The politics of interfaith relations in Indonesia

The politics of interfaith relations in Indonesia

Bob S. Hadiwinata, Head, International Relations Department
University of Parahyangan, Bandung

Open conflict between the majority Muslims and minority
Christians has been rare in Indonesian history. When it does
break out, however, it is often violent and brutal.

Economic disparity, ethnicity, class differences,
transmigration and control over resources often enters into
inter-religious conflicts. There is a perception of a gap between
the well-off Christian minority and the mostly impoverished
Muslim majority, which tends to be exploited by political
leaders.

During Soeharto's New Order government, the ruling elite
successfully minimized opposition by dividing potential
challengers into religious differences. This "divide-and-rule"
strategy, according to the scholar Bob Hefner, proved efficient
in reducing the power and influence of political forces outside
the state.

Towards the end of Soeharto's era, the struggle for political
control between the military and the pro-reform forces had led to
a new episode of politicization of Muslim-Christian relations in
Indonesia.

Public disorder was seen to be able to justify the resurgence
of militarism, thus allowing the regaining of political grip by
some military leaders. Political instability might further
justify an increase of military budgets. And ambitious military
leaders could build up alliances with various radical religious
groups to establish a new political empire.

The relation between politics and religion can be traced to
the 1940s. Debates were not about whether citizen's rights should
be differentiated by ethnicity, as in Malaysia, but whether or
not they should be differentiated by religion.

In the months preceding the declaration of independence on
Aug. 17, 1945, Indonesian leaders had worked hard to formulate a
tentative constitution for the planned republic. The most debated
issue was indeed whether the state should impose different rights
and duties on citizens according to their religion.

The issue began to evolve when Muslim leaders drew up a draft
preamble to the Constitution wherein the state would be based on
belief in God with "the obligation to carry out the laws of Islam
(syariah) for the followers of Islam".

This draft, also known as Piagam Jakarta, (Jakarta Charter)
was refused by the secularists and the non-Muslims, which led to
its exclusion from the Constitution. For radical Islamic groups,
the failure to enact the draft became a painful reminder of the
Muslims' defeat. From then on, Muslims-Christians relations in
Indonesia have become very sensitive indeed.

Proponents of the Jakarta Charter lost ground, especially when
the political control was in the hands of then President Sukarno,
a nationalist-secularist. Muslim interests were subdued,
especially since Sukarno dissolved Masyumi, a political party
strongly committed to the formation of an Islamic state in
Indonesia.

In the New Order era, President Soeharto adopted repressive
measures in dealing with conflicts and disturbances in society.

Repression against Islamic fundamentalism persisted until the
early 1990s, when Soeharto began to turn to Islam to contest the
growing opposition and increasing demand for democratization in
society. In the 1990s, Soeharto dropped all pretense of
neutrality and actively courted ultra-conservative Muslims who,
just a few years earlier, had figured prominently in the
opposition. Soeharto's close association with this hard-line
community appears to have represented a decisive break with his
earlier support for Javanese mysticism and Pancasila pluralism
against Muslim organizations.

This radical shift was motivated by his determination to win
Muslim support for his re-election as president.

The impact of the politicization of religion on Muslim-
Christian relation was indeed dreadful. Islamic radicalism began
to grow in the 19902.

The (radical) organizations found more freedom to express
their beliefs. Sometimes they gave strong messages to grassroots
people that Indonesian Muslims had been out-maneuvered and out-
witted by the non-Muslims in controlling the local and national
resources and in securing political positions.

In the late 1990s, Muslim-Christian relations in Indonesia
turned from tense to bloody. An increasing number of political
leaders tended to use hatred of Christians in their attempts to
mobilize followers. When it involved mobs and thugs, violence
became inevitable. The Situbondo and Tasikmalaya cases in 1996,
when riots exploded killing dozens of people and destroying
Christian-associated property, are clear examples.

In the post-Soeharto era, while the fall of a military-backed
authoritarian regime brought new hope to many Indonesians for
democracy and tolerance, the future of Muslim-Christian relations
is less promising.

During B.J. Habibie's presidency, the legislature ratified a
UN convention on the protection of minority rights. This act was
welcomed by many minority groups including Chinese-Indonesians,
most of whom are Christian/Catholic. When Abdurrahman Wahid or
Gus Dur was appointed president, expectations for more tolerant
inter-religious relations in Indonesia were higher, given that
Gus Dur himself was renowned as a moderate Muslim leader.

However, ongoing conflicts and public disorder, provoked by
certain parties to discredit the moderate administration, quickly
give way to disappointment and frustration. The most serious
threat to Muslim-Christian relations is indeed the rise of
radical Islamic groups.

Serving as "defenders of the Islamic faith", these groups
attacked those whoever they considered to be the enemies of
Islam. Police investigations into the suspects of the Bali
bombing now strongly suggest that a radical Islamic group was
responsible for various bombings on a number of Christian targets
during the year 2000 and 2001.

Political scientist Greg Barton argues that although the
appeal for radical Islam are put forward by some genuine
idealists who are deeply convinced of the truth of the Islamic
doctrine, it is likely that some youthful romantics are more
interested in the drama of protest (or violence) itself.
Consequently, they can be easily persuaded to target certain
demonized enemies who are regarded to be the source of society's
woes.

Another issue which may have an effect on Muslim-Christian
relations in Indonesia is the resurgence of the issue of sharia
law. When the central government introduced Law No.22/1999 on
regional autonomy, local leaders began to search for local norms
and values that would accommodate local identity.

Some of them have dabbled in sharia as a norm that will
differentiate local code of conducts from those of the central
government. In many parts of several provinces, local
administrations have begun to adopt sharia.

Christian minorities responded to the introduction of the
sharia in their areas in two different ways.

First, a small minority strongly opposed the implementation of
sharia, albeit quietly, as they believe that it may disturb
Muslim-Christian relations due to the segregation of people on
the basis of their religious beliefs.

Second, a large number of Christians are indifferent towards
because they believe that the law is confined to Muslims only.

At the present, although the future of Muslim-Christian
relations in Indonesia remains volatile, there are those who
seriously believe that inter-religious dialogs -- especially at
grassroots levels -- will eventually lead to good prospects of
inter-religious relations.

They believe that getting to know one another is one possible
way to develop a tolerant behavior, acceptance and open-
mindedness between different religious followers. These days,
there are several efforts being made by young Christians to reach
out to Muslims to develop religious dialogs at a grassroots
level. These efforts will have a long term effect where people
from different religious backgrounds no longer see each other
with suspicion or hatred.