The indulgence of American policies

Lee Poh Ping, Institute of Malaysian Studies, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, The Star, Asia News Network, Selangor, Malaysia

We are witnessing the astonishing spectacle of a revolt over Iraq by the "moderate" wing of the Republican establishment. Two of its most respected elder statesmen, Brent Scowcroft and James Baker, have come out urging the younger Bush (George W.) not to attack Iraq without taking into account the views of allies and without exhausting all diplomatic efforts to solve the Saddam Hussein problem.

This revolt is surprising not only because both statesmen served as national security adviser and secretary of state respectively to the elder Bush's administration but because they are also extremely close to the Bush family.

This revolt, in so far as it signifies a split over not only Iraq but also over the conduct of future U.S. foreign policy, is a good occasion to consider the schools of thought contending for supremacy in U.S. foreign policy especially after Sept. 11.

We may begin with two extremes. One is the isolationist school, of which Pat Buchanan is a forceful advocate.

In foreign relations, Buchanan would have the U.S. fall back on the American continent and not be involved in the affairs of other nations except when the deepest interests of the U.S. are involved. An America in isolation may not work to the advantage of Malaysia and Southeast Asia as it could create a destabilizing situation until new powers emerge to stabilize the balance.

Buchanan is now no longer influential in the Republican party, though an American scholar once said that about 30 percent of Americans believe in some form of isolationism for America.

The other extreme is a foreign policy based on international law and cooperative security. Though this may have been the basic aim of U.S. foreign policy it is increasingly less so now.

A much talked about article in the Washington Post by the columnist Robert Kagan, in distinguishing between the American approach from that of the European in foreign affairs, writes about their divergent views on the use of power.

"Europeans," he writes, "believe they are moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation" while the U.S. "remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international rules are unreliable and where security and the promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might."

This world of international law is probably the best for a small country like Malaysia as it means big powers as well as small are subject to law and not arbitrary action.

There is nevertheless a flip side as a country like Malaysia will have no legal defense if such laws allow for intervention in states in the name of humanitarianism or for some other reasons.

While either of this extreme no longer is the dominant school in U.S. foreign policy, it is not true to say that the debate raging between those in favor of an Iraq attack, the "neo- conservatives," and those who urge caution, do not take heed of international law and cooperative security.

Those who urge caution do. But while those who urge caution may not look upon the European concept of a post-modern system based on the rejection of force and on self-enforced rules of behavior as something operative in international relations, or as some ideal to be achieved, they nevertheless believe in the utility of coopting some of the institutions and practices of this Europeans' post-modern world, to use a term by the British diplomat, Richard Cooper, to achieve the aims of American policy.

Thus, the supporters of the elder Bush (the cautionary) would still see a utility for institutions such as the United Nations and NATO and the cooperation of other allies to help the U.S. wage war in Iraq or elsewhere. Neo-conservatives believe the U.S. can go it alone in Iraq and elsewhere. And if the allies want to come along, fine. If not, it does not matter.

But these cautionary and the neo-conservatives agree that global security and liberal order depend on the U.S.

Thus the cautionary and the neo-conservatives do not differ on the importance of U.S. power and the kind of world in which the U.S. lives.

The difference lies in their divergent assessments of U.S. power and in the way U.S. foreign policy aims can be achieved.

The neo-conservatives believe that the U.S. is so powerful it can go it alone, and indeed if the U.S. were to demonstrate such power, the allies would go along in Iraq or elsewhere.

They also believe that this power should be used to spread U.S. values and ideals, believing such spread benefits U.S. interests. Worry not over the destabilizing consequences of an attack over Iraq, these conservatives will argue, for if the U.S. can show its determination to use its power for democracy and other U.S. values, the Middle East will go along.

The cautionary do not think American power is so overwhelming that it can do without allies for major conflicts. And they are concerned with the consequences of any use of American power. They do not believe that the aftermath of an attack on Iraq would necessarily bring about consequences favorable to the U.S.

Who will finally triumph over the Iraqi issue is still not certain. If the cautionary do, the U.S. may be more willing to seek cooperation from a country like Malaysia or other countries in Southeast Asia before they utilize American power for any issue that might affect the fundamental interests of Malaysia or Southeast Asia.

If however the neo-conservatives win, be prepared for an America less sensitive to the opinions of mankind; more ready to ride roughshod over the sovereignty of any country (in the name of pre-emption of a security threat or whatever justification the U.S. might use), whether it is Malaysia or any other Southeast Asian country; and perhaps, a new liberal American imperialism.