The last phases of the Aceh peace agreement

Omar Halim, Jakarta

The third phase of the decommissioning of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) weapons, to be followed by the withdrawal of the non- organic Indonesian Military and police forces, is currently taking place. This will be the penultimate phase of GAM fulfilling their commitment to surrender 842 weapons as stated in the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Helsinki, Finland. It is expected that these last two phases will also be carried out successfully.

It is perhaps a good time to assess this agreement (Helsinki MOU) in the context of the previous peace negotiations with GAM.

The first attempt to negotiate peace with GAM was made during the tenure of President Abdurrahman Wahid resulting in the Humanitarian Pause, an agreement on a cease-fire for certain periods of time to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the conflict-affected areas. The implementation of this agreement was not considered very successful, because there were no provisions for monitoring the cease-fire from both sides. Nevertheless, that was the beginning of negotiations with GAM.

Amid the acrimony between both sides, a second attempt was made to negotiate another agreement during the tenure of President Megawati Soekarnoputri, which finally led to the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) in December 2002. In negotiating this agreement, the government wanted to have a final and comprehensive solution to the Aceh question, based on the basic assumption that GAM would be ready to renounce its intention for Aceh to become independent from the Republic of Indonesia.

The COHA agreement was the first step in which, instead of just a cease-fire, the two sides were required to cease hostilities toward each other. If successfully implemented, in which of course GAM would relinquish its plan to establish its own governmental machinery in Aceh and its own military force, the next phase would have been an All-inclusive Dialog during which all Acehnese groups, especially the civil society, including GAM would discuss the most appropriate future arrangements for Aceh within the context of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia. The last phase would have been elections, in which GAM members would be able to participate fully.

It turned out that GAM did not want to renounce its intention for Aceh to become independent from the Republic of Indonesia. During the implementation of COHA (December 2002-May 2003), GAM continued to strengthen their civil administrative structure and military force by publicly appointing new officials and officers, extracting "Nanggroe tax" and smuggling in weapons from outside the country.

This is why when the Helsinki MOU did not explicitly state that GAM would abandon its effort for Aceh to become independent, many Indonesians became quite concerned. Has GAM really changed it objective, as the government continues to assure us? Let us therefore scrutinize more closely the Helsinki MOU itself to see if GAM would have a much bigger incentive to comply with this agreement.

First of all, as will be clear from the discussion below, the MOU is more than an agreement. It deals with some aspects of the relationships between the central government and the Aceh administration. In this sense, it has a quasi-constitutional character. The MOU compresses the three phases of the previous negotiations into one package. The cessation of hostilities, as exemplified by the surrender of GAM weapons during the first four months, to be followed by the reintegration of GAM forces into the society.

There is no part that provides for dialog among the Acehnese for future administrative and political arrangements. Instead, the government, central and regional, together with GAM and Acehnese academics, will formulate, as they are now doing, what is called the Aceh Administrative Law which will have to be in effect, according to the MOU, by April 2006. This is when the next round of regional executive elections in Aceh will be held.

GAM members, who have been given amnesty by the government, will be able to participate and be elected as "head of the Aceh Administration" (Article 1.2.3 of the MOU) in April 2006. In the future, "administrative measures undertaken by the government of Indonesia with regard to Aceh will be implemented in consultation with and with the consent of the head of the Aceh administration" (1.1.2.d). If GAM captures the seat of the "head of Aceh administration", then it will have veto power over decisions by the government. Meanwhile, the "appointment of the chief of the organic police force and the prosecutors shall be approved by the head of the Aceh administration" (1.4.4).

How about the Aceh regional legislature which was elected last year until 2009? "Until 2009 the legislature of Aceh will not be entitled to enact any laws without the consent of the head of Aceh administration" (1.2.4). This consolidates the authority and power of the "head of the Aceh administration" vis a vis the central government and the present Aceh regional legislature. In the long run, the government "will facilitate the establishment of Aceh-based political parties" at the latest by the first quarter of 2007 (1.2.1).

GAM will thus have a legitimate vehicle to capture the Aceh regional legislature in 2009. Furthermore, international agreements entered into which relate to Aceh, and decisions with regard to Aceh, by the House of Representatives and the Indonesian government have to be agreed upon by the legislature of Aceh (1.1.2.b and 1.1.2c). The absolute control by Aceh, the executive as well as legislative, over its own affairs is assured (1.1.2.a).

If, by 2009, GAM is able to wrest control over the Aceh administration and the legislature, they will have been able to be in full control of Aceh by political and peaceful means.

The writer is a former senior staff member of the United Nations dealing with peacekeeping missions in Namibia, Lebanon, Somalia and Liberia, and the resolution of conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan on Nagorno Karabakh and between Cameroon and Nigeria on the Bakassi Peninsula. Was also a member of the government negotiating team with GAM resulting in the COHA agreement in December 2002.