The nation-state is not an end in itself

The nation-state is not an end in itself

It is a sacred task to defend a heritage in the face of
challenges, but political analyst J. Soedjati Djiwandono
stresses the urgent need for a critical understanding of history.

JAKARTA (JP): Coordinating Minister for Political and Security
Affairs, Gen. Wiranto, recently stated that any solution of the
Aceh problem must be within the framework of the unitary state.
The unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia is final. It was
designed as such by our founding fathers.

Such a way of thinking must have been the result of
misleading, misled education and ossifying indoctrination by
Soeharto's New Order, which was well known for its distortion of
history. There is no logical or rational basis for such
statements. Who has the right to determine such in the first
place?

Let's look briefly at our history. Just a little over a year
after the proclamation of Indonesian independence, Prime Minister
Sutan Syahrir signed the Linggardjati agreement with the Dutch on
Nov. 15, 1946. Article (1) of the agreement says that "The
Netherlands Government recognizes the Republic as the de facto
authority in Java and Sumatra." Article (2) of the agreement
says, inter alia, that "The Netherlands Government and Republican
Governments co-operate toward the setting up of a sovereign
democratic federal state, the United States of Indonesia..."

That was an initial part of Sutan Syahrir's brilliant
diplomatic efforts to gain international recognition for
Indonesian independence. Under the circumstances, he had no
choice but to agree to what, at that moment, was thought to be
the most we could get. It almost cost his prime ministership but
for Sukarno's and Mohammad Hatta's full backing of his policy.

Surely the Linggardjati agreement was never meant to be
something final. Nor was the final agreement reached at the Round
Table Conference in The Hague, the Netherlands, near the end of
1946, which led to the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to
the new United Republic of Indonesia, envisaged by the
Linggardjati agreement. Barely a year later, the federal republic
was dissolved and replaced by the unitary republic of Indonesia
that has lasted to the present.

The (new) unitary republic that had substituted the federation
was based on a provisional constitution. Hence the significance
of the general election of 1955 for a new parliament and the
constitutional assembly to determine a new constitution. This is
important to remember. The assembly was not to confirm the 1945
Constitution, which was itself a provisional one. Therefore it
contains provisional and supplementary provisions.

Article (2), or the latter, provides that "Within six months
after the People's Consultative Assembly has been formed, the
People's Consultative Assembly shall convene to enact the
Constitution."

That was never done, even after the Constitutional Assembly
was dissolved by then President Sukarno's decree of July 5, 1959
for its failure to enact a new constitution. The decree not only
dissolved the Constitutional Assembly and newly elected
Parliament, but it also decreed the return to the 1945
Constitution -- still a provisional constitution.

Under the prevailing circumstances in Indonesia near the end
of the 1950s, Sukarno's action was presumably justified. It was
an emergency situation.

The point I want to make here is that neither the unitary
state on the basis of the provisional constitution of 1950 -- as
clear from the term "provisional" -- was never meant to be final.
Nor was the ("new") unitary state on the basis of the 1945
Constitution, the return to which was decreed by Sukarno. And as
was indicated earlier, the 1945 Constitution was also a
provisional one.

Here lies a mystery of Soeharto's New Order. From the very
beginning, the New Order based its legitimacy on its "total
correction" to Sukarno's deviations from the 1945 Constitution.
Ironically, it continued to claim the 1945 Constitution as its
basis, a constitution decreed by President Sukarno, which was
never confirmed by a series of People's Consultative Assemblies
of Soeharto's own creation over three decades, and which the New
Order claimed to adhere "purely and consistently", again despite
the fact that it was a provisional constitution. Is this also to
be a final constitution?

Did not our founding fathers argue long before independence on
what should constitute the boundaries of an independent
Indonesia? Did not Sukarno and Hatta differ on whether or not
West Irian should be part of independent Indonesia? Did our
founding fathers also envisage the integration of East Timor,
which we used to affirm that the integration of East Timor was
final and therefore as a domestic affair of ours not negotiable?

We can look into the history of some other nations for
comparison. France has had it first, second, third, fourth, and
fifth republic. When the American federation of states declared
their independence more than 200 years ago, they started with 12
or 13 states. Was it meant to be final? Of course not. In the
course of its history, the USA has added Alaska, Texas and
Hawaii, among others, to its federation. Hardly anything in this
earthly life is final and permanent.

Lest anyone should get me wrong, I must say at this point that
I am not against a unitary state as such. Nor am I for or against
a federal state. As a matter of principle, however, I am against,
and strongly so, the imposition of anything by the central
government on the people, against the wishes of the people,
backed by lies and false arguments, at the expense of justice.
After all, the nation-state is never an end in itself.