The fine art of picking the nation's chosen few

JAKARTA (JP): When then Lt. Gen. Soeharto was entrusted by the People's Consultative Assembly to form a cabinet in 1966, it was the first time in years in which the process could be considered devoid of bickering over who would get which ministerial post.

Installed in July of the same year, this was the "Kabinet Ampera", named for the acronym Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat (Message of the People's Suffering). The term, embodying demands for reform, was coined in student demonstrations protesting what was perceived as total neglect for the people's suffering amid years of jockeying for political power.

Since that time, researcher Daniel Dhakidae says, the country has seen what he describes as "business cabinets", a departure from the era of the country's first president, Sukarno, when the selection of ministers depended heavily on the lobbying of the strongest parties in government.

As described in detail in Herbert Feith's The Decline of the Constitutional Democracy, each brief cabinet period from 1949 to 1957, despite attempts at coalition, was ruined by politicians and members of the military who disagreed with one policy or another of the party in power.

The now defunct Indonesian Nationalist Party and the Moslem- based Masyumi were among those fighting for strategic positions.

The most durable cabinet was the one under Prime Minister Mohammad Natsir, which served from 1957 to 1959. Others had an average of a year, and the shortest-serving one was brought down in a matter of months. None had the opportunity to bring about the programs urgently needed to address the frail condition of the new republic.

Cabinets, Feith wrote, "... concerned themselves ... less with the enforcement of law and more with the fashioning of ideology".

Eventually, the parliamentary system under which these cabinets rose and fell was ended. Blamed for being too "liberal" and largely responsible for the political chaos, the administration in 1959 gave in to pressure to return to the presidential system endorsed by the 1945 Constitution. No one, it seemed, including the Armed Forces and Sukarno, had the patience to stand by any longer.

This continued through the early years of the ensuing decade and the formation of the "Ampera" cabinet. In 1968, the "Kabinet Pembangunan" (Development Cabinet) was installed.

Base

Cabinets from that year to the one installed in 1993 -- named in succession "Kabinet Pembangunan" I to VI -- were the subject of a survey by Daniel and the research department of the Kompas daily comparing their social base in the New Order years.

Cabinets were primarily recruited from the bureaucracy, Golkar (referring to Keluarga Besar Golkar, or the Golkar "family", including its affiliated organizations and ABRI) and academia.

Top people in Golkar's youth organization, KNPI, governors and military chiefs of strategic areas, and high ranking officials in ministries were the main potential candidates.

The survey concluded that the social base of the cabinets increasingly narrowed to the bureaucracy, as indicated in the composition of the 1993 cabinet.

Other sources of recruitment were rare; five years ago, the Association of Moslem Intellectuals (ICMI) was a notable source.

The risk of a cabinet with members mainly from the bureaucracy, Daniel wrote, was the lack of creativity which outsiders could bring.

"Maybe this contributed to their lack of efficiency," Daniel said this week. Although outsiders were rare, businessman Abdul Latief, appointed manpower minister, was one