The powers that be

Among the various decrees enacted by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) yesterday, one will give the new president additional powers to deal with emergency situations. The decree gives the president a free hand to take whatever steps deemed necessary to safeguard the nation and national development, if and when they are threatened.

Although it provides one of the few highlights of the current MPR General Session, the decree is not entirely new. The powers granted by the decree have their origin in the famous executive order signed by serving president Sukarno on March 11, 1966 which empowered Gen. Soeharto, then the Army commander, to take all steps necessary to restore peace and order. When the order was signed, Indonesia was on the brink of collapse. One of the first steps taken by Soeharto was to outlaw the Indonesian Communist Party and disband the cabinet. In retrospect, these measures put Indonesia on the road to recovery and then subsequently, a path to relative prosperity.

These extra powers were confirmed by the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly in 1967 and then extended by MPR decree in 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983 and 1988. Throughout this time, the special powers remained at Soeharto's disposal but occasion for their use did not arise.

Appearing to be redundant, the MPR decided not to renew the decree authorizing use of the powers during the 1993 General Session. The move reflected growing confidence in the country's political situation and in the ability of the legal system and law enforcement agencies to deal with any threats to national stability and development. The nation was comfortable vesting these powers in the President and was equally comfortable withdrawing them five years ago.

In any case, the government retained the comprehensive Subversion Law at its disposal. The law was enacted by Sukarno in the early 1960s and has frequently been used by the present government in situations deemed a threat to national stability. Armed rebellions, acts of terrorism, criticism of the government, corruption, smuggling and narcotic offenses are among the myriad crimes smashed by this law.

The decision to resurrect the decree has raised many questions, which Golkar, the chief sponsor of the reenactment, has unfortunately been unable to answer satisfactorily. During media briefings, Golkar executives have been unable to answer some of the questions raised, far less articulate a strong argument for bringing back the decree.

Why does the assembly want to reenact the decree when President Soeharto, who will almost certainly be reelected today, has not had the occasion to use it's special powers for many, many years? What threats do Golkar and the government now perceive -- what emergency situations do they foresee which could warrant the use of these powers?

Golkar leaders have sought to allay concerns that these special powers may be abused, arguing that the tough conditions set out in the decree prevent the President invoking the powers in all but the most exceptional of circumstances. If he does make use of the powers, he will later be called to account for his actions before the MPR.

Recent history is comforting, as it suggests these extra powers will be used sparingly, if at all. But we lament the lack of debate, both in the MPR and by the general public, in the enactment of such a weighty and salient decree.

Had the Assembly afforded the subject greater thought, it could have provided more articulate and persuasive arguments in favor of the motion. It could also have insisted that the military and the government provide intelligence on threats which Indonesia may face in the coming years, and share them with the public. This knowledge would better prepare the public to face up to dangers. If they are capable of that then, who knows, perhaps there will be no need for the decree after all.