The future of UN peacekeeping

LONDON: The scale and scope of UN peace-keeping efforts reached a peak in 1994. The period since then has been characterized by retrenchment, a scaling down of ambitions and a consolidation of changes made since 1992 to the organization's machinery for mounting and sustaining peacekeeping operations.

The highly uneven level of achievement in Angola, Cambodia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia has also led to a more general reappraisal of the possibilities and limitations of UN military involvement in intra-state conflicts.

This reassessment has taken place within the UN Secretariat, among the Security Council's permanent members China, France, Russia, the UK and the U.S. as well as in the capitals of traditionally staunch supporters of UN peacekeeping, such as Canada and the Scandinavian countries.

In the short-to-medium term, it is doubtful that the UN will continue to take the lead in the kind of ambitious, large-scale and multi-faceted operations undertaken in Cambodia in 1992-1993 and in the former Yugoslavia in 1992-1995.

The UN is also unlikely to undertake enforcement action as allowed under Chapter 7 of its Charter. Instead, there will be a sharper distinction between UN-led involvement in consent-based operations, and ad hoc 'coalitions of the willing' engaged in enforcement activities.

UN deployments have been reduced significantly since 1994. Although there are still 16 peacekeeping operations in progress, the number of personnel involved has diminished markedly. As of Aug. 31, there were 19,191 UN blue hel-mets deployed following the replacement on July 1, 1997 of the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) III with the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) compared to 76,000 in September 1994.

The UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) is due to leave the Balkans in January 1998, when the territory reverts to Croatian control. Without UNTAES and MONUA, total UN deployments would involve little more than 13,000 personnel.

This trend does not so much reflect an absolute decline in international interventions as a change in their management, form and scope. Member states -- notably the U.S. -- have concluded that the UN is structurally and doctrinally ill-equipped for activities beyond traditional consent-based operations. As a result, the UN has opted out of peace-support measures likely to involve combat other than self-defense.

To some extent, this development has been welcomed by the UN Secretariat, which was scarred by events in the former Yugoslavia. Scaling down activities has also allowed the organization to consolidate its reform process. Initiated in 1993, this is aimed at professionalizing the management of operations.

The UN's reversion to a less ambitious agenda has been paralleled by the emergence of regional coalitions operating with less restrictive rules of engagement and more robust mandates. UN military personnel involved in peacekeeping operations are now out-numbered by regional forces engaged in diverse peacekeeping missions.

The Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia comprised 60,000 soldiers from NATO and 16 non-Alliance states; its successor, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) comprises some 35,000 troops.

Other examples of this trend are: -- the 18,000 Russian border guards deployed in 1994 by the Common-wealth of Independent States (CIS) in Georgia and Tajikistan; -- the 7,500-strong force dispatched to Liberia from 1990 onwards by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); and -- the 6,500 troops that participated in Operation Alba, the Italian-led mission to Albania, that ended in August 1997.

In addition, it was proposed in November 1996 that Canada should lead a force to the then Zaire, and in 1997 for South Pacific states to send troops to Bougainville, Papua New Guinea.

Some of these operations bear only a tenuous resemblance to consensual peacekeeping. CIS operations have more in common with counter-insurgency, and some aspects of IFOR and SFOR clearly amount to peace enforcement.

Experiences since 1995 show that peace missions conducted by regional groupings also present problems. First, the concept of regional organizations is imprecise. They often include groups of self-appointed states policing their own interests who, knowingly or not, add to the conflict's dynamics. CIS actions have been endorsed by the UN, although Russia seems more interested in promoting its influence than in securing stability.

Second, 'contracting out' discriminates between well- integrated regions with meaningful structures and those without them. Only Europe has competent multinational infrastructures, and even these proved inadequate in meeting the challenge of Bosnia. Moreover, leading regional governments sometimes have dubious standing, acting brutally and divisively in their own jurisdictions and lessening the credibility of humanitarian interventions.

Many developing states continue to regard the UN as the most appropriate body to safeguard international peace and security. This is because all countries are represented in the UN General Assembly, and the organization embeds even its most powerful members in a system of checks and balances.

Furthermore, coercion by ad hoc groupings is unlikely to provide a solution for dealing with intra-state conflicts. Some of the reactions against UN peace-keeping are based on historical mis-representations. For example, although the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)'s 1993 safe-areas mandate in Bosnia was a mistake, having little regard for operational consequences, this was less a failure of UN peacekeeping than an outcome of incongruous U.S. and European policies. France and the UK promoted the safe-areas concept to preclude air attacks on Serb positions that would expose their troops to retaliation.

