The Merauke incident
The Merauke incident
For an organization whose aim it is to establish an
independent state, it could be said that at least some of the
demands that the Free Papua Organization (OPM) are making
following the taking of 11 PT Tunas Korindo timber workers
hostage on Tuesday in Irian Jaya sound pretty modest.
According to newspaper reports in Jakarta, this group of 50
OPM members led by Willem Onde has demanded that PT Tunas
Korindo, a timber company with its head office in South Korea,
pay the organization US$1 million in compensation for the damage
caused to forests logged in the territory, as well as payment by
the company of money owed by the group to a bar in Merauke
amounting to Rp 2.4 million -- besides of course some more
substantial demands such as the withdrawal of all police Mobile
Brigade (Brimob) personnel from the entire province and
revocation of an earlier police announcement calling on all
members of the OPM guilty of having committed crimes before and
up to Dec. 1, 2000, to surrender.
Other demands made by the group include that PT Tunas Korindo
put a stop to the destruction of Irian Jaya's forests, in
particular those in the Merauke area and that Jakarta pay heed to
the aspirations of the people of Irian Jaya.
At present, the group is reported to be holding the 11 timber
workers, plus five negotiators it captured on Thursday, in a camp
in the Asiki district, Merauke, near the border between Irian
Jaya and Papua New Guinea. Among the hostages are three South
Korean executives of the timber company. Negotiations to free the
hostages have so far yielded no results.
Given the long-standing feud between the OPM and Jakarta, one
would have expected some more serious demands from the OPM, such
as immediate autonomy as a first step toward independence or the
holding of an East Timor-style referendum. But let's not fool
ourselves about the gravity of the incident.
The taking of hostages, especially when it includes
foreigners, is certain to have an unfavorable impact on
investment, in Irian Jaya for certain, but most likely also in
other parts of Indonesia. Many of this country's reserves of
natural resources are located in far-flung regions, well away
from the center of government, where it is not easy for the
government to guarantee security.
Irian Jaya Governor J.P. Salossa was certainly fully aware of
this threat when he warned against using force in resolving the
crisis. "The incident creates (a certain) image among foreign
investors in the province. We don't want a military-style
settlement. We are talking about people's lives here," the
governor said, adding that his administration was, in so far as
possible, seeking to settle the incident by nonviolent means,
including negotiations.
On the other hand, there is the danger that applying too soft
a hand in settling the issue could encourage insurgents in other
areas to follow the Asiki example and resort to kidnapping and
hostage-taking to achieve their aims. Which would only aggravate
the security situation in this country.
As in all hostage-taking incidents, the Asiki confrontation is
placing Jakarta in the difficult situation of having to find just
the right balance between giving in and holding its ground.
Jakarta must do all it can to free the hostages while at the same
time protecting the wider interests of the nation.
For the authorities entrusted with guarding over the nation's
security, in Jakarta as well as in the provinces, the incident
provides a valuable lesson in anticipating and dealing with the
kinds of security risks the nation is likely to face in the
immediate future. The lives of innocent people are at stake.