The institutionalization of state violence after 1965
Asvi Warman Adam, Jakarta
Prof. Henk Schulte Nordholt maintains that in Indonesia's history, the intensity of violence increases during the transition of power, the reinforcement of power, and also amid economic woes. This is exactly what happened throughout the period of the New Order.
The root of violence can be traced to the colonial era. While history textbooks in Indonesia describe the early 20th century as the period of implementation of the Dutch ethical policy in this archipelago, at the same time successive military expeditions were in fact dispatched to Aceh, Lombok, Central and South Sumatra, Borneo, Aceh, Central and South Sulawesi, Seram, Flores, Timor, Bali and again Aceh. Some 75,000 people or 15 percent of the Acehnese population were killed by Dutch colonial troops.
Following Indonesia's independence, various rebellions broke out in the country with a high death toll, though they were eventually stamped out. This was not the case with the Sept. 30, 1965 movement (G30S) coup attempt, which set off the longest conflict after independence. That year seems unending. Despite the passage of 40 years, the impact of this incident lingers, leaving deep and lasting repercussions up to the present.
Communists and Communism became the enemy constantly recycled by the New Order or especially the New Order military. This country turned into the most anti-Communist nation that probably ever existed. The Nazis exterminated millions of Jewish people in gas chambers at one juncture in history. But in Indonesia the torture inflicted on Communists or those accused of being ones lasted for decades, making them suffer physical pain followed by mental torment.
I share the view of Australian historian Robert Cribb that we could not have guaranteed the absence of brutality if the Communists had risen to power. But I wish to point out that the slaughter of 500,000 people in 1965 was the gravest tragedy of humanity in Indonesia's history.
The 1965 incident also served as a watershed, marking major changes in economic, political and cultural areas. The free-and- active, non-aligned foreign policy became pro-American and pro- western. The self-supporting economy shifted to a market economy relying on capital and external loans. The entire cultural potential was mustered to ensure successful development, with no more polemics or criticism. Unlike the changes occurring in other periods, in 1965 they were so simultaneous that their reverberations were more alarming.
Below is the process and modes of institutionalization of state violence during the New Order era.
The institute formed after the outbreak of G30S had unlimited power. Kopkamtib (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) seized and interrogated people considered dangerous to the government. It also instructed the attorney general to banish B-category political detainees to Buru Island (1969-1979).
These detainees' involvement in G30S was suspected but there was not sufficient evidence to bring them to court. Kopkamtib decided whether somebody was "environmentally clean" (with no family members directly or indirectly implicated in G30S) through special screening in the selection of civil servants and armed forces candidates, or periodical screening in the framework of rank/office promotion of servicemen and civil servants.
Under Admiral Sudomo, the agency prohibiting the public from undertaking any activity or publishing anything seen by the government as a potential source of conflict relating to the key areas of ethnicity, religion, race and societal relations, a concept known as SARA. At the end of the New Order, this body changed into the Coordinating Agency to Support the Strengthening of National Stability (Bakorstranas), which was dissolved by then president Abdurrahman Wahid.
The 1965 incident also led to a diplomatic freeze with the People's Republic of China. Everything suggestive of China was suspect and banned. Parcels of magazines with Chinese characters were examined by immigration personnel; religious and socio- cultural activities were considerable restricted if not prohibited. In the various social disturbances arising under the New Order regime, the Chinese often became a target of mass fury.
The policy of giving Indonesian names to or renaming citizens of Chinese descent is worth noting. It was a form of oppression that considerably affected individuals in a community. A name has its meaning and members of society treat each other also according to their names as they indicate the status and position of families.
In 1959 the law of land reform was enforced, which as a whole was not so radical. But it also contained provisions on production sharing between farm workers and owners, which was very favorable to laborers and could overturn the rural social order. While earlier land owners got 60 percent and laborers 40 percent of harvests, the law ruled otherwise.
Starting from 1962/63, the Indonesian Farmers Union and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) launched "unilateral actions" against village evils, including landlords, rural authorities and loan sharks. Protests, land takeovers and village-head overthrows prevailed. Insurgencies in Java's villages were far more widespread and intense because poor masses were involved. Some of their victims were devout Muslims and clerics. The confused and uncontrolled situation prompted people to arm or protect themselves. The G30S coup attempt took place against this backdrop.
In the New Order era, the government supported by the security apparatus could easily seize people's land for and in the name of development.
The 1965 conflict was purposely maintained by the New Order regime to perpetuate its power. One of the characteristics of the 1965 incident was the utilization of history to maintain conflicts.
The New Order's orchestration of history took different forms, such as:
The Indonesian National History (SNI) school textbooks clearly mentioned Sukarno's involvement in the Sept. 30 coup attempt.
Labor Day was annulled and the June 1 Pancasila (state philosophy) anniversary was replaced by the Oct. 1 Pancasila Sanctity Day, which had nothing to do with Pancasila. The killing of six generals was commemorated by ignoring the massacre of 500,000 people that happened thereafter.
Until now, none of Soeharto's successors, including Sukarno's own daughter, Megawati Soekarnoputri, have been able or willing to find the truth behind the Sept. 30 coup attempt. It will remain one of the darkest chapters in the nation's history.
The writer is research professor at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta.