The new government's short honeymoon

By Jeffrey A. Winters

CHICAGO (JP): Indonesians had every right to pause and celebrate their successful transition to democracy. Not only did they manage to overthrow a deeply entrenched dictator, but they also prevented him from carrying out his plan to engineer the succession so that a Soeharto dynasty could be created. Given all that has happened during the past two years, it is easy to forget how the former president's daughter Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, or Tutut, and his son-in-law Gen. Prabowo Subianto, were being carefully prepared to take over power.

The Indonesian people also delivered a major defeat to the legitimacy of military intervention in government. The generals lost the battle over their claimed right to play a role in governing. They lost for two reasons. The first is because the people, especially the students, struggled hard against the military. The second is because it became so obvious to everyone that military rule was destroying the country's unity, its political system, and its economy. Even the U.S. Pentagon and State Department finally figured this out.

Another reason for pride is that the Indonesian people behaved peacefully and responsibly during the national election of 1999. Although there was violence and death before and after the election, the election campaign and the voting involved almost no violence at all. And these were the moments when the greatest numbers of Indonesians were actively involved in the process.

Indonesians should also be proud that the fall of Soeharto and the rise of democracy in Indonesia will have a deep impact on the prospects for democracy throughout Asia and beyond.

In the days immediately following the session of the People's Consultative Assembly and the announcement of the new cabinet, it was as if many in the country breathed a huge sigh of relief. People from across the political spectrum said things like "be patient," "give the new government a chance," "give them 100 days," or even "give them six months" to address the country's problems.

As if to symbolize the sense of relief in domestic affairs, president Abdurrahman Wahid, or Gus Dur, began a foreign policy trip that promised to restore the prominence and tarnished image of Indonesia on the world stage.

But the massive referendum rally in Aceh marked the end of the honeymoon for the new government of Gus Dur. And Gus Dur's decision to return home symbolizes his own realization that the domestic situation in Indonesia is dangerously urgent.

The threat is worse than just the possible separation of Aceh and other regions. The long-awaited economic recovery can be jeopardized by how the regional crises are handled. If the regional problems drag on for months or years, foreign and domestic investors will continue to view the country as risky for investment. If the government gets bogged down in regional conflicts, it will be impossible to give the necessary attention to economic restructuring and recovery.

And worst of all, if the response from Jakarta is to send in troops to stop the regional demands for referendums, the economy will be damaged even further and Indonesia's delicate transition to democracy and civilian rule could be jeopardized.

If we go back to the early years of the New Order, the main complaints from Aceh were ones of economic fairness -- that Soeharto cronies, working together with major foreign companies, were stripping the Outer Islands of their resources.

The response to these complaints was a systematic campaign of brutality on the part of the military. By the 1990s, the main complaints were no longer economic. After all the killing, torture, disappearances, and rapes, the issues turned to justice and human rights.

It was not issues of economic sharing that brought a million people to the rally in Aceh. It was a sense of outrage for years of injustice.

The outrage in Aceh and other regions cannot be reduced by some kind of new plan for economic sharing or by putting federalism in place -- although these things will be important later.

This presents a very difficult challenge for Gus Dur's government. A key pillar of the "Jakarta Formula" that worked out in October for Indonesia's democratic transition is Gus Dur's implicit guarantee that powerful figures who are alleged to be responsible for abuses will not be threatened or brought to justice.

The dilemma for Gus Dur is that to respond to the demands from Aceh, he must take serious and immediate actions against individuals who are currently protected by the accommodative formula that is the basis of Indonesia's new government.

In fact, it is common for new leaders in democratic transitions to be accommodative and ignore the terrible abuses of justice of the past so that the country can move beyond the fragile stages of transition and deepen the roots of democracy. Powerful players from previous regimes often set the terms for their peaceful exit from office.

But Indonesia is a special case. Unlike Chile, Argentina, South Africa, or even Nigeria, the new government in Indonesia is immediately confronted with regional movements that demand justice and accountability as the condition for maintaining national unity.

Gus Dur and Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri face urgent and difficult challenges in the coming weeks. How they handle Aceh now will determine whether Indonesia survives as a unified nation or breaks up into many pieces.

The writer is a professor of political economy at Northwestern University in Chicago, the United States.