The lessons of the failed Chechen truce of 1996

Dmitri Kosyrev Political Columnist RIA Novosti Moscow

This is not the first time when my Indonesia-watching makes me see some amazing parallels between this far-away country and Russia, where I live.

Indonesia's coming peace agreement with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) separatists immediately makes me recall many episodes of Russia's "war and peace" relations with its autonomy, Chechnya.

Each and every separatist movement is based on history. Those who lead the campaign need the support of their constituents -- the inhabitants of the province they want to hijack.

And what better way to do this than claiming that historically their people used to live better because their current metropolis was not dominating them at that time.

Chechnya was a wild gangland in the 19th century, which the Russian Empire could not afford, because it could not tolerate unruly tribes blocking access to southern parts -- the Christian kingdoms (currently the republics) of Georgia and Armenia, and the Moslem Azerbaijan.

The war in the mountains was won by Russian troops after many years and heavy losses. But even after 100 years of relative calm, the Chechens have not forgotten anything.

There was not much of oppression under the Russian rule.

Exactly 80 years ago, in December 1922, they were granted autonomy, which worked even in the strongman's Stalin era.

During World War II, in 1942, a powerful faction of the Chechens decided to back Hitler, sent emissaries to the headquarters of his advancing troops and started preparing airfields in the mountains to greet the Germans planning to get behind the Russian lines.

This Stalin a pretext to do punish this small nation -- sending almost its entire population to the cold plains of Kazakhstan. They got back to their own mountains only some years after Stalin's death.

This explains only the historical memories of Chechnya. National mythology may be important or not, a politician must still deal with the leaders of the separatist movement, not with all the people.

Therefore it is essential, while concluding an agreement with such leaders, to ask yourself several simple questions: "Why do they want to sign an agreement with you?" and "What are they going to do when they get this agreement?"

Simply put, it is a question of who are you dealing with: A bunch of politicians willing to manage their own land and pay you no tax revenue, or outright criminals?

The infamous Khasav-Yurt agreement signed by Moscow with the Chechens in August 1996 taught us, Russians, and the ones willing to learn from our experience, a bitter lesson.

Immediately after signing this simple cease-fire and troop- withdrawal agreement, the Chechen leaders unilaterally proclaimed their independence.

The Russian government ignored these statements, obviously absurd from the legal standpoint -- and generally left the Chechen autonomy to its own devices. The leaders of the republic had effectively become independent but in name.

What have they done with their semi-independence?

They turned Chechnya into a 100 percent gangland whose only economy was crime: Kidnapping and slave-trading, drugs, weapons, and money laundering. And they did something else: They started to expand their activities.

President Yeltsin government's idea that this criminal land should be left alone did not take into account one reality of our times -- the growing international terrorist networks.

Places like Chechnya, or Afghanistan, or Somalia -- are needed for black financial operations, safe refuge, etc., which means that the same terrorist networks are almost always behind the separatist movements.

You can never be sure that if you, a strong and populous country, leave some small splinters in peace, the splinter will not bother you anymore.

You may say that the biggest mistake in a war is to conclude a bad peace agreement. Ask yourself a question: why do YOU want this agreement? Is it because your military have lost the war ? Or are there other reasons for which you will regret later on?

The 1996 Khasav-Yurt agreements in Russia was concluded in part because of the forthcoming presidential elections, and also because the Russian public opinion had been shocked by the first really big terrorist act by the Chechen militants.

A group of fighters headed by Shamil Basaev invaded the neighboring Russian region and took everyone in a town hospital hostages. Moscow decided against a troop operation and promised peace talks (which ended in the Khasav-Yurt agreements).

What is interesting, when the Chechens repeated the same act in Moscow in the fall of 2002, nobody even thought of negotiating with them.

The public outrage because of this event in 1996 was directed towards the government -- with not a little help from the Moscow media, allegedly financed by the government's election rivals.

The man who led the talks -- the late Gen. Alexander Lyebed also had presidential ambitions. Little did he know that the stain of the Khasav-Yurt would taint his reputation and block his way to power. But that happened only later, when the result of Khasav-Yurt became obvious to everyone.

You may ask: So what kind of agreements should be concluded with the separatist-minded territories ? The Russian experience shows that one factor you should note is called "protect your own".

First of all you should not leave any chances for your opponents to harass you even after they get what they wanted.

Second -- and not insignificant -- you should not let your friends and allies suffer.

In Chechnya soon after Khasav-Yurt the northern Chechen plains, normally friendly toward Moscow and at odds with the highland ganglands, were harassed by the winners.

Many pro-Moscow Chechens were removed from local administrations and or killed by their extremist compatriots.

You may also ask: If peace agreements are so suspect, where is the solution to the problem of separatism, which looks like just another name to terrorism these days?

My answer this time is not based on Russian experience, because the Russians are only beginning to understand the core problem of such cases.

The problem is in the national values.

And the only thing which can tackle this problem is patience and perseverance. Which means -- time. Which means that no peace agreements should prevent you from the capability, and obligation, to exercise patience and perseverance in the area in question.

So what shall we do with the Chechens -- leave them to their set of values, and wait for them to come to our cities with guns and explosives again, or initiate a "mental revolution" in their minds to accommodate them with modern civilization by supporting long peacemaking and reconstruction processes in Chechnya?

I'd prefer the second since there is no other choice. You cannot hide from reality simply by drawing the line on paper and putting two signatures under it."

At least Indonesia is not involved into a "religious conflict" in Aceh. Not that it makes matters simple for Jakarta.

The writer, Vice-President of the Foreign Policy Association, wrote this article specially for The Jakarta Post.