The new government's short honeymoon

The new government's short honeymoon

By Jeffrey A. Winters

CHICAGO (JP): Indonesians had every right to pause and
celebrate their successful transition to democracy. Not only did
they manage to overthrow a deeply entrenched dictator, but they
also prevented him from carrying out his plan to engineer the
succession so that a Soeharto dynasty could be created. Given
all that has happened during the past two years, it is easy to
forget how the former president's daughter Siti Hardiyanti
Rukmana, or Tutut, and his son-in-law Gen. Prabowo Subianto, were
being carefully prepared to take over power.

The Indonesian people also delivered a major defeat to the
legitimacy of military intervention in government. The generals
lost the battle over their claimed right to play a role in
governing. They lost for two reasons. The first is because the
people, especially the students, struggled hard against the
military. The second is because it became so obvious to everyone
that military rule was destroying the country's unity, its
political system, and its economy. Even the U.S. Pentagon
and State Department finally figured this out.

Another reason for pride is that the Indonesian people behaved
peacefully and responsibly during the national election of 1999.
Although there was violence and death before and after the
election, the election campaign and the voting involved almost no
violence at all. And these were the moments when the greatest
numbers of Indonesians were actively involved in the process.

Indonesians should also be proud that the fall of Soeharto and
the rise of democracy in Indonesia will have a deep impact on the
prospects for democracy throughout Asia and beyond.

In the days immediately following the session of the People's
Consultative Assembly and the announcement of the new cabinet, it
was as if many in the country breathed a huge sigh
of relief. People from across the political spectrum said things
like "be patient," "give the new government a chance," "give them
100 days," or even "give them six months" to address the
country's problems.

As if to symbolize the sense of relief in domestic affairs,
president Abdurrahman Wahid, or Gus Dur, began a foreign policy
trip that promised to restore the prominence and tarnished image
of Indonesia on the world stage.

But the massive referendum rally in Aceh marked the end of the
honeymoon for the new government of Gus Dur. And Gus Dur's
decision to return home symbolizes his own realization that the
domestic situation in Indonesia is dangerously urgent.

The threat is worse than just the possible separation of Aceh
and other regions. The long-awaited economic recovery can be
jeopardized by how the regional crises are handled. If the
regional problems drag on for months or years, foreign and
domestic investors will continue to view the country as risky for
investment. If the government gets bogged down in regional
conflicts, it will be impossible to give the necessary
attention to economic restructuring and recovery.

And worst of all, if the response from Jakarta is to send in
troops to stop the regional demands for referendums, the economy
will be damaged even further and Indonesia's delicate transition
to democracy and civilian rule could be jeopardized.

If we go back to the early years of the New Order, the main
complaints from Aceh were ones of economic fairness -- that
Soeharto cronies, working together with major foreign companies,
were stripping the Outer Islands of their resources.

The response to these complaints was a systematic campaign of
brutality on the part of the military. By the 1990s, the main
complaints were no longer economic. After all the killing,
torture, disappearances, and rapes, the issues turned to justice
and human rights.

It was not issues of economic sharing that brought a million
people to the rally in Aceh. It was a sense of outrage for years
of injustice.

The outrage in Aceh and other regions cannot be reduced by
some kind of new plan for economic sharing or by putting
federalism in place -- although these things will be important
later.

This presents a very difficult challenge for Gus Dur's
government. A key pillar of the "Jakarta Formula" that worked
out in October for Indonesia's democratic transition is Gus Dur's
implicit guarantee that powerful figures who are alleged to be
responsible for abuses will not be threatened or brought to
justice.

The dilemma for Gus Dur is that to respond to the demands from
Aceh, he must take serious and immediate actions against
individuals who are currently protected by the accommodative
formula that is the basis of Indonesia's new government.

In fact, it is common for new leaders in democratic
transitions to be accommodative and ignore the terrible abuses of
justice of the past so that the country can move beyond the
fragile stages of transition and deepen the roots of democracy.
Powerful players from previous regimes often set the terms for
their peaceful exit from office.

But Indonesia is a special case. Unlike Chile, Argentina,
South Africa, or even Nigeria, the new government in Indonesia
is immediately confronted with regional movements that demand
justice and accountability as the condition for maintaining
national unity.

Gus Dur and Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri face urgent
and difficult challenges in the coming weeks. How they handle
Aceh now will determine whether Indonesia survives as a unified
nation or breaks up into many pieces.

The writer is a professor of political economy at Northwestern
University in Chicago, the United States.