The return of 'securo-crats' in U.S.

The return of 'securo-crats' in U.S.

Under George W. Bush, the United States may be more willing to
act unilaterally, writes Kusnanto Anggoro, a senior
researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies
and a lecturer in the postgraduate studies program at the
University of Indonesia in Jakarta.

JAKARTA (JP): There may be an American ideal, however
President-elect George Bush Jr. has no choice but adopt a
different strategy from his predecessors. During the Clinton
years, U.S. dominance has met with mixed emotions across the
world.

In Asia, the United States is viewed as a benign balance to
China's growing power, but American power has been used to force
unwelcome change. Washington also failed to help when its friends
were in need, as in the 1997 financial crisis. Anti-Americanism
of some sort is emerging across the region, even in Okinawa,
Japan, her most important ally in the region.

Nor can the President-elect exercise a similar strategy to
that of George Bush Sr. The world has changed since the days of
glory when the United States assembled the Gulf War coalition
against Saddam Hussein. Bush Jr. will not be dealing with a
compromising Mikhail Gorbachev, but a more assertive and
deliberate Vladimir Putin.

The old ways of doing governmental business, forged during the
Cold War, are being complicated by the forces of globalization
and the rise of nationalist sentiments.

In Asia and the Pacific, the last three years have brought
about more significant, yet turbulent, changes than the previous
decade.

The self-confidence of Southeast Asia was shattered by the
1997 financial crisis. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
Forum and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations seem to have
lost direction. Democracy is being tested everywhere. Leaderships
are being challenged in Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia.
Many governments are politically and economically adrift.
Sensitivity and coherency are needed to control such
desynchronizing challenges to the international economy and the
domestic sphere.

To a large degree, Bush's overall vision suggests a United
States willing to act more unilaterally than previously, and less
disposed to work through international institutions, including
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the United
Nations. Bush Jr. the presidential campaigner spoke of
approaching policy with "humility" and of showing restraint in
the use of American forces.

Yet, Bush Jr. the President-elect mentioned in his victory
speech that "(the U.S.) will have a military equal to every
challenge, and superior to every adversary". Details remain to be
seen, and the U.S. will ultimately be judged by its deeds.

It is on this point that the flavor of U.S. foreign policy is
about to shift. Gone are the leading figures in the Clinton
administration from the world of economics, the "econocrats", the
likes of Samuel R. Berger and Robert E. Rubin. The foreign policy
team Bush Jr. is assembling seems to have a distinctly "securo-
crat" flavor -- much more so than in any recent presidency. Just
consider personalities like Richard Cheney, Gen. Colin Powell,
Richard Armitage and Paul Wolfowitz.

Even the academic Condoleezza Rice, Bush's likely choice for
national security adviser, gained most of her experience as Bent
Scowcroft's protege on the National Security Council and worked
briefly in the Pentagon.

Of course, the U.S. has been the leader of Kantian democratic
peace. The White House will continue to assert American values
and support countries going through the transition to democracy
and the market economy.

But this will certainly not take place at the same level as
during Clinton's presidency. The Bush administration will be
inclined to make this more non-governmental business. U.S. non-
governmental organizations and multinational corporations may
become more prominent as instruments of American foreign policy,
and the U.S. Congress may even talk louder.

The resurgence of these Pentagon-breeds appears to be welcomed
in Japan. And while the Clinton administration was seen to have
paid too much attention to China, the Taiwanese also must be
equally happy.

In a presidential debate Bush Jr. not only mentioned Taiwan,
but also said if China attacked Taiwan the United States must
come to the island's defense. However, a tougher line toward
North Korea carries the risk of disrupting the peace process on
the Korean Peninsula, and could therefore create some problems
with Seoul.

In all probability, the United States will continue to use
incentives or rewards along with penalties or punishments to
influence the behavior of difficult regimes.

The question is how Washington will decide when engagement
strategies might be considered in place of, or in tandem with,
more punitive measures. Washington should be more sensitive. A
microscopic decision based on U.S. interests could have
macropolitical consequences of epic proportions elsewhere.

By and large, the White House is likely to use more honey with
Japan and Taiwan, and more vinegar with China and Myanmar. To
Indonesia, the Bush presidency is a delicate paradox. The White
House may be more tolerant of a slower pace of political,
bureaucratic and economic reform, but more hostile toward a such
nationalist ideas as forging closer security and/or defense
cooperations with China and India.

A "conspiracy of consensus" of overtly nationalist policy
between Merdeka Palace, the President, and Senayan, home of the
House of Representatives, will not sit well with the new American
"securo-crats".