The next move in Indonesian politics

By Jusuf Wanandi

JAKARTA (JP): Now that all the votes have been finally counted, the next step is to prepare for the General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and, in particular, to finalize the composition of its 700 respresentatives. The 135 MPR representatives from the provinces, which are to be added to the 500 members of the House of Representatives (DPR), will be formally determined by the new regional legislative councils. However, the criteria for the selection of these representatives remains unclear.

The National Elections Committee (KPU) is of the view that the five representatives from each region should reflect the votes that the parties received in the respective region. The alternative is for the winner to take all five. This alternative is less likely to be acceptable. The remaining 65 representatives will be composed of 20 representatives from religious groups, 5 from veteran, 9 from economic, 5 from women, 9 from artist, intellectual and scientist, 5 from NGOs, youth and student, 5 from civil servants, 5 from ethnic minorities, and 2 from disabled. The KPU will nominate these representatives, and here also the process is not clear.

The general preference is for these two groups of representatives to comprise personalities that are not involved in political parties, i.e. neither a member on the board of parties nor a party candidate in the general elections. These 200 representatives are important because they can have a significant influence on the election of the president. It is possible that members of these two groups will be evenly distributed between the two potential coalitions, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan)-led or the Golkar-led coalition. This further means that the Armed Forces faction in the MPR could play a decisive role. The Armed Forces (TNI) have at least 38 representatives from the DPR and possibly an additional 12 to 14 from the regions.

The preparations to formulate the guidelines of state policy should not be a cumbersome affair because Indonesia is in a period of transition and change, as was the case in 1966. It will be sufficient to produce several decrees that can easily be adjusted. In addition, it is currently also being envisaged that the MPR session be held annually instead of once every five years. The traditional form of the state guideline produced under the Soeharto government is long-winded and all encompassing, and no longer fitting. It would only create frustration in drafting and widespread apprehension if not duly implemented.

There are three main areas of reform that the state guidelines will have to address. First, to deal with the entrenched corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN). This will involve a dismantling of policies that create monopolies and provide special treatment. Rules and regulations to ensure fair competition should be introduced and enforced. The rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, Attorney General's Office and the police are critical.

Second is the realm of economic reforms. This will include developing more credible arrangements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IMF/IBRD) and the international community in implementing programs for economic recovery. The main challenge is to formulate and implement economic development policies that will produce growth with equity and social justice.

Third is in the field of political reforms in which there will be a more powerful legislative to balance the executive branch as well as an effective Supreme Court and judiciary. In addition, it will also have to formulate a new relationship between the central government and the regions that reflect decentralization, greater autonomy and self-government for the regions.

The most important task is, of course, the setting up of a new government. The Habibie government is considered also a transitional one and is only an extension of the Soeharto regime without Soeharto. Therefore it lacks legitimacy and credibility. The past year only confirms this. Habibie is rejected by almost all the students, the mass media, generally, and most of the people, as was shown in the defeat of Golkar, from over 73 percent of the votes in the 1997 elections to over 22 percent in 1999.

The election system is complicated and is one that is neither an absolutely proportional nor full-fledged district system. As a result, a coalition has to be established to form a government. If the three reformist parties, PDI Perjuangan, National Awakening Party (PKB) and National Mandate Party (PAN), can form a strong coalition based on a common platform, in which there is a full partnership and decisions on basic policies are made together, it is possible to establish a strong government. Such a strong coalition will create a bandwagon effect on the rest of the parties as well as members of the MPR. It will gain widespread public support through the media, masses and students. Habibie and Golkar cannot easily undo this even if they use money politics up to the MPR session.

In the end, the TNI will vote with the people. It will base its decision on one important factor, namely what would restore its legitimacy, authority and credibility. This will be possible only if it goes with this coalition. It has to be appreciated that TNI will make its choice known at the last moment.

There are a number of prerequisites for such a coalition to be credible and able to hold together. First, Megawati must be able to lead and to bring others on board on the basis of full partnership. Second, Gus Dur, NU scholars and PKB must give full support to Megawati's candidacy. This has been secured. Despite some confusing statements by their leaders, NU and PKB are firm in support for Megawati.

Third, is the support of PAN and Amien Rais. This depends on whether some basic items in PAN's platform will be accepted by Megawati and her party. This is to secure that there will be broad support from within PAN. Some of these basic items are: recognition of the concerns of Indonesian Muslims, reform of the Constitution, decentralization and a referendum in East Timor, the phasing out of the dual role of the TNI and a political or judicial resolution on Soeharto's alleged abuses. It should not be difficult for the two sides to come to an agreement on this.

Thus far, Megawati has not taken any initiative to form a partnership with PKB and PAN. This has created great uncertainty, disillusionment and frustration among the public, but perhaps especially so among her prospective partners. It may still be possible that within the next couple of days the three leaders, Megawati, Gus Dur and Amien Rais, will meet and conclude an agreement that will be announced to the world. Only then will the Indonesian people and the international community have some confidence that the general elections will indeed produce a stable government.

Will other parties join this coalition? There is an idea of forming a national government that will consist of all the major parties. In such a government even Golkar can become a partner. Golkar members that are proreform, such as Marzuki Darusman, can be brought into the Cabinet. However, this is possible only without Habibie at the helm of Golkar. Representatives of TNI can be included in the government, but as retired servicemen and the only active soldier in the Cabinet should be the commander. The TNI may eye the vice presidential post, but this will be very controversial. To rehabilitate itself, the TNI should avoid this.

The idea of a national government may have some attraction, particularly in a period of transition. However, for a real democracy to be established, there needs to be a strong opposition. It may be best, therefore, that the two established status quo parties -- Golkar and United Development Party (PPP) -- place themselves in the opposition.

The writer is Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Centre for strategic and International Studies.