The problems of nuclear-free zones

By Brahma Chellaney

NEW DELHI (JP): While nuclear weapons have become indispensable for the security of the great powers and the enlarging Western alliance, one more region is aspiring to declare itself "free" of such arms. The five Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan want to create a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in their area, even as the consummation of similar zones in Southeast Asia and Africa has run into difficulties.

NWFZs have been established by regional states largely in response to the tardy progress on global disarmament and the growing recognition that nuclear weapons will remain the icons of power. The irony is that such zones are free neither of nuclear dangers nor of nuclear weapons.

NWFZs fit well with the big powers' strategy to make nonproliferation a respectable and lawful enterprise through measures that do not significantly constrain the movement and deployment of nuclear arms.

The ban on the stationing of nuclear weapons imposed by such zones does not cover the most sophisticated and invulnerable component of a modern nuclear force -- submarines armed with nuclear weapons. Such submarines can stay under water for many days at a stretch, scoffing at the restrictions of any NWFZ. Such zones, moreover, do not bar the movement of nuclear arms by air or sea. The most "free" aspect of a nuclear-free zone is that nuclear-armed ships, submarines and aircraft can move about freely in the region.

Nothing better exemplifies how the leading powers have safeguarded their freedom of action than the treaties that declare nuclear-free the seabed as well as the moon and all other celestial bodies within the solar system -- expect Earth. Only peripheral parts of the world are becoming "nuclear-free". In contrast, Eastern Europe, instead of being denuclearized after the end of the Cold War, is partly coming under NATO's nuclear umbrella.

The existing and emerging NWFZ's are in favorable geopolitical settings and do not clash with big-power strategic interests. The regional states drawn to NWFZ's are already members of the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and their participation in such zones provides a second set of legal commitments against developing nuclear weapons.

Until the nuclear powers ratify the protocols of any NWFZ, their reciprocal obligations do not come into force. The protocols define the obligations of the nuclear powers, including activities they cannot engage in and the security assurances they commit themselves to.

The first NWFZ to cover an inhabited area was the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco governing Latin America and the Caribbean. However, it was not until 1981 that the United States ratified the treaty protocol that affected its deployments at military bases in Puerto Rico, Gauntanamo Bay and the Panama Canal Zone.

The 1986 Rarotonga Treaty was fashioned at the height of the Cold War to contain East-West rivalry in the South Pacific, but was accepted by the Western nuclear powers only after its original purpose had been lost and the French had ceased testing in the area. Its protocols still await U.S. ratification.

The other two nuclear-free zones, in Southeast Asia and Africa, are of recent origin but face troubling questions. The Pelindaba Treaty setting up the African NWFZ has been marred by Russian resentment over the exclusion of the only nuclear post in the region -- the Anglo-American Diego Garcia base.

Not a single nuclear power has yet signed, let alone ratified, the sole protocol of the Bangkok Treaty, creating a NWFZ across Southeast Asia. The nuclear powers have objected to important features of this NWFZ: the inclusion of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelves, and the unqualified security assurances sought from the nuclear powers.

Four of these five powers are ready to commit to not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any state party to the treaty, but object to the provision requiring them not to engage in nuclear threats or activities anywhere within the zone. Their position provides a clue on how secure any NWFZ is from nuclear dangers.

If continental shelves and EEZs are deleted from the scope of the Bangkok Treaty and security assurances are limited to member states rather than to the entire region, the 10-nation NWFZ in effect would get confined to the Southeast Asian landmass and its inland seas and territorial waters. But with its large ocean area, Southeast Asia believes that the objectives of the treaty should be served by a zone encompassing the entire land and sea areas of the region.

The Bangkok Treaty guarantees rights of passage through the EEZs and does not cover the waters above the continental shelves, only the continental shelves themselves. Yet, some powers are objecting to the inclusion of continental shelves, whose use for nuclear deployments is in any case barred by the Seabed Treaty. Discussions, however, are under way on possible amendments that could help allay the concerns of these powers.

One can empathize with the Central Asian interest in establishing a NWFZ. Central Asia, with nuclear neighbors in the north, east and south, has suffered from Russian nuclear testing at Semipalatinsk, now in Kazakhstan, and Chinese testing at next- door Lop Nor.

A Central Asian NWFZ, first proposed by Uzbek President Islam Karimov, was endorsed by the five states at Almaty last February and discussed in detail at Taskhent last month. These states, however, need to appreciate that they cannot insulate themselves from nuclear dangers by creating such a zone. In an age in which nuclear weapons can be fired from anywhere into any region, the concept of a NWFZ is militarily meaningless, although politically it is extolled as a confidence-building measure.

Non-nuclear states are lulling themselves into a mistaken sense of security by creating NWFZs. A nuclear exchange in one part of the world will, through the radioactive fallout, affect another region even if it were "nuclear free".

It is also doubtful whether a NWFZ can remain legally valid in wartime, especially in a global or nuclear conflict. Under international law, the rules of warfare take over when regional aspects of global disarmament agreements fail in their mission to prevent war.

NWFZs can serve as a palliative but not as the antidote to nuclear dangers. The establishment of such cocoons of brittle security helps ease global pressure on the nuclear powers and undermines the cause of disarmament.

The term, "nuclear weapons-free", is really a misnomer, providing only a free delusion. The unequal nature of mutual obligations incorporated in such zones is self-evident.

While the obligations of the non-nuclear parties are verified, the reciprocal obligations of the nuclear powers are neither verified nor verifiable because of the absence of mechanisms to monitor compliance. There should be verification of the full obligations of the nuclear powers, not confined merely to the territories these states might posses within a given zone.

The writer is professor of security studies at the Center for Policy Research, an independent think tank in New Delhi.