The freedom of religion and the rule of apostasy

Mirza Tirta Kusuma, Chicago

According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."

Since the Declaration of Human Rights in 1945, the concept of freedom of religion has emerged as an essential part of international law.

In this context, one of contemporary issues of pressing concern in Islam especially an regards human rights, pluralism and interreligious and intra-religious dialogue, is freedom of religion, including conversion and the rules covering apostasy.

In the West, people think of the freedom to convert from one religion to another as a central concern of provisions guaranteeing religious freedom. However, in Muslim milieus the perspective is different; and the question of whether there should be freedom to convert to another religion remains a central concern.

Religious liberty is the fundamental right of everyone. From a Muslim perspective, based on Koranic teaching, religious liberty is fundamentally an ultimate act of respect for God's sovereignty and for the mystery of God's plan for humanity. Ultimately, to respect human freedom is to respect God's plan. In short, to be a true Muslim is to submit to this plan.

The Koran states that an individual's spiritual destiny is a matter strictly between the person and Allah.

So, then, compulsion and external interference would appear to be the antithesis of the Islamic faith. This is so much the case that Muhammad was strongly admonished by God not to compel people to follow the truth of revelation. "If it had been thy Lord's will, they would all have believed, all who are on earth! Wilt thou then compel mankind against their will to believe? (Q.10: 99). Thus, the principle of the freedom of conscience is firmly established in the Koran.

The aspect of sharia that violates freedom of religion and conscience as a human right is the notion of apostasy. Besides its obvious discrimination against non-Muslims, this principle of sharia also violates the freedom of belief and expression of Muslims themselves. Thus, a drastic Islamic reform is urgently needed.

Many thoughtful Muslims in the past were prepared to reform, even to discard, the premodern Islamic jurisprudence on apostasy and accept the concept of religious freedom. Contemporary Muslims who have repudiated the penalty against apostasy argue that the premodern juristic interpretations were unwarranted by Islamic sources and out of keeping with the principle that there should be "no compulsion in religion" (Q. 2: 256).

There is no verse in the Koran that stipulates any earthly penalty for apostasy, and the premodern jurists' rulings on apostasy were extrapolated from incidents in the Prophet's life and from historical events after his death that actually lend themselves to a multifariousness of interpretation.

The Prophet never killed anyone purely for apostasy alone. Indeed, the death penalty was applied when the act of apostasy from Islam was linked to an act of political betrayal of the community. This being the case, the death penalty was not meant to apply to a simple change of faith, but to punish acts such as treason, joining forces with the enemy, and sedition.

In this field, traditional theology has not followed the spirit of the Koran. Instead, it has seriously abridged the liberty to choose one's religion. According to this theology, although the conversion to Islam must be, and is in fact, without coercion, it is practically impossible, once inside Islam, to get out of it. According to this understanding, conversion from Islam to another religion is considered treason, and thus the apostate is liable to the penalty of death.

The elaboration of traditional theologians relies on the precedent set by the first caliph of Islam, Abu Bakar, who strenuously fought the tribes who rejected his authority after the Prophet's death and refused to pay him alms taxes. He compared their rebellion to apostasy.

A careful review of the context in which these references occur, however, reveals that the only permissible use of force is for purposes of defense, not for coercion. It means if non- Muslims themselves instigate force for the purpose of military conquest or religious persecution, or through breach of a solemn treaty, then and only then is forceful reaction justifiable. These passages justify force as a response to persecution and the threat of destruction.

What is needed is a new understanding that transcends our apparently limiting sociological and historical necessities. We are often unaware of the extent to which we are bound by sociological, cultural and historical circumstances, which make us see some things as absolutes. Regarding conversion, there are no injunctions in the Koran setting penalties or punishments.

The standards are provided in the Koran, but an edict that the convert must be killed is only found in sharia, which is polyinterpretable. For this reason, one way to create further understanding in interreligious and intra-religious relations is by going back to the Koran.

Only then can we transcend our socio-cultural, socio- historical and even socio-psychological necessities. This is fully consonant with the actions of Umar, the second caliph, when faced with the death of the Prophet Muhammad. He had the courage to say, "the Koran is enough for us". The Koran is the ultimate source in Islam.

To recapitulate, there is no mention in the Koran of any kind of penalty for conversion. On the contrary, Muslims are advised to "forgive and overlook till God accomplished this purpose, for God hath power over all things."(Q.2: 109)

Muslims may select a lot alternative interpretations of the Koran that are consistent with modern ideas of religious freedom. When they maintain that apostates are to be executed, one must wonder whether it is Islam or political concerns that provide their motivation.

The writer is the director of the Center for Human Rights and Religious Values, Yogyakarta, and is now a graduate student of comparative theology at the Divinity School, University of Chicago, U.S. She can be reached at mirzatk@yahoo.com.