The future of ASEAN-China ties

The future of ASEAN-China ties

Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Nation, Asia News Network/Bangkok

Assessing the future of the currently excellent ASEAN-China
relationship is not an easy task. How does one improve rock-solid
ties? Indeed, this would be very difficult to do.

When the ASEAN-China Eminent Persons Group was set up early
this year to prepare a report on how ASEAN-China relations are
expected to evolve over the next 15 years, its 22 members
struggled to identify the guiding principles and areas of
cooperation that would best nurture their friendship.

For thousands of years, Southeast Asia countries have been
living with this mammoth giant to the north. The work of the
eminent persons group marked the first time that China and its
small neighbors tried to come to terms with each other and agree
on a set of rules that would set the tone for future relations.

After four meetings and dozens of hours of debating and
drafting, the group has completed its report, which will be
officially delivered to ASEAN foreign ministers on Dec. 11 in
Kuala Lumpur before their bosses meet the next day at the ASEAN
Summit with their Chinese counterpart. The report will also
certainly be looked at with interest by attendees of the "East
Asian Summit" on Dec. 13.

The guiding principles that representatives from ASEAN and
China agreed on drew heavily from the UN charter and the 1976
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation concerning respect of national
sovereignty and non-interference.

In addition, the report reiterated that their future
cooperation must be "strengthened and deepened" and be
"consensus-based, open and inclusive". Most importantly, the
group agreed that ASEAN-China relations must not over-shadow
other existing areas of international cooperation and their own.

In the past 15 years, ASEAN-China ties have undergone several
strains, with the most critical crisis related to a maritime
conflict a decade ago.

Mutual mistrust peaked in March 1995, when ASEAN issued its
strongest condemnation of China's aggression on Mischief Reef in
this disputed region of the South China Sea. It was a wake-up
call for China, which ever since the incident has been committed
to fostering better relations with ASEAN.

Since dialog-based relations were established in 1996, a total
of 48 ASEAN-China mechanisms, ranging from science and technology
to trade and tourism, have been set up to strengthen ties. In
comparison, ASEAN-U.S. cooperation has been marked by only 15
such mechanisms in their 28 years of "dialog relations".

What is at stake for ASEAN is obvious. ASEAN would like an
early conclusion of an ASEAN-China free trade agreement, which
was originally planned for completion by 2010. Cooperation within
APEC and other regional groups, such as those between countries
in the Mekong corridor, must be strengthened.

Furthermore, such efforts must be more holistic and
encompassing, and come to include investment and economic
cooperation. China's investment in ASEAN is still small in
comparison with that of the U.S., Japan and Taiwan.

As part of the scheme, the idea of an ASEAN-China Center has
been put forward. Modeled on the ASEAN-Japan Center established
in 1981, the proposed center would promote trade, investment and
tourism, and have multi-functional purposes. It would also
include research and coordinating units for investors and traders
from China and ASEAN.

To strengthen people-to-people contacts in China and ASEAN and
to increase their awareness and promote cultural understanding,
the report recommends the establishment of an ASEAN-China
Foundation that would take care of educational exchanges and
cultural cooperation. ASEAN and China have yet to agree to how to
fund the center and foundation.

Of late, China has also worked diligently to promote cultural
cooperation, including in regards to the media. As a rising
power, economic and political clout must be supported by
information networks and language exchanges. To the surprise of
many, China media have the strongest institutional ties with
ASEAN media despite their different media cultures and freedoms.
In the near future, Confucius Institutes will be set up in major
cities to promote Putonghua (Mandarin).

On key transnational issues such as cross-border crimes, drug
smuggling, human trafficking, terrorism and maritime security,
China and ASEAN had nothing to quarrel about. However, the mood
shifted when it came to the area of political and security
cooperation, which was marked by notable recalcitrance.

China has been very proactive, taking the bull by the horns.
While preparing for the Eminent Persons Group report, China has
been very engaged and forthcoming in committing itself to future
cooperation in both the disputed areas of South China Sea and the
defense sphere. But ASEAN has been more circumspect, as if its
members first need a better understanding of China's motives.

At this juncture, China can look back with pride and
appreciation that it has overcome ASEAN hostility in the South
China Sea in less than 10 years through effective uses of
regional forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC and
various consultative forums.

As a group, ASEAN countries still feel that additional
confidence-building measures are essential to propel bilateral
cooperation. That explains why ASEAN has turned down China's
overture to begin ASEAN-wide security and defense cooperation
with China, even though it could start with defense
consultations.

As such, it displays a patina of deep-rooted fear. The
grouping recently agreed to start an inaugural defense
ministerial meeting. The preparatory work for the first meeting
will be discussed in Kuala Lumpur early next month ahead of the
ASEAN summit.

The report has one caveat. However useful ASEAN-China
relations might be, they must not be forged at the expense of
ASEAN ties with other major powers such as the U.S., Japan, India
and Australia. These ties must be constructed as part and parcel
of the broader strategic outlook of the region and beyond, ie,
South Asia and Central Asia.

China's enthusiasm in forging military and defense ties with
ASEAN can be understood as part of its new strategic thinking and
its desire to provide for the first time an alternative alliance
for Southeast Asia.

Beijing would like to create a special sense of strategic
partnership with ASEAN, just as it has done with countries in
Central Asia. Since the end of World War II, the region has been
accustomed to and dominated by U.S. security perceptions and
military inter-operatability. In 2020, China's military ties with
ASEAN, if they are to be of any real significance, will
definitely come under a new doctrine that will challenge the
long-dominant U.S. strategic mind-set in the region.