The future of ASEAN-China ties

Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Nation, Asia News Network/Bangkok

Assessing the future of the currently excellent ASEAN-China relationship is not an easy task. How does one improve rock-solid ties? Indeed, this would be very difficult to do.

When the ASEAN-China Eminent Persons Group was set up early this year to prepare a report on how ASEAN-China relations are expected to evolve over the next 15 years, its 22 members struggled to identify the guiding principles and areas of cooperation that would best nurture their friendship.

For thousands of years, Southeast Asia countries have been living with this mammoth giant to the north. The work of the eminent persons group marked the first time that China and its small neighbors tried to come to terms with each other and agree on a set of rules that would set the tone for future relations.

After four meetings and dozens of hours of debating and drafting, the group has completed its report, which will be officially delivered to ASEAN foreign ministers on Dec. 11 in Kuala Lumpur before their bosses meet the next day at the ASEAN Summit with their Chinese counterpart. The report will also certainly be looked at with interest by attendees of the "East Asian Summit" on Dec. 13.

The guiding principles that representatives from ASEAN and China agreed on drew heavily from the UN charter and the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation concerning respect of national sovereignty and non-interference.

In addition, the report reiterated that their future cooperation must be "strengthened and deepened" and be "consensus-based, open and inclusive". Most importantly, the group agreed that ASEAN-China relations must not over-shadow other existing areas of international cooperation and their own.

In the past 15 years, ASEAN-China ties have undergone several strains, with the most critical crisis related to a maritime conflict a decade ago.

Mutual mistrust peaked in March 1995, when ASEAN issued its strongest condemnation of China's aggression on Mischief Reef in this disputed region of the South China Sea. It was a wake-up call for China, which ever since the incident has been committed to fostering better relations with ASEAN.

Since dialog-based relations were established in 1996, a total of 48 ASEAN-China mechanisms, ranging from science and technology to trade and tourism, have been set up to strengthen ties. In comparison, ASEAN-U.S. cooperation has been marked by only 15 such mechanisms in their 28 years of "dialog relations".

What is at stake for ASEAN is obvious. ASEAN would like an early conclusion of an ASEAN-China free trade agreement, which was originally planned for completion by 2010. Cooperation within APEC and other regional groups, such as those between countries in the Mekong corridor, must be strengthened.

Furthermore, such efforts must be more holistic and encompassing, and come to include investment and economic cooperation. China's investment in ASEAN is still small in comparison with that of the U.S., Japan and Taiwan.

As part of the scheme, the idea of an ASEAN-China Center has been put forward. Modeled on the ASEAN-Japan Center established in 1981, the proposed center would promote trade, investment and tourism, and have multi-functional purposes. It would also include research and coordinating units for investors and traders from China and ASEAN.

To strengthen people-to-people contacts in China and ASEAN and to increase their awareness and promote cultural understanding, the report recommends the establishment of an ASEAN-China Foundation that would take care of educational exchanges and cultural cooperation. ASEAN and China have yet to agree to how to fund the center and foundation.

Of late, China has also worked diligently to promote cultural cooperation, including in regards to the media. As a rising power, economic and political clout must be supported by information networks and language exchanges. To the surprise of many, China media have the strongest institutional ties with ASEAN media despite their different media cultures and freedoms. In the near future, Confucius Institutes will be set up in major cities to promote Putonghua (Mandarin).

On key transnational issues such as cross-border crimes, drug smuggling, human trafficking, terrorism and maritime security, China and ASEAN had nothing to quarrel about. However, the mood shifted when it came to the area of political and security cooperation, which was marked by notable recalcitrance.

China has been very proactive, taking the bull by the horns. While preparing for the Eminent Persons Group report, China has been very engaged and forthcoming in committing itself to future cooperation in both the disputed areas of South China Sea and the defense sphere. But ASEAN has been more circumspect, as if its members first need a better understanding of China's motives.

At this juncture, China can look back with pride and appreciation that it has overcome ASEAN hostility in the South China Sea in less than 10 years through effective uses of regional forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC and various consultative forums.

As a group, ASEAN countries still feel that additional confidence-building measures are essential to propel bilateral cooperation. That explains why ASEAN has turned down China's overture to begin ASEAN-wide security and defense cooperation with China, even though it could start with defense consultations.

As such, it displays a patina of deep-rooted fear. The grouping recently agreed to start an inaugural defense ministerial meeting. The preparatory work for the first meeting will be discussed in Kuala Lumpur early next month ahead of the ASEAN summit.

The report has one caveat. However useful ASEAN-China relations might be, they must not be forged at the expense of ASEAN ties with other major powers such as the U.S., Japan, India and Australia. These ties must be constructed as part and parcel of the broader strategic outlook of the region and beyond, ie, South Asia and Central Asia.

China's enthusiasm in forging military and defense ties with ASEAN can be understood as part of its new strategic thinking and its desire to provide for the first time an alternative alliance for Southeast Asia.

Beijing would like to create a special sense of strategic partnership with ASEAN, just as it has done with countries in Central Asia. Since the end of World War II, the region has been accustomed to and dominated by U.S. security perceptions and military inter-operatability. In 2020, China's military ties with ASEAN, if they are to be of any real significance, will definitely come under a new doctrine that will challenge the long-dominant U.S. strategic mind-set in the region.