The Miles Kupa affair

The Miles Kupa affair

Miles Kupa, a promising Australian diplomat, served as deputy
ambassador to Indonesia during the second half of the 1980s. Upon
his return to Canberra after completing his term in 1988, he
produced a paper which summarized his assessment of the overall
Indonesian political situation, including advice on certain lines
of action to be taken. The paper, entitled The Little Big Man --
referring presumably to President Soeharto -- was discussed in an
internal departmental discussion among senior officials.

In 1992, the Australian media published the paper, or some
important parts of it. The main points of Kupa's 1988 political
assessment on Indonesia are:

* President Soeharto's government was being seriously weakened
by unbridled, rampant corruption which had reached serious
proportions.

* Consequently, due to the widespread dissatisfaction among
the public and within the military establishment, a political
upheaval and even a coup d'etat could be expected.

* Given the uncertainties, it was not advisable for Australian
companies to invest in Indonesia.

A short-lived public discussion resulted from the publication
of some points from Kupa's paper. Prime Minister Keating's
government, however, was able to dampen the furor, with
assurances that the paper did not carry any official weight and
was meant only to stimulate internal discussion.

At this stage of the process, we would like to submit two
observations. First: What was the frame of mind among senior
officials at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in
Canberra when they proposed Kupa's name to Foreign Minister
Alexander Downer as the new ambassador to Indonesia? Surely
Secretary Philip Flood, as the department's head, was aware of
the 1992 episode. Or was it the other way around? Given the
publicity which the paper had enjoyed, is it possible Kupa
attracted the attention of Foreign Minister Downer, who named him
to fill the Jakarta post, overruling the department's warning it
was unwise to propose Kupa as Allan Taylor's replacement?

Second: Why was Kupa's name processed in the usual manner
through established channels within the Indonesian government,
nearly being approved? Perhaps approval was given as a matter of
standard operating procedure without consulting the Indonesian
embassy in Canberra about the possible ramifications?

The candidacy was eventually dropped and Kupa issued a
statement saying that he did not see himself as having committed
any professional wrongdoing. We disagree with him. Based on the
essential points of Kupa's paper as published in 1992, we view
the paper as having a prankish quality and being void of the
incisive insights and the mature geopolitical views of a first-
class diplomat. Coming from an Australian diplomat, the paper
displays Kupa's apparent lack of concern that Indonesia's
capability to overcome its internal problems, as it slowly
advances, is essential to Australia's strategic future.

Miles Kupa could have written an assessment of Indonesia's
political dynamics and its perceived role in Southeast Asia,
approaching the quality of George Kennan's long February 1946
telegram from Moscow, where he served as the U.S. embassy's
second man. That telegram, later widely circulated within the
official Washington establishment, was written in response to the
U.S. Treasury Department's question about why the Soviet Union
decided not to join the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund, contrary to their earlier promises. George Kennan analyzed
the Soviet Union's post-war strategic intentions and the
historical background that underlined those ambitions. He made
suggestions on how the U.S. should cope with their new
ideological and military opponent. Had Kupa engaged in a similar
intellectual exercise in analyzing the underpinnings of President
Soeharto's New Order, he could have done a good service to
Australian-Indonesian bilateral relations.

All this, however, is past. The main lesson that both Canberra
and Jakarta must draw from the Miles Kupa affair is not to take
their relationship for granted. Every step that is to be taken,
every proposal that is to be made in connection to the future of
both Indonesia and Australia, must be carefully considered. The
interests and the sensitivities of both countries should always
be respected and not taken lightly.

In the meantime, it is indeed fortunate that Ambassador Taylor
is willing to extend his term until a successor is found.
Australia should feel fortunate to have senior ambassadors such
as Taylor, who served in difficult posts in Nigeria and Papua New
Guinea, and has shown his superb qualities in coping with the
expanded bilateral relations during the last few years.

With the upcoming ASEAN Regional Forum (in which Australia is
a member) together with Prime Minister John Howard's visit
scheduled for early August and the third Indonesia-Australia
ministerial forum to take place in October in Jakarta, the
presence of an experienced and astute Australian ambassador such
as Allan Taylor is very much needed to represent Australia's
views and interests.