The political cost of Aceh's civilian casualties

The political cost of Aceh's civilian casualties

Kusnanto Anggoro, Senior Researcher, Centre for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta

Casualties are rising as the war in Aceh intensifies. Hundreds
of schools throughout the province were destroyed in the first
two days of the military encounter. Military strategy, political
posturing or simply psychological warfare may drag both sides
into targeting the civilian population in their offensives.
Predictably, in the days to come there will be more civilian
casualties.

The military leadership in Jakarta has already ordered
soldiers to root out the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), while the
regional military emergency authority in Aceh has identified many
quarters of civil society in Aceh, including those proposing
political solutions to the crisis, as supporters of GAM, and thus
potential targets of military operations. Meanwhile, GAM is using
guerrilla strategies, hiding behind and among the people, which
means crushing GAM will likely increase the number of civilian
casualties.

Both sides should respect the rules of war. Politically,
however, the TNI is in a much more difficult position than GAM.
It is important, therefore, for the military to show restraint.
This is not going to be easy. Some generals recognize the need
for limited use of force and for minimizing civilian casualties.
But many in the military argue that it might be difficult to
avoid civilian casualties in an insurgency war. More importantly,
the military believes it will not be held responsible for
civilian casualties, as it enjoys a political mandate that
legalizes the operations.

Such a view is completely wrong and unprofessional. Yes, the
civilian authorities, the government, has already legitimized the
operations by declaring martial law in Aceh (Presidential Decree
No. 23/2003). It is also true that commander of the military has
the right to devise what strategies and tactical operations may
be needed on the battlefield.

The most troubling question here, however, is not about the
legality of the operations. Rather, it concerns whether the
military, as director of the operations, will be obliged to
implement operational accountability.

Soldiers must behave as professionals capable of achieving the
political objectives of the war with minimum resources and
minimum unnecessary casualties. Thus, the military leadership in
Jakarta should devise a code of conduct at the operational level
that helps define when the use of force is justified. They must
make the code public, to ensure operational accountability that
will serve not only to create external control but also to ensure
internal discipline among soldiers.

Three principles are relevant to this point: Military
necessity, humanity and proportionality.

The first principle, military necessity, relates to the
primary aim of armed conflict -- the complete submission of the
enemy at the earliest possible moment with the least possible
expenditure of personnel and resources. This principle should
justify the application of force not forbidden by international
law. The most important rule in this is for the armed forces to
engage only those forces committing hostile acts or clearly
demonstrating hostile intent.

The second, closely related to the first, is the principle of
humanity. This principle forbids the infliction of suffering,
injury or destruction not actually necessary for the
accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.

While resulting in a specific prohibition against unnecessary
suffering, the requirement of proportionality and a variety of
more specific rules, the concept of humanity also confirms the
basic immunity of civilian populations and civilians from being
targeted for attack. Indeed, the immunity of the civilian
population does not preclude unavoidable incidental civilian
casualties that may occur during the course of attacks against
legitimate targets.

The third principle is that of proportionality. This requires
that the force used be reasonable in intensity, duration and
magnitude, based on all facts known to the commander at the time,
to decisively counter hostile acts or hostile intents and to
ensure the continued safety of the armed forces.

To obey these principles, the field commander must guide not
only target distinction, but also hostility criteria, while being
prepared to adopt a gradual escalation in the use of force.
Soldiers must distinguish between legitimate targets and
civilians. Collateral civilian damage arising from military
operations must not be excessive in relation to the direct and
concrete military advantage anticipated from such operations.

Meanwhile, hostility criteria should meet a set of objective
factors to assist soldiers on the ground in determining whether a
potential assailant exhibits hostile intent, thus clarifying
whether shots can be fired before receiving fire. Soldiers are
not allowed to bomb a school. They, as a converse example, are
not obliged to hold back an air strike on an ammunition dump
simply because a farmer is ploughing a field beside it.

The conduct of an operation should show a graduated use of
force by ground troops, even in an ambiguous situation, before
resorting to deadly force. It is important at this point to
include such measures as giving a verbal warning, using a riot
stick or perhaps firing warning shots into the air.

Only by following these principles will a military operation
attain the rational balance between legitimate destructive
effects and undesirable collateral effects. The anticipated
military advantage must be balanced against other consequences,
such as the adverse effect upon civilians or civilian objects.
This involves weighing the interests arising from the success of
an operation on the one hand, against the possible harmful
effects upon protected persons and objects on the other.

Needless to say, standard measurements are required to ensure
whether all of these principles are being respected.
Unfortunately, we do not have the mechanisms and institutions
needed to perform judicial reviews of the use of force and
possible military misconduct. Internal discipline within the
Indonesian Military (TNI) is problematic, in part because of a
lack of external accountability.

Perhaps it is at this point that the media and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) may have a vital role to play.
The media, for example, can and must expose and discuss problems
in the provision of law enforcement services.

And NGOs are uniquely placed to conduct research, lobby
political leaders and disseminate information. The public,
therefore, will have alternative sources to judge whether the
armed conflict in Aceh is still in line with a so-called "just
war". The National Commission on Human Rights would be credible
institution for performing this job.

The international community is watching very closely what
happens in Aceh. Quite a few countries and organizations have
decried the war in Aceh and called on both side to resume
negotiations. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan is "deeply
concerned" about reports of renewed fighting in Aceh. A political
solution has always been the best instrument for resolving
insurgency problems. Many fear that the military, which has a
poor record on human rights, will continue to abuse civilians.

Indeed, so far most countries remain committed to supporting
Indonesia's territorial integrity. Yet, this is not without
reservation. Excessive civilian casualties and/or a prolonged war
in Aceh may change their position. The military doctrine of today
is not the 19th century German doctrine of Kriegsraison, which
asserted that any measure in war was justified when the
necessities of a particular situation justified it.

The TNI must not help GAM internationalize the war in Aceh by
fighting the wrong war in the wrong manner.

The writer lectures on strategic and security studies at the
postgraduate studies program at the University of Indonesia in
Jakarta.