The mainsprings of Russian policy
Andrei Ryabov RIA Novosti Moscow
Looking at Russian policy through the prism of the struggle between the two wings of president Putin's team -- those who came to power in the Yeltsin times (the so-called "old Kremlin team" and those who ascended to the pinnacle of power with Putin (the "new St. Petersburg team") -- is common practice nowadays. The rest of the conflicts do not matter, as it were. The political thought is trying to the solve the question: Will the president swap the "old Kremlin team" for the "new St. Petersburg team" and what changes may follow in the Kremlin's policy, as a result?
In actual fact, real political life, the more so in Russia, is incomparably richer than any pattern. There is a quite specific explanation to this. Contrary to widespread ideas, there are no principled differences among the Russian leaders over how the country should develop, how to get profit in it and how to preserve their domination. In other words, there is no alternative "project for further development" or alternative strategy to the course that has been pursued over the past decade with certain amendments.
Hence, the struggle between the "old Kremlin team" and the "new St. Petersburg team" cannot determine the future of the country. The private conflicts between various interest groups, their striving to become closer to the president, regain control over the economy and financial flows may turn out to be more important for determining the prospects of Russian policy and power configuration. Here in lie the true mainsprings of Russian policy.
In this context, it is far from always important whether any particular political player belongs to the "new St. Petersburg team" or the "old Kremlin team". Say, economic development minister German Gref and RAO UES of Russia head Anatoly Chubais would seem to belong to the same wing. Both began their careers in St. Petersburg and are consistent supporters of radical market reforms.
However, the minister's proposal to impose a special excise on the RAO profit received as a result of the growth of tariffs may do more harm to the energy reform being promoted by Chubais than even communist leader Zyuganov with his party comrades could not do. So, there is no solidarity among the supporters of market reforms. Gazprom concern head Miller, who began his career in St. Petersburg, made the company's chief financier Savelyev, also from St. Petersburg, resign, despite the fact that both of them had come to Moscow to reform the largest natural monopoly...
The assertion on a close alliance between the leading forces of the "old Kremlin team" -- the former president's "family" and the political group led by Chubais is also a pure fiction. The former are not averse to curb RAO's tariff and gains control over the NTV television company. The latter, using the possibilities of the media close to them, sometimes scathingly criticize the government, especially, the social results of its policy. This should come as no surprise: If Mikhail Kasyanov and Anatoly Chubais really intend to run in the 2008 presidential elections, as they say, then their alliance cannot be close by definition.
The list of such conflicts of interests may be continued and would be very long. Politically, all this means that an entirely new configuration of power may arise unexpectedly for observers and the country as a whole. Under this configuration, yesterday's sworn enemies may find themselves in the role of good friends and vice versa, the former friends may become irreconcilable opponents. All this changes may be served to the Russian voters under various ideological dressings. However, this would not change anything. Judging by everything, the nation feels this. This is why the president still has such a high rating. After all, someone has to take care of ordinary people.