Criticism of UN peacekeepers' inability to handle 'robustness' in Somalia and Rwanda has been similarly mis-directed. The foundations on which alternative concepts are being constructed may therefore be flawed. 'Quick-exit' strategies, designed to make the warring parties focus on deadlines and to avoid 'donor fatigue', contradict the reality that political, economic and social regeneration is a long-term process.

Given these limitations on action outside the UN framework, what is the prospect for a revitalized and reformed UN engaging in peace-support operations? In the medium term, the scope for UN involvement will be most directly shaped by developments in three areas: the UN's finances; its relations with the U.S.; and the question of doctrine.

The UN's financial situation remains acute. It is striking that the opening sessions at the 52nd General Assembly in Sept- ember focused not on the future of peacekeeping but on the failure of key members to pay their dues. The main problem continues to lie with the U.S.

UN peacekeeping has not been costly in absolute terms. The U.S.$1.85 billion out-standing as of Sept. 24, 1997 is less than the Eurofighter's cost overruns. Moreover, the financial problem has been eased with the reduction in commitments. The budget is down from $3.5billion in 1994 to $1.2billion in 1997.

Washington's failure to pay its dues is part of a wider political problem in U.S.-UN relations. The U.S. remains deeply uncertain about the UN's place in U.S. foreign policy.

While opinion polls indicate widespread backing for the organization, and U.S. President Bill Clinton frequently offers declaratory support, the administration has not been prepared to confront opposition on Capitol Hill. In fact, Clinton has yet to try and convince Congressional leaders that improving relations with the UN might be in the U.S. interest.

The third reason why peacekeeping remains in a state of flux has to do with the doctrinal debates and different lessons that member states are drawing from previous operations. During 1994 and 1995, UK assessments of peace-keeping doctrine -- codified in the UK Army document Wider Peacekeeping -- powerfully influenced the thinking of both troop contributors and the UN itself. Wider Peacekeeping stresses that no middle ground exists between peace- keeping and peace enforcement.

This view has been challenged most directly by the French military, which has identified 'peace-restoring operations' as a third category that its armed forces have to be prepared for. The declared aim of such missions would be to restore security by using coercion. However, this would occur without formally designating an aggressor or prejudging the conflict's political outcome.

Considerable disagreement remains about the political and operational viability of this idea. However, it is generally accepted that the UN is best suited to conduct operations at the lower end of any spectrum of peace-support operations.

Three main trends stand out. First, the complex pattern of UN and coalition relationships will grow. Regional forces may be accompanied by smaller, more localized UN missions in stabilized areas. These forces may be followed up by UN troops to assist with the long-term regeneration of societies.

UN deployments will still be needed where regional agencies are over-stretched, lack infrastructure or require legitimacy. Despite the calls by some U.S. officials for Eastern Slavonia to be supervised by NATO, the Security Council had to create UNTAES in January 1996 mainly because NATO had no resources to spare from its commitment in Bosnia.

Although a major test will occur when the UN leaves, most observers, including local civilian peace teams, agree that UNTAES has succeeded in aiding demilitarization and in stabilizing the situation.

Second, UN peacekeeping missions may be smaller than coalition operations, but they are more professional, better trained and more effectively deployed. In the 1990s, national forces, regional bodies and international training centers have invested significantly in raising standards and producing codes of conduct.

Third, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Renewing the United Nations: A Program for Reform report, released on July 16, 1997, stressed the value of the UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS) in providing information about the availability and timely deployment of national contributions. As of Oct. 1, 1997, 67 states, including all the Security Council's permanent members, had decided to participate in UNSAS. Some 87,000 personnel are theoretically available.

However, the rapid-reaction capability lacks support units, only eight states have signed a memorandum of understanding with the UN, and the agreements are still subject to national parliamentary approval. Nevertheless, the database has already facilitated budget planning and preparation for deployments to Guatemala and Haiti.

Although the UN has opted out of peace-enforcement missions, its universal legitimacy and a trend towards increased professionalism will continue to make small-scale peacekeeping operations useful in the future. Robust intervention by proxies will be only one of a range of international response options to wars and complex emergencies.