The Merauke incident

For an organization whose aim it is to establish an independent state, it could be said that at least some of the demands that the Free Papua Organization (OPM) are making following the taking of 11 PT Tunas Korindo timber workers hostage on Tuesday in Irian Jaya sound pretty modest.

According to newspaper reports in Jakarta, this group of 50 OPM members led by Willem Onde has demanded that PT Tunas Korindo, a timber company with its head office in South Korea, pay the organization US$1 million in compensation for the damage caused to forests logged in the territory, as well as payment by the company of money owed by the group to a bar in Merauke amounting to Rp 2.4 million -- besides of course some more substantial demands such as the withdrawal of all police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) personnel from the entire province and revocation of an earlier police announcement calling on all members of the OPM guilty of having committed crimes before and up to Dec. 1, 2000, to surrender.

Other demands made by the group include that PT Tunas Korindo put a stop to the destruction of Irian Jaya's forests, in particular those in the Merauke area and that Jakarta pay heed to the aspirations of the people of Irian Jaya.

At present, the group is reported to be holding the 11 timber workers, plus five negotiators it captured on Thursday, in a camp in the Asiki district, Merauke, near the border between Irian Jaya and Papua New Guinea. Among the hostages are three South Korean executives of the timber company. Negotiations to free the hostages have so far yielded no results.

Given the long-standing feud between the OPM and Jakarta, one would have expected some more serious demands from the OPM, such as immediate autonomy as a first step toward independence or the holding of an East Timor-style referendum. But let's not fool ourselves about the gravity of the incident.

The taking of hostages, especially when it includes foreigners, is certain to have an unfavorable impact on investment, in Irian Jaya for certain, but most likely also in other parts of Indonesia. Many of this country's reserves of natural resources are located in far-flung regions, well away from the center of government, where it is not easy for the government to guarantee security.

Irian Jaya Governor J.P. Salossa was certainly fully aware of this threat when he warned against using force in resolving the crisis. "The incident creates (a certain) image among foreign investors in the province. We don't want a military-style settlement. We are talking about people's lives here," the governor said, adding that his administration was, in so far as possible, seeking to settle the incident by nonviolent means, including negotiations.

On the other hand, there is the danger that applying too soft a hand in settling the issue could encourage insurgents in other areas to follow the Asiki example and resort to kidnapping and hostage-taking to achieve their aims. Which would only aggravate the security situation in this country.

As in all hostage-taking incidents, the Asiki confrontation is placing Jakarta in the difficult situation of having to find just the right balance between giving in and holding its ground. Jakarta must do all it can to free the hostages while at the same time protecting the wider interests of the nation.

For the authorities entrusted with guarding over the nation's security, in Jakarta as well as in the provinces, the incident provides a valuable lesson in anticipating and dealing with the kinds of security risks the nation is likely to face in the immediate future. The lives of innocent people are at stake.