The politics of East Asian Summit

Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Nation, Asia News Network, Bangkok

When confronted by an emergency, it is common for the countries of East Asia to quickly band together, usually without any hassle. In normal times, however, they tend to return to their old habit of hard bargaining and bickering over trivial things until the other side slips up or surrenders.

Somehow, giving up is not the name of the game, and compromise always comes as the last resort.

Such is the prevailing sentiment on the modality of the East Asian Summit (EAS). ASEAN leaders are having a tough time hammering out on the future of the EAS, though they have agreed to host the inaugural meeting later this year in Kuala Lumpur.

Many questions remain unanswered. Which country will host the next summit? Will it become a permanent annual fixture or just a one-off affair? What is the future of ASEAN plus three? Which country is going to take the lead? What is the United States' attitude towards the EAS? How can ASEAN cope with the competition between China and Japan? The list goes on.

ASEAN leaders must be able to answer all these questions before they meet their counterparts from Japan, China and South Korea in Kyoto in May. Of particular importance are two irritating issues relating to the host of the second EAS and whether there should be a co-chair with the ASEAN chair.

On the first issue, China made clear long ago that it would like to host the second EAS in Beijing next year, but no consensus has been reached within the grouping on whether to accept this offer.

Last month at the ASEAN senior-official meeting in Hanoi Cambodia circulated a paper on the EAS modality prepared by China. It called for ASEAN to take a leading role in the future of the EAS, both in terms of procedure and substance.

The paper recommended that only ASEAN members should be allowed to chair EAS meetings, though it said other non-ASEAN countries, such as China, Japan and South Korea, should be allowed to host an EAS summit if they wished. This approach would enable China to convene the second EAS next year as planned, if ASEAN agrees.

Last November precedents were set in Beijing when the host, China, invited Indonesia to chair a session on regional security attended by senior defense officials under the umbrella of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

ASEAN applauded this strategy as it highlighted the grouping's leading role in the regionwide security dialogue. Vis-a-vis ASEAN, Beijing has not only matched words with deeds, but also shown sensitivity to the deep-rooted ASEAN fear of China's growing economic and political clout.

Sensing China's increased political maneuverability, Japan countered with a proposal recommending that a co-chairmanship system with an ASEAN chair be introduced at the inaugural EAS in Kuala Lumpur. This was quickly shot downed by ASEAN senior officials, much to the chagrin of the Japanese delegation.

Japanese and ASEAN leaders successfully co-chaired a commemorative summit in Tokyo last year, the first in ASEAN history. Tokyo wishes to see this kind of co-chairmanship framework continued within the EAS.

Unfortunately, the grouping still views Tokyo's approach as an attempt to weaken ASEAN's agenda and the leading role it wants to preserve. Worse still, it also reflects deep concern that co- chairmanship could enable Japan to introduce new ideas harmful to ASEAN schemes or interests.

Japan has argued repeatedly that the EAS should be an inclusive entity, taking in key economic players in the Asia Pacific region such as the U.S., Australia and New Zealand. Their support and eventual participation is pivotal for the future, if not the survival, of the EAS.

On the other hand, ASEAN and China share the conviction that the EAS is about cooperation between East Asian countries first and foremost, the so-called ASEAN plus three. While they have not completely ruled out the future participation of Western countries, they want to highlight the fact that Asian cooperation and consolidation are the top priority.

ASEAN views the EAS as an evolutionary process. The grouping does not want its dynamism snatched away by the three Asian economic giants, nor does it want to permit economic powers like the U.S. or Australia to partake just yet.

Obviously ASEAN-plus-three countries are aware of the reactions of these important trading partners and do not want to antagonize them. Washington is currently formulating its policy towards the EAS. It is highly unlikely that the U.S. will resume the hostile position it took in 1991 on East Asian economic cooperation.

Therefore ASEAN will maintain the current ASEAN-plus-three discussion of regional and functional cooperation while the EAS will focus on broader issues affecting the world as a whole, leaving the door open for the U.S. and other key players to participate in an expanded EAS as dialogue partners.

Attempting to break the current deadlock, Thailand recently proposed three formulas of chairmanship and co-chairmanship. The first remains an exclusive ASEAN undertaking; the remaining two are joint co-chairmanship between ASEAN and the three Asian economic giants, which would be similar to Japan's proposal, and a co-chairmanship system in special areas of cooperation, such as the method used in ARF intersessional meetings.

ASEAN prides itself on being an honest broker of security and economic cooperation within East Asia. China, Japan and South Korea, ASEAN believes, have not yet established the kind of mutual trust and rapport necessary to propel their own cooperation. They still need ASEAN as an intermediary, a role that the grouping cherishes.