The 'Islam-nationalist' divide, one obstacle to progress

The 'Islam-nationalist' divide, one obstacle to progress

Mochtar Buchori, Legislator, Indonesian Democratic
Party of Struggle (PDI-P), Jakarta, mbuchori@indo.net.id

In the Indonesian political psyche there seems to be a wall
that firmly separates the "Islamic wing" from the "nationalist
wing", the two traditional main pillars of the political system.
The rivalry between these two political communities can at times
be so bitter that they look at each other not only as rivals, but
as adversaries.

This is unhealthy. Many political leaders, now and in the
past, have been looking for a formula that can break this
political divide. One formula -- supposedly envisaged by first
president Bung Karno -- suggests that to end this hostility two
hybrid groups should be created, the "nationalistic-religious"
group, and the "religious-nationalistic" group. In current
political idiom the political ideology of these two groups might
be referred to as "nationalistic Islamism" and "Islamic
nationalism".

The difference between these two ideologies would be very
slim, and whether they exist is also questionable. For one thing,
the term "Islamic nationalism" itself would be an oxymoron,
nationalism having claimed to stand outside and above religious
matters. In fact, nationalist political parties have always
claimed that they are the political home for Indonesians from all
religious creeds.

Is it realistic to expect that one day such groups will
emerge? Thus far this dream has not materialized. However,
developments in the last 10 years or so have signaled shifts
within both camps.

The rise of the "liberal Islam" movement within the Islamic
camp, and the rise in adherence to Islamic religious observance
among hard-core nationalists are signs of this shift. Admittedly
they are weak signs, but nonetheless departures from political
orthodoxies, and readiness for rapprochement.

Even though it is impossible to say at the moment whether this
dream of rapprochement would ever come true, it is still possible
to say whether the conditions that had caused the discord had
changed; and whether these changes indicate converging or
diverging trends.

One important cause of this Islam-nationalist discord was
education. There was a glaring contrast between the education of
Islamic leaders and that of Nationalist leaders. This contrast
lay primarily in the cultural orientation that the two
educational systems had cultivated in their students.

Whereas the Koranic education introduced Islamic leaders
solely to an Islamic orientation of life, the basically secular
education of nationalist leaders provided them with a repertoire
of knowledge anchored in Western culture. Thus whereas subjects
like natural sciences and Western languages were alien to the
Islamic leaders of that time, the nationalist leaders were
ignorant about ideals of society based on Islam.

The result of this educational dichotomy was that the groups
of leaders could not communicate effectively about matters
affecting respective followers. The social, economic and cultural
factors among the grass roots of each group further separated
them. The Islamic and nationalist blocs were thus divided both at
the bottom and at the top.

After 1950 the educational situation changed, if only
marginally. But the basics are still more or less the same.
Islamic educational institutions like the madrasah and pesantren
have been modifying themselves with regard to organizational
format and method of instruction, but instruction in Islamic
theology is still the dominant element.

It is still very difficult to persuade these institutions to
introduce mathematics and natural sciences into many of these
institutions. Their classic attitude has been that science
education would reduce the faith of their students.

Yet suspicion and dislike of everything Western is no longer
as strong as they used to be. The State Academy of Islamic
Studies (IAIN) is living evidence of this evolution. The question
is whether the new Islamic intellectuals are willing to assume a
political role or whether they would rather stay away from
politics, and live as academics.

On the nationalist side, despite changes in academic quality
and cultural orientation, the basic pattern of education is also
the same.

A decline in education quality have made students less
inclined to boast about achievements. The new cultural
orientation in schools has made them conscious of their own
cultural identity, and less knowledgeable about Western culture.
The ultimate impact of this change is that the feeling of
superiority toward people brought up within the Islamic education
system has been very much reduced.

However, the mental wall that divides the Islamic and
nationalist communities still stands firm, especially among older
political leaders. They can argue for days about symbolism, but
not about substance. This is obviously an unsettling obstacle for
efforts toward national progress.

Where do we go from here? We cannot stop half way in
educational reform. Further reform must be based upon a new
paradigm, cultural and political, which should take into account
our current national and global realities.

What we must build is a new Indonesia that can live in harmony
with the rest of the world, and is part of the global
civilization.