The latent dangers of extremism

The latent dangers of extremism

By Sidhesh Kaul

JAKARTA (JP): Conditions in Indonesia are just right for
extremists to come goose-stepping into the theater -- high
unemployment, economic disparity, a divided society, a bickering
polity and an unstable government.

Throw in a dash of restless youth and a pinch of religious
fervor and you have successfully cooked up a volatile dish that
has the potential of replacing one form of tyranny with another.

Revolutionary extremism does not take shape overnight. It goes
through several stages, as experts say. It starts with the decay
of the Old Regime. During this stage, the administration breaks
down, taxes rise, corruption shamelessly manifests itself in all
walks of life and the common folks lose their faith in the
government.

Intellectuals pontificate endlessly about idealized systems of
governance. The government maneuvers for legitimacy whilst the
polity undergoes polarization. This scenario sets the ground for
a revolution.

During the first stage of the revolution committees, networks,
cells and conspiracies are formed with the single-minded focus of
overthrowing the regime. Discontent amongst the masses becomes
overt, the general mood turns rebellious and the political
players draw up battle lines.

The government then calls out the troops to quell such
rebellion -- this move typically fails, the army losing its'
courage at firing on their own and this event signals the
beginning of the end for the Old Regime. The Old Regime is kicked
out, popular exultation breaks out and the next stage of the
revolution sets in.

The stage following the exit of the Old Regime is transitory
in nature. Leaders, having opposed the Old Regime in the past
(though still connected either directly or indirectly with the
deposed powers), man the government typically during this stage.
Replacements to the Old Regime are generally moderate.

The moderates initiate middle-of-the-road reforms (the typical
elitist struggle of balancing pretensions to change versus
preservation of effective power) and their energies are
dissipated between initiating reforms at a pace that is
acceptable to the general polity and hanging on to power.

This stage witnesses the second wave of discontent among the
masses as general impatience with the slow pace of reform rises,
even as it becomes increasingly difficult for the moderates to
placate the expectations of the general public.

During this next stage, the impatience of the populace with
the perceived slow pace of the moderates and the yawningly wide
expectations gap, sets the ground for extremists to step in
savior-like. The extremists are better organized and focused on
their objectives than the moderates -- an aspect of great appeal
to the populace in general.

The extremists oust the moderates and along with it everything
"Old" is thrown out as well. The extremists lay down canons for
"good" and "bad" and propagate an "idealistic society" -- by
force, if necessary. The public's initial exultation on the
hastening of the reforms is soon replaced by fear as the
extremists reveal their own agenda.

A reign of terror is unleashed, cloaked in high flown
idealistic canons and in the name of the revolution and gradually
madness sets in and as Brinton elegantly says: "The revolution
devours its' children".

Its' only a matter of time before a "Thermidor" (named after
the French Revolutionary month in which, Robespierre, the
demagogue-revolutionary, himself was guillotined) sets in and
typically, and history is witness to this, a dictator is born
once again. The country goes back to square one.

The problem with revolutionary extremism is that although they
set out with the intention of bringing about change but in the
end little is achieved. All that it does is replace one kind of
tyranny with another.

French Kings were replaced by Napoleon. The despotic Tsars by
an even more despotic Stalin. The Batista Regime by Fidel Castro.
The unpopular tyranny of the Shah by the unpopular tyranny of the
priests from Qom.

Simon Bolivar, the liberator of South America, sums up his
despair about the inefficacy of revolutionary extremism when he
says, "He who aids a revolution ploughs the sea". In general,
revolutions are disasters.

Some critiques to this stand are quick to point out the
success of the American Revolution as an important exception. In
my opinion, it was not a revolution but merely a war of
independence -- purely political and devoid of social issues.

The French Revolution on the other hand was deeply involved in
social matters, became a bloody mess and ended in a dictatorship.
The degradation of a revolution is inevitable.

A glance at this model should alarm every Indonesian. What is
happening in the political-socio arena seems to be following the
Brinton script. Let us step back in time and examine the recent
developments in Indonesia within the framework of this model.

The "New Order" regime wrote its' own death sentence. Decades
of corruption, cronyism and collusion had withered the backbone
of the Soeharto administration and coupled with the skewed
developmental, fiscal and monetary policies (all aimed towards
growth at the expense of inequitable distribution of wealth) the
regime soon found its' legitimacy evaporating.

The growing, but deep-seated, resentment against the
government was crushed. With the advent of the Asian Crisis the
New Order's problems got exacerbated and the misleading veneer of
growth peeled away (and the decades long chorus of applause from
International Financial Institutions gave way to a cacophony of
new found outrage) with the first shower of economic catastrophe,
to reveal a country ravaged by poverty and economic disparity and
mechanisms of government that were mired in corruption and
inefficiency.

By calling out the troops to quell the protests, Soeharto's
regime ignited the populace into a mad frenzy of revolt. The New
Order thus laid the foundations for the first stage of the
revolution.

With the demise of the New Order (and if one discounts the
brief appearance by B.J. Habibie as the flickering and dying
flames of the New Order) the country witnessed a polarization of
forces. True to the Brinton script, the classic study in
revolutions, the moderate Abdurahman Wahid walked into the
Presidency, a representation of the compromise amongst the
bitterly divided polity.

Unfortunately, the crown sits precariously on President
Abdurrahman Wahid's head. The pace of reforms is slow, corruption
is still rampant, if not worse than before and the government
seems to be stumbling from one scandal to another. The people are
impatient for change and frustrations are slowly manifesting
themselves again in the form of protests that hold the promise of
violence.

Indonesia, if examined through Brinton's eyes, is thus ideally
poised for extremism. The shaky and reluctant governance of
President Abdurrahman, in the face of socio-economic frustration,
is an open invitation for extremists. The recent show of strength
by political parties who did not hesitate to mobilize their storm
troopers (during the recent spate of protests and demonstrations)
is evidence to the fact that Indonesian politics is very close to
the brink.

Strong-arm posturing is symptomatic of the erosion of the
government's effectiveness and legitimacy. Politicians have been
quick to cast away secular pretensions as they harness the
momentum of the masses for their own political ends.

Toying with sectarian and religious polarization as a means of
mass mobilization is a one-way road to hell and akin to holding
aloft a welcome banner for extremism.

The recent spate of pronouncements by zealots as well as the
dangerous experiment being conducted by some sections of the
polity to use the scepter of religious fanaticism as an
instrument of change is a journey that is fraught with
irreversible perils.

The polarization of the Indonesian masses along religious
lines to bring about a change in the system of governance is too
radical an approach and would bring about irreversible and
retrograde changes whose effects it would take decades to undo.

President Abdurrahman is left with few choices and the die is
cast. By hastening the pace of the reforms single-mindedly and
matching the people's expectations, the President can choose to
don the protective shield of the legitimacy armor that the people
will bestow on him and pursue the path of democracy -- or
preserve the ineffective status quo and unwittingly roll out the
red carpet for extremists.

The writer is a commentator on regional economic and political
issues based in Jakarta.