The powers that be
The powers that be
Among the various decrees enacted by the People's Consultative
Assembly (MPR) yesterday, one will give the new president
additional powers to deal with emergency situations. The decree
gives the president a free hand to take whatever steps deemed
necessary to safeguard the nation and national development, if
and when they are threatened.
Although it provides one of the few highlights of the current
MPR General Session, the decree is not entirely new. The powers
granted by the decree have their origin in the famous executive
order signed by serving president Sukarno on March 11, 1966 which
empowered Gen. Soeharto, then the Army commander, to take all
steps necessary to restore peace and order. When the order was
signed, Indonesia was on the brink of collapse. One of the first
steps taken by Soeharto was to outlaw the Indonesian Communist
Party and disband the cabinet. In retrospect, these measures put
Indonesia on the road to recovery and then subsequently, a path
to relative prosperity.
These extra powers were confirmed by the Provisional People's
Consultative Assembly in 1967 and then extended by MPR decree in
1968, 1973, 1978, 1983 and 1988. Throughout this time, the
special powers remained at Soeharto's disposal but occasion for
their use did not arise.
Appearing to be redundant, the MPR decided not to renew the
decree authorizing use of the powers during the 1993 General
Session. The move reflected growing confidence in the country's
political situation and in the ability of the legal system and
law enforcement agencies to deal with any threats to national
stability and development. The nation was comfortable vesting
these powers in the President and was equally comfortable
withdrawing them five years ago.
In any case, the government retained the comprehensive
Subversion Law at its disposal. The law was enacted by Sukarno in
the early 1960s and has frequently been used by the present
government in situations deemed a threat to national stability.
Armed rebellions, acts of terrorism, criticism of the government,
corruption, smuggling and narcotic offenses are among the myriad
crimes smashed by this law.
The decision to resurrect the decree has raised many
questions, which Golkar, the chief sponsor of the reenactment,
has unfortunately been unable to answer satisfactorily. During
media briefings, Golkar executives have been unable to answer
some of the questions raised, far less articulate a strong
argument for bringing back the decree.
Why does the assembly want to reenact the decree when
President Soeharto, who will almost certainly be reelected today,
has not had the occasion to use it's special powers for many,
many years? What threats do Golkar and the government now
perceive -- what emergency situations do they foresee which could
warrant the use of these powers?
Golkar leaders have sought to allay concerns that these
special powers may be abused, arguing that the tough conditions
set out in the decree prevent the President invoking the powers
in all but the most exceptional of circumstances. If he does make
use of the powers, he will later be called to account for his
actions before the MPR.
Recent history is comforting, as it suggests these extra
powers will be used sparingly, if at all. But we lament the lack
of debate, both in the MPR and by the general public, in the
enactment of such a weighty and salient decree.
Had the Assembly afforded the subject greater thought, it
could have provided more articulate and persuasive arguments in
favor of the motion. It could also have insisted that the
military and the government provide intelligence on threats which
Indonesia may face in the coming years, and share them with the
public. This knowledge would better prepare the public to face up
to dangers. If they are capable of that then, who knows, perhaps
there will be no need for the decree after all.