The politics of Muslims-Christian relations in Indonesia
The politics of Muslims-Christian relations in Indonesia
Bob S. Hadiwinata
Head
International Relations Department,
University of Parahyangan, Bandung
Open conflict between the majority Muslims and minority
Christians has been rare in Indonesian history. When it does
break out, however, it is often violent and brutal. Violent
clashes between Muslims and Christians in Maluku, Kalimantan and
Sulawesi perhaps represent the most brutal episode of Muslims-
Christian relations in Indonesian history.
Economic disparity, ethnicity, class differences,
transmigration and control over resources often enters into
inter-religious conflicts. In Indonesia, perception that there is
a gap between the well-off Christian minority and the mostly
impoverished Muslim majority has caused much of the trouble
between the two religions. Political leaders tend to exploit this
situation in order to mobilize supporters around religious
issues.
During Soeharto's New Order government, the ruling elite had
been successful in minimizing political opposition by dividing
potential challengers into religious differences. This "divide-
and-rule" strategy, according to Bob Hefner, proved to be
efficient in reducing the power and influence of political forces
outside the state.
Towards the end of Soeharto's era and its subsequent
transition to democracy in 1998, the struggle for political
control between the military (who wanted to remain in power) and
the pro-reform forces (who wanted to remove military influences
from politics) had led to a new episode of politicization of
Muslim-Christian relations in Indonesia. Hard-line military
leaders backed the formation of radical Islamic organizations and
para-military groups to perpetrate communal conflicts. For a
number of military leaders who are subject to public scrutiny,
the preservation of conflicts are important for at least three
reasons. First, public disorder and rampant violent conflicts can
justify the resurgence of militarism that allows them to regain
their political grip. Second, political instability may justify
an increase of military budgets that will institutionally
strengthen the military. Third, ambitious military leaders can
build up alliances with various radical religious groups to
establish a new political empire. This may explain the formation
of many radical Islamic organizations with (unofficial) military
backing during recent presidential administrations.
The relation between politics and religion in the modern
Indonesia context can be traced back to the 1940s. The question
that has animated citizenship debates in independent Indonesia
was not focused on whether citizen's rights should be
differentiated by ethnicity, as in Malaysia, but whether or not
they should be differentiated by religion. In the months
preceding the Indonesian declaration of independence on Aug. 17,
1945, Indonesian leaders had worked hard to formulate a tentative
constitution for the planned republic. The most debated issue on
which leaders faced difficulties to strike a deal was indeed
whether the state should impose different rights and duties on
citizens according to their religion.
The issue began to evolve when Muslim leaders drew up a draft
preamble to the Constitution wherein the state would be based on
belief in God with "the obligation to carry out the laws of Islam
(syariah) for the followers of Islam". This draft, also known as
Piagam Jakarta, (Jakarta Charter) was refused by the secularists
and the non-Muslims, which led to its exclusion from the
Constitution. For radical Islamic groups, the failure to enact
the draft became a painful reminder of the Muslim's defeat.
Because many of the secularists came from a Christian background,
some extreme Islamic leaders considered the exclusion of the
Jakarta Charter as the Christian's anti-Islamic campaign. From
then on, Muslims-Christians relations in Indonesia have become
very sensitive indeed.
In Sukarno's government, the issue was revived again through
the debate in the Constituent Assembly that pitted the proponents
of an Islamic state against an odd alliance of military
conservatives and left-leaning popular nationalists committed to
secularism. The proponents of the Jakarta Charter had lost
ground, especially when the political control was in the hands of
President Sukarno, a nationalist-secularist, who announced the
decree to dissolve the Constituent Assembly. Since then, Muslim
interests have never resurfaced, especially when President
Sukarno dissolved Masyumi, a political party strongly committed
to the formation of an Islamic state in Indonesia.
In the New Order era, President Soeharto (a retired army
general) adopted repressive measures in dealing with conflicts
and disturbances in society. For him, any extreme movements - may
they be left or right in their ideological leanings - were
dangerous to the country's political and economic stability. His
focus on economic development had prompted a stringent control
over any extreme Islamic movements. His military-backed
government adopted a non-compromising approach in handling
Islamic extremism. Many extreme activists were jailed or even
executed as was the case with the prosecutions against suspects
of the bombing of the Buddhist Borobudur temple and Bank Central
and the killings of Muslim demonstrators in Tanjung Priok and
Lampung.
Repression against Islamic fundamentalism persisted until the
early 1990s, when Soeharto began to turn to Islam in order to
contest the growing opposition and increasing demand for
democratization in society. In the 1990s, Soeharto dropped all
pretense of neutrality and actively courted ultra-conservative
Muslims who, just a few years earlier, had figured prominently in
the opposition. Soeharto's close association with this hard-line
community appears to have represented a decisive break with his
earlier support for Javanese mysticism and Pancasila pluralism
against Muslim organizations. This radical shift was motivated by
the president's determination to win Muslim support for his re-
election as president. He was also certain that this tactical
shift could help him undermine the growing democratic opposition
by splitting it along religious lines.
The impact of the politicization of religion on Muslim-
Christian relation was indeed dreadful. Islamic radicalism began
to grow. A number of new organizations representing the extreme
views of Islamic teaching were formed during the 1990s. These
organizations found more freedom to express their beliefs.
Sometimes they gave strong messages to grassroots people that
Indonesian Muslims had been out-maneuvered and out-witted by the
non-Muslims in controlling the local and national resources and
in securing political positions. As a result, Muslim anger and
resentment grew, especially toward people from any other
religion. This situation was somewhat exacerbated by conflicts in
the Balkans where the Christian Serbs slaughtered many Muslim
Bosnians - including women and children - in their attempt at
ethnic cleansing. In cursing this tragedy, some Islamic leaders
in Indonesia often made fiery, provocative statements containing
anti-Christian sentiment.
In the late 1990s, Muslim-Christian relations in Indonesia
turned from tense to bloody. An increasing number of political
leaders tended to use hatred of Christians in their attempts to
mobilize followers. When it involved mobs and thugs, violence
became inevitable. The Situbondo and Tasikmalaya cases in 1996,
when riots exploded killing dozens of people and destroying
Christian-associated property, are clear examples.
In the post-Soeharto era, while the fall of a military-backed
authoritarian regime brought new hope to many Indonesians for
democracy and tolerance, the future of Muslim-Christian relations
is less promising. During Habibie's presidency, the legislature
ratified a UN convention on the protection of minority rights.
This act was welcomed by many minority groups including Chinese-
Indonesians, most of whom are Christian/Catholic. When Gus Dur
was appointed as Indonesia's fourth president, the expectation
for more tolerant inter-religious relations in Indonesia was even
higher given that Gus Dur himself was renowned as a moderate
Muslim leader with strong commitment to the promotion of
democracy and religious tolerance.
However, ongoing conflicts and public disorder, provoked by
certain parties to discredit the moderate administration, made
the expectation quickly give way to disappointment and
frustration. The most serious threat to Muslim-Christian
relations is indeed the rise of radical Islamic groups. Serving
as the so-called "defenders of the Islamic faith", these groups
attacked those who they considered to be the enemies of Islam.
Police investigations into the suspects of the Bali bombing makes
it evident that a radical Islamic group was responsible for
various bombings on a number of Christian targets during the year
2000 and 2001.
Political scientist Greg Barton argues that although the
appeal for radical Islam are put forward by some genuine
idealists who are deeply convinced of the truth of the Islamic
doctrine, it is likely that some youthful romantics involved in
such activity are more interested in the drama of protest (or
violence) itself. Consequently, they can be easily persuaded to
target certain demonized enemies who are regarded to be the
source of society's woes.
Another issue which may have an effect on Muslim-Christian
relations in Indonesia is the resurgence of the issue of shariah
law. When the central government introduced Law No.22/1999 on
regional autonomy, local leaders began to search for local norms
and values that would accommodate local identity. Some of them
have dabbled in shariah as a norm that will differentiate local
code of conducts from those of the central government. In many
parts of West Sumatra, Madura and West Java, local
administrations have begun to adopt shariah. Frustrated by the
failure of the country's law to restore order and to fight
corruption, people began to support the implementation of shariah
in their areas. Christian minorities responded to the
implementation of shariah in two different ways. First, a small
minority strongly opposed the implementation of shariah, albeit
quietly, as they believe that it may disturb Muslim-Christian
relations due to the segregation of people on the basis of their
religious beliefs. Second, a large number of Christians are
indifferent towards the implementation of shariah because they
believe that the law is confined to Muslims only. For this group,
as long as they are allowed to practice their religious beliefs
without any hindrance, there is no reason to oppose the
implementation of shariah.
At the present, although the future of Muslim-Christian
relations in Indonesia remains volatile, there are those who
seriously believe that inter-religious dialogs - especially at
grassroots levels - will eventually lead to good prospects of
inter-religious relations. They believe that getting to know one
another is one possible way to develop a tolerant behavior,
acceptance and open-mindedness between different religious
followers. These days, there are several efforts being made by
young Christians to reach out to Muslims to develop religious
dialogs at a grassroots level. In Yogyakarta, INTERFIDEI (Inter-
faith Dialog in Indonesia) had started its activities from the
mid-1990s. Similar efforts are replicated in other cities, such
as the JAKATARUB (Jaringan Kerja Antar Ummat Beragama or inter-
religion working group) in Bandung.
Although the immediate effects of this dialog on inter-
religious relations in Indonesia may not yet be great, these
efforts (particularly when they are replicated and scaled up to
the national level) will have a long term effect where people
from different religious backgrounds are no longer seeing each
other with suspicion or hatred.