The governorship race -- Whose Jakarta is it anyway?

The governorship race -- Whose Jakarta is it anyway?

Endy M. Bayuni, Deputy Editor, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

Although the election of Jakarta's next governor is not due
until September, the city's Legislative Council has already shut
the door on the public to participate in a process that is
crucial to their lives and the future of the city.

Public participation virtually stopped when the registration
of the candidates at the Legislative Council ended on June 21.
A total of 72 people took up the challenge to register. Another
47 registered for the vice governorship race.

The governor-wannabees who are challenging incumbent Sutiyoso
include not only seasoned local politicians, but also scholars,
senior bureaucrats, retired generals and activists.

But one who stands out among the pack is Rasdullah, the 38-
year-old school dropout becak (pedicab) driver, whose chief claim
to the city's top position is that he has a conscience. That is a
rare quality among today's politicians in Indonesia, but the way
elections here are designed, conscience is an irrelevant issue.

The registration process was a merry affair. Never before in
the history of Jakarta has the governorship election been
formally contested by so many people of diverse backgrounds.

But that's it as far as public participation in the election
process goes. Once the registration was closed, the matter of
electing the governor became fully the domain of the city's
political elite: the factions in the Legislative Council.

There is hardly any room left, if at all, for the public to
influence the course of the election, let alone the outcome.

The next stage in the election process is the formal
nomination. Only candidates supported by one of the 11 factions
will qualify. That virtually rules out independent candidates
like Rasdullah and urban planning expert Marco Kusumawijaya and
lawyer and activist Nursyahbani Katjasungkana -- who is
contesting the vice governorship -- even if they enjoy some
support from members of the public.

Each of the 11 factions has the right to select two groups of
nominees, with each containing the names of candidates for
governor and vice governor. Theoretically, there could, in
consequence, be up to 22 candidates for each of the two posts
after nominations are closed on Aug. 5.

Those who pass the nomination process will undergo a rigorous
fit-and-proper test conducted by the Jakarta Legislative Council.
From this process, the Council is expected to bring the list of
candidates down to five pairs, before they are put to a vote,
which is scheduled for Sept. 17.

What role is there for the public in any of this process?

None apparently.

During the nomination process, the factions are not even
obliged to consult with the public. Going by their attitude these
past few weeks, none of the factions seems to give a hoot about
public opinion. Witness their cool response to protests opposing
Sutiyoso's nomination.

President Megawati Soekarnoputri's PDI Perjuangan faction, the
largest, with 30 of the 84 seats in the Council, must count as
the worst betrayer of public trust by nominating Sutiyoso when it
is clear that he no longer enjoys the support of most Jakartans
because he has failed them in the last five years.

Once public participation has ended, the election process
quickly turns into horse-trading, which seems to have become the
trademark of Indonesian politics. All 11 factions, including,
most of all, PDI Perjuangan, will use their clout to get whatever
they can from this process. Unfortunately, their political
interest rarely coincides with that of the public.

Take as an example PDI Perjuangan's decision to nominate
Sutiyoso. Going by party officials' explanation, it was President
Megawati who ordered the party's faction in the Legislative
Council to nominate the incumbent governor.

The reason given is that she felt more comfortable if the post
were held by someone with a military background, apparently out
of concern about the security situation in the capital city.

Since Jakarta's problems seemed to have worsened, despite
being governed by military generals since the 1960s, Megawati
must either have a very low opinion about present-day civilian
leaders, or an inflated view of men in uniform.

If military background is indeed the chief criterion, then
Sutiyoso fits the bill, and the faction need not bother looking
for another candidate. Just make sure that he gets elected, so
the order from Megawati goes.

This, however, puts her at odds with many of the party's own
rank-and-file who remember Sutiyoso's role in the bloody attack
at the party's headquarters in Jakarta in July 1996. The fact
that he has still to clear his name in the affair in court
mattered little to Megawati, whose overriding concern was
security.

But security for whom was never made clear.

Given that her argument for choosing Sutiyoso was not very
compelling, the real reason has been the subject of speculation.
One theory most often cited is that Sutiyoso has promised to
deliver Jakarta to PDI Perjuangan in the 2004 elections if he
were reappointed governor.

Whatever the real reason, Megawati has acted not only against
the public interest, but also against the interests of her
supporters. Even the Jakarta Chapter of PDI Perjuangan had
opposed Sutiyoso's nomination before it was forced to comply with
her order.

Megawati's intervention in the governorship election process
may not stop there. By law, the Legislative Council must
"consult" with her about the final candidates before voting.

This is a presidential prerogative accorded to her because,
under the unitary state system of government, a provincial
governor is a representative of the president in the region. The
person is technically an extension of the President's power.

President Megawati, like Soeharto before her, could strike out
any candidate she disliked, and could even influence the council
to vote for her preferred candidate. The President has the right
to refuse to install the elected candidate, if she so wishes.

This explains the reluctance of the central government to
fully entrust the people with electing their governors or regency
chiefs; And why the public is excluded from the election process,
except at the beginning.

The election of the governor of Jakarta -- the seat of the
Indonesian administration, the nation's center of trading and
business activity -- is simply too precious for Megawati and the
powers that be to be left to simple democratic forces.

But for the 9 million or so residents, Jakarta is their home,
a place to live and work in, to raise families and to build their
communities. They, rather than the politicians, should have the
right to determine whom they wish to see as their governor.

Politicians who conspire to deprive Jakartans of their
democratic rights must remember that the elected or appointed
governor must eventually work with the residents he or she
governs. Without their support, the next governor will find it
difficult, if not impossible, to work.