The Miles Kupa affair
Miles Kupa, a promising Australian diplomat, served as deputy ambassador to Indonesia during the second half of the 1980s. Upon his return to Canberra after completing his term in 1988, he produced a paper which summarized his assessment of the overall Indonesian political situation, including advice on certain lines of action to be taken. The paper, entitled The Little Big Man -- referring presumably to President Soeharto -- was discussed in an internal departmental discussion among senior officials.
In 1992, the Australian media published the paper, or some important parts of it. The main points of Kupa's 1988 political assessment on Indonesia are:
* President Soeharto's government was being seriously weakened by unbridled, rampant corruption which had reached serious proportions.
* Consequently, due to the widespread dissatisfaction among the public and within the military establishment, a political upheaval and even a coup d'etat could be expected.
* Given the uncertainties, it was not advisable for Australian companies to invest in Indonesia.
A short-lived public discussion resulted from the publication of some points from Kupa's paper. Prime Minister Keating's government, however, was able to dampen the furor, with assurances that the paper did not carry any official weight and was meant only to stimulate internal discussion.
At this stage of the process, we would like to submit two observations. First: What was the frame of mind among senior officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Canberra when they proposed Kupa's name to Foreign Minister Alexander Downer as the new ambassador to Indonesia? Surely Secretary Philip Flood, as the department's head, was aware of the 1992 episode. Or was it the other way around? Given the publicity which the paper had enjoyed, is it possible Kupa attracted the attention of Foreign Minister Downer, who named him to fill the Jakarta post, overruling the department's warning it was unwise to propose Kupa as Allan Taylor's replacement?
Second: Why was Kupa's name processed in the usual manner through established channels within the Indonesian government, nearly being approved? Perhaps approval was given as a matter of standard operating procedure without consulting the Indonesian embassy in Canberra about the possible ramifications?
The candidacy was eventually dropped and Kupa issued a statement saying that he did not see himself as having committed any professional wrongdoing. We disagree with him. Based on the essential points of Kupa's paper as published in 1992, we view the paper as having a prankish quality and being void of the incisive insights and the mature geopolitical views of a first- class diplomat. Coming from an Australian diplomat, the paper displays Kupa's apparent lack of concern that Indonesia's capability to overcome its internal problems, as it slowly advances, is essential to Australia's strategic future.
Miles Kupa could have written an assessment of Indonesia's political dynamics and its perceived role in Southeast Asia, approaching the quality of George Kennan's long February 1946 telegram from Moscow, where he served as the U.S. embassy's second man. That telegram, later widely circulated within the official Washington establishment, was written in response to the U.S. Treasury Department's question about why the Soviet Union decided not to join the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, contrary to their earlier promises. George Kennan analyzed the Soviet Union's post-war strategic intentions and the historical background that underlined those ambitions. He made suggestions on how the U.S. should cope with their new ideological and military opponent. Had Kupa engaged in a similar intellectual exercise in analyzing the underpinnings of President Soeharto's New Order, he could have done a good service to Australian-Indonesian bilateral relations.
All this, however, is past. The main lesson that both Canberra and Jakarta must draw from the Miles Kupa affair is not to take their relationship for granted. Every step that is to be taken, every proposal that is to be made in connection to the future of both Indonesia and Australia, must be carefully considered. The interests and the sensitivities of both countries should always be respected and not taken lightly.
In the meantime, it is indeed fortunate that Ambassador Taylor is willing to extend his term until a successor is found. Australia should feel fortunate to have senior ambassadors such as Taylor, who served in difficult posts in Nigeria and Papua New Guinea, and has shown his superb qualities in coping with the expanded bilateral relations during the last few years.
With the upcoming ASEAN Regional Forum (in which Australia is a member) together with Prime Minister John Howard's visit scheduled for early August and the third Indonesia-Australia ministerial forum to take place in October in Jakarta, the presence of an experienced and astute Australian ambassador such as Allan Taylor is very much needed to represent Australia's views and interests.