The Jakarta Charter is not Islamic law

The Jakarta Charter is not Islamic law

Wisnu Pramudya, Editor, 'Suara Hidayatullah' Magazine,
Jakarta

One telling incident occurred during an international
scientific conference attended by both Muslim and non-Muslim
scholars in Bandung in 1994. In his address, then minister of
research and technology B.J. Habibie remarked: "As a secular
state, Indonesia does not place the Koran as its main source of
legislation".

However, immediately upon receiving a scribbled note from
Nurcholish Madjid, Habibie retracted his statement: "Oh, excuse
me, what I meant was that as a pluralist state based on
Pancasila ... No, Indonesia is not a secular state".

More than anything, the incident served to illustrate the
state of confusion affecting Indonesia's identity.

Indonesia is home to the world's largest Muslim population, it
is based on Pancasila rather than Islam, and the current
campaigns for the re-installment of the Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta
Charter), which will enable the implementation of syariah
(Islamic law) for Muslims, has been facing stiff opposition.

So, is this country Islamic or secular? What is apparent from
the present discourse on the campaigns for syariah is a narrowing
down of the syariah concept.

Islamic law is not the Jakarta Charter.

The first is universal, while the second is local (in this
case, Indonesia) and sectorial (in this case, political).

It took the Committee for the Preparation of the Independence
of Indonesia months to prepare the Jakarta Charter as an official
document to be read as a proclamation of independence.

Two crucial parts of the document went missing when Soekarno
and Hatta, after they had been kidnapped several days earlier,
read out a makeshift text on Aug. 17, 1945.

The first part was a sentence declaring independence with the
blessing of Allah the Almighty.

The second missing part was seven words in the first of what
later became the five-tenet Pancasila state ideology, namely:
(Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa) dengan kewajiban melaksanakan syariat
Islam bagi pemeluknya (literally translated as the obligation for
Muslims to observe syariah).

Some say the seven words were omitted at the behest of
Mohammad Hatta, a Dutch-educated socialist democratic figure,
reportedly under pressure by a Japanese officer and
representatives from eastern Indonesia, who threatened to secede
if the formula remained.

Hatta died years later without revealing who the Japanese
officer or who the eastern Indonesian representatives were.

Hence the confusion over Indonesia's identity.

Indonesians do not have the courage to build a legal system on
what are actually their own roots.

The French built their legal system upon their belief in
liberte, egalite et fraternite, so why don't Indonesians dare to
build a legal system upon Islam, which is the social and cultural
roots of its majority?

The current Criminal Code and other legislations are Dutch
colonial inheritance. One can thus imagine the psycho-social
confusion, resulting in what can only be called a split
personality.

Those who oppose the campaigns argue that because Indonesia is
plural, it would be unfair to base most of its laws on Islam.

But was not France plural on July 14, 1789? The battle between
the feudalist and people's movement continued until well after
the French Revolution had already been won.

Was not England plural when its legislature began to assume
power equal to that wielded by the monarchy? A witness to such
plurality was King Charles I who was beheaded in 1649 for treason
by a country that was changing into a democracy.

England was at the time experiencing a crisis because of its
very plurality. The tensions between the monarchy, the
legislature, the Catholics and the Protestants, English and non-
English were signs of that crisis. Yet the situation did not
prevent growing democratization.

What can be learned from the history of England and France is
that pluralism is never a hindrance to upholding the truth.
Because the truth is not the result of consensus.

The French revolutionary and the English democrats believed
that democracy was the truth.

Indonesia has failed to understand that the position of Islam,
as the dominant source of social and cultural roots, has to be
solidified before it can go on and solve other problems.

The English and the French, by contrast, have succeeded
because they realized that a secular democracy, which places the
Church in the margins of power, was the exclusive precondition
for their people to lay the foundation of their countries.

The Jakarta Charter is a political matter. The annual People's
Consultative Assembly sessions last year and this coming August
was and will be the witnesses to a political campaign for the re-
installment of the document.

But because it is only a political matter, neither failure nor
victory should be deemed a life or death question.

Supporters of the document do not have to feel sorry if their
campaign is defeated. There are many other roads leading to Rome
(in this case, syariah).

Those who are against the Jakarta Charter do not need to panic
if campaigners prevail and the document is included in the
Constitution.

The present discourse on the Jakarta Charter, however, has
witnessed a narrowing down of the syariah concept. People have
been led to believe that syariah is equal to the Jakarta Charter.

What emerged from various discussions are myths surrounding
syariah.

Three of the most quoted myths are: That Islam is no longer
relevant; syariah will threaten human rights; and that it will
cause Indonesia to disintegrate.

The first myth belies the fact that the West's knowledge and
technological advancement today was founded from what had been
developed by Muslim scholars centuries earlier.

History shows that syariah is parallel with the advancement of
civilization. The slide only began when syariah was abandoned.

The second myth, that the implementation of syariah will
threaten human rights, might have been prompted by fears of
authoritarianism in the name of God.

History tells us that syariah cannot be upheld if individuals
and the community are not empowered before the state. For
example,syariah was implemented formally in Medina only after 13
years of efforts to empower individuals in Mecca.

There are certainly oppressive Muslim regimes, but a closer
look reveals two telling components. The first was that those
regimes implement only items in syariah that preserve their
power, the second was that the regimes, more often than not, were
those that came to power by the grace of their former Western
occupiers.

The last myth that syariah threatens national integrity is
speculation. There is no historical proof of a country being torn
apart due to the implementation of syariah.

Indeed, Indonesia is facing the threat of disintegration but
it is disintegration by design.

The scapegoats could be numerous but because most Indonesians
are ambivalent Muslims, campaigners for syariah fit the bill of
scapegoat nicely.

In an Islamic point of view,syariah touches practically all
aspects of a Muslim's life.

For every Muslim, the syariah has to do with, for want of a
better expression, comfort during one's lifetime and after death.

It is therefore clear why campaigns for the syariah will never
cease.