The illusion of political supporters

Political analyst J. Soedjati Djiwandono shares his views on a "new blend" of Indonesian politics.

JAKARTA (JP): Institution building should be an essential part of the reform process. In this country, however, institution building has proceeded mainly in name and form, and not quite in spirit and substance.

We have an elected president. But President Abdurrahman Wahid did not even contest the popular election. He was elected by "representatives of the people", most of whom were not directly elected by the people, the rest pretenders at their worst.

It is thus small wonder that Indonesian politicians have little sense of accountability. They have little sense of the prevailing aspirations of the people. Their "constituencies" are no more than their own illusions.

It seems that they do not even have a clear idea of their functions and responsibilities. And worst of all, they do not seem to have respect for their own institutions.

A clear indication of the weakening of institution building in this era of reform is the growing tendency toward extra- legislative democracy, particularly in the form of street demonstrations.

Now not only university students, but also people of different walks of life, irrespective of age or gender, take to the streets for a variety of causes.

Members of the legislature, and even the President himself, have tended to rely more and more on mass support in the form of rallies and public statements by various groups of people, than on democratic process and mechanism.

Certainly, ordinary people cannot possibly take a direct part in a legislative debate or in any other formal part of democratic processes in state institutions. The best, not necessarily the most effective alternative, is to make public statements or to stage demonstrations.

No one knows for sure if such mass movements are orchestrated by politicians, apart from suspicions expressed in public of "provocation" by political elite backed by "money politics".

And surely, with millions unemployed since the onset of the monetary crisis, one cannot underestimate the significance of money politics. For many, to get paid for taking part in a demonstration, no matter what for or against, is an easy way to earn a living, at least temporarily.

It is ironical to note, however, that politicians are getting increasingly interested in making use of rallies, whether or not such extra-legislative activities are their own making.

One case in point was the apparent political exploitation of such demonstrations in support of the special committee of the House of Representatives (DPR) on the Brunei and Bulog scandals.

Even more ironical is the fact that many politicians now seem increasingly inclined to resort to what should rightly belong to extra-legislative or mass politics. Thus in order to support their demand to speed up the process toward a special session of the People's Consultative Assembly aimed at impeaching the President in the wake of DPR's memorandum to him, one House deputy speaker started to collect signatures.

Having obtained over 100 signatures from legislators, however, for one reason or another, the effort was abandoned.

Another case was the public statement issued by six factions of the House to support the Golkar Party in the face of public demands for the dissolution of the party, considered the main pillar of the New Order regime under Soeharto. It is doubtful, however, if such a course of action would in any way affect public hostility toward Golkar.

Most disconcerting is the fact that even the President himself seems to have supported, if implicitly, or even resorted to such use of extra-legislative politics.

Reacting to the House memorandum, he claimed that he still enjoyed the people's support, probably having in mind the rowdy expressions of support for him by his loyal supporters in days of demonstrations.

He considered dissolving the House, challenging that the mandate of the people did not necessarily come through the mechanism of the legislature.

That is a new phenomenon that characterizes Indonesian politics today. It is a mixture of elite and mass politics, of legislative and extra-legislative politics. It is a special blend of Indonesian politics, a blend of sorts.

Not like delicious blended tea, coffee, whisky or tobacco, it stinks.

What are we in for? A revolution, in a country not likely to be a fertile ground for a successful one? A national reconciliation, Indonesian style?

Are we, particularly the top leadership of this country, dead serious about it? Do we really deserve to be a nation, free and independent, and to survive?