The last phases of the Aceh peace agreement

The last phases of the Aceh peace agreement

Omar Halim, Jakarta

The third phase of the decommissioning of the Free Aceh Movement
(GAM) weapons, to be followed by the withdrawal of the non-
organic Indonesian Military and police forces, is currently
taking place. This will be the penultimate phase of GAM
fulfilling their commitment to surrender 842 weapons as stated in
the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Helsinki, Finland. It
is expected that these last two phases will also be carried out
successfully.

It is perhaps a good time to assess this agreement (Helsinki
MOU) in the context of the previous peace negotiations with GAM.

The first attempt to negotiate peace with GAM was made during
the tenure of President Abdurrahman Wahid resulting in the
Humanitarian Pause, an agreement on a cease-fire for certain
periods of time to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance
to the conflict-affected areas. The implementation of this
agreement was not considered very successful, because there were
no provisions for monitoring the cease-fire from both sides.
Nevertheless, that was the beginning of negotiations with GAM.

Amid the acrimony between both sides, a second attempt was
made to negotiate another agreement during the tenure of
President Megawati Soekarnoputri, which finally led to the
signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) in
December 2002. In negotiating this agreement, the government
wanted to have a final and comprehensive solution to the Aceh
question, based on the basic assumption that GAM would be ready
to renounce its intention for Aceh to become independent from the
Republic of Indonesia.

The COHA agreement was the first step in which, instead of
just a cease-fire, the two sides were required to cease
hostilities toward each other. If successfully implemented, in
which of course GAM would relinquish its plan to establish its
own governmental machinery in Aceh and its own military force,
the next phase would have been an All-inclusive Dialog during
which all Acehnese groups, especially the civil society,
including GAM would discuss the most appropriate future
arrangements for Aceh within the context of the unitary state of
the Republic of Indonesia. The last phase would have been
elections, in which GAM members would be able to participate
fully.

It turned out that GAM did not want to renounce its intention
for Aceh to become independent from the Republic of Indonesia.
During the implementation of COHA (December 2002-May 2003), GAM
continued to strengthen their civil administrative structure and
military force by publicly appointing new officials and officers,
extracting "Nanggroe tax" and smuggling in weapons from outside
the country.

This is why when the Helsinki MOU did not explicitly state
that GAM would abandon its effort for Aceh to become independent,
many Indonesians became quite concerned. Has GAM really changed
it objective, as the government continues to assure us? Let us
therefore scrutinize more closely the Helsinki MOU itself to see
if GAM would have a much bigger incentive to comply with this
agreement.

First of all, as will be clear from the discussion below, the
MOU is more than an agreement. It deals with some aspects of the
relationships between the central government and the Aceh
administration. In this sense, it has a quasi-constitutional
character. The MOU compresses the three phases of the previous
negotiations into one package. The cessation of hostilities, as
exemplified by the surrender of GAM weapons during the first four
months, to be followed by the reintegration of GAM forces into
the society.

There is no part that provides for dialog among the Acehnese
for future administrative and political arrangements. Instead,
the government, central and regional, together with GAM and
Acehnese academics, will formulate, as they are now doing, what
is called the Aceh Administrative Law which will have to be in
effect, according to the MOU, by April 2006. This is when the
next round of regional executive elections in Aceh will be held.

GAM members, who have been given amnesty by the government,
will be able to participate and be elected as "head of the Aceh
Administration" (Article 1.2.3 of the MOU) in April 2006. In the
future, "administrative measures undertaken by the government of
Indonesia with regard to Aceh will be implemented in consultation
with and with the consent of the head of the Aceh administration"
(1.1.2.d). If GAM captures the seat of the "head of Aceh
administration", then it will have veto power over decisions by
the government. Meanwhile, the "appointment of the chief of the
organic police force and the prosecutors shall be approved by the
head of the Aceh administration" (1.4.4).

How about the Aceh regional legislature which was elected last
year until 2009? "Until 2009 the legislature of Aceh will not be
entitled to enact any laws without the consent of the head of
Aceh administration" (1.2.4). This consolidates the authority and
power of the "head of the Aceh administration" vis a vis the
central government and the present Aceh regional legislature. In
the long run, the government "will facilitate the establishment
of Aceh-based political parties" at the latest by the first
quarter of 2007 (1.2.1).

GAM will thus have a legitimate vehicle to capture the Aceh
regional legislature in 2009. Furthermore, international
agreements entered into which relate to Aceh, and decisions with
regard to Aceh, by the House of Representatives and the
Indonesian government have to be agreed upon by the legislature
of Aceh (1.1.2.b and 1.1.2c). The absolute control by Aceh, the
executive as well as legislative, over its own affairs is assured
(1.1.2.a).

If, by 2009, GAM is able to wrest control over the Aceh
administration and the legislature, they will have been able to
be in full control of Aceh by political and peaceful means.

The writer is a former senior staff member of the United
Nations dealing with peacekeeping missions in Namibia, Lebanon,
Somalia and Liberia, and the resolution of conflicts between
Armenia and Azerbaijan on Nagorno Karabakh and between Cameroon
and Nigeria on the Bakassi Peninsula. Was also a member of the
government negotiating team with GAM resulting in the COHA
agreement in December 2002.