear to all.
These aspects require an understanding and articulation of the
main goal of both parties, including the third party, as well as
an assessment of the interests that can generally be accepted by
international practices, particularly in relation to internal
armed conflict norms or Indonesia's legal instruments.
Take Law No. 26/2002 on human rights courts with jurisdiction
over major human rights violations committed by the government
and armed guerrillas. It is worth finding out how far Indonesia's
legal mechanisms can affect the behavior of GAM and the
government and how far this legal approach is compatible with the
conflict approach adopted.
Meanwhile, the HDC as a third party has to show impartiality
and guarantee fairness.
Second is the essence of anti-justice, the antithesis of the
essence of truth. This is falsehood, which is often disseminated
through propaganda. One is reminded of the propaganda machines of
Slobodan Milosevic -- particularly the state television stations
-- to build up Serb nationalism; of the nationalism which aroused
the organizing of many East Timorese against those who were for
independence; and the organization of security volunteers
(Pamswakarsa) set up against the student movement after the
downfall of Soeharto.
The anti-GAM mass mobilization resulting in the damage and
arson to JSC offices also brings to mind the prevailing pattern
in the 1998 mid-May riots in Jakarta.
Violence bred under this pattern will never bring peace.
Justice has to be really enforced. Alternatives abound: the
establishment of a mechanism of individual responsibility and
avoidance of collective mistakes; avoidance of discrediting an
institution and leaders responsible for a crime; accurate
historical documentation; a victims catharsis and deterrence.
Unless justice is enforced, violence can never be stopped.
Instead, violence will continue to be used as an instrument and a
means to reach an objective.
2. 6PRO24 -- The atlantic divide in black and white
2 x 26
The transatlantic divide
in black and white
Alberto Alesina
and Francesco Giavazzi
Project Syndicate
Relations between Continental Western Europe and the US have
never been so strained in recent decades as they are now. Is the
cause a short-run disagreement about a specific issue, the war in
Iraq? Or is the transatlantic ideological divide deep, pervasive,
and unlikely to disappear anytime soon?
Before diplomats and pundits begin to paper over the two
sides' differences, it is necessary to reflect on their sources.
For we believe that the transatlantic divide does mirror
fundamental differences in values -- with the immediate caveat
that these differences do not, and should not, bring the two
sides into conflict.
The profoundly different values that America and Europe hold
can best be viewed by examining how each perceives poverty,
inequality, and the welfare state. According to the World Value
Survey, a respected attitudinal study conducted in about 40
countries, 60 percent of Americans believe that the poor are
"lazy," a view shared by only 26 percent of Europeans. Nearly the
exact opposite proportions (60 percent of Europeans and
29 percent of Americans) believe that the poor are trapped in
poverty.
Similarly, evidence drawn from surveys about well being
indicates that Americans are much less bothered by inequality
than Europeans. In fact, even the American poor do not mind
inequality, which they see as a social ladder that they can
climb. The European poor view inequality as an insurmountable
social obstacle.
These basic differences lead to obvious consequences for
social polices.
Europe spends twice as much as the US on social programs, and
total government spending in Europe is close to 50 percent of
gross domestic product. In the US, government consumes about 30
percent of GDP. These numbers are not just about social spending,
but have implication for issues like defense and foreign policy.
If Europe wants to play a more active role in international
affairs it must become a military power: The US spends about 4
percent of its GDP more than Europe for military purposes.
But this is difficult for Europe to achieve, let alone
contemplate: Looming deficits and exhausted taxpayers make it
hard, if not impossible, to divert several percentage points of
GDP to military spending.
But where do these differences in attitude toward fundamental
issues like inequality come from? One explanation is that America
is a more mobile society where the poor are not trapped and can
seemingly get out of poverty if they really try. If the poor
remain poor, Americans conclude, it must be because they are
lazy. The European poor do not have such mobility and thus lack
the supposed chance that poor Americans possess. Even if they try
hard, they feel trapped.
The alternative, and much more likely, explanation is that
these differing views reflect profound ideological differences
that pay little attention to economic reality. In other words,
the ideological differences across the Atlantic are much larger
than actual differences in social mobility and the supposed
laziness of the poor.
European culture remains profoundly affected by the Marxist
intellectual tradition in which classes are viewed as cast in
stone -- which implies that it is almost impossible for a poor
person to become rich, or, apropos the tradition, for a
"proletarian" to become a "capitalist."
Marxism assumes social immobility to justify the concept of
"class." In many European countries, political institutions were
shaped in revolutionary periods in which socialist parties and
ideas enjoyed mass support. European constitutions often reflect
an emphasis on equality and redistribution.
In America, the Marxist cultural influence was very limited.
Indeed, outside of universities, it scarcely ruffled American
life. Instead, the culture (or myth) of the "self-made man"
provides the ideological tool for America's social conservatives
to justify limited government intervention.
The US Constitution, though reshaped, amended, and adapted to
fit changing times, reflects its origins as a document written
and designed to protect private property against the predations
of the State.
The second source of the transatlantic divide in attitudes
toward fundamental issues like inequality has to do with racial
bias. The US is a racially fragmented society, so it is
convenient for the majority of wealthy whites to view the poor
(many of them black) as different and lazy compared to hard-
working whites.
Indeed, even controlling for income, whites are much less
receptive to redistributive policies than non-white Americans,
precisely because they perceive them as favoring racial
minorities. Even poor whites oppose redistributive policies,
owing to racial distrust, if not downright animosity.
Historically, America's racial and ethnic divisions also
inhibited the development of a homogeneous working-class culture
and movement, which empowered socialist and Communist parties
across Europe in the 20th century.
In more homogeneous European countries, the differences
between rich and poor are much less obvious: In Sweden, rich and
poor are all white, often tall and blond. Not surprisingly, the
European right is beginning to use immigration as a tool to
attack the welfare state. As Europe becomes increasingly multi-
cultural, political pressures against the welfare state seem
certain to grow.
For now, Americans and Continental West Europeans remain very
different in their basic attitudes concerning poverty,
inequality, and the welfare state. It remains to be seen whether
these attitudes will persist in their current form, and whether
the transatlantic divide widens or narrows.
Alberto Alesina is Professor of economics at Harvard
University and Francesco Giavazzi is Professor of economics at
Bocconi University, Milan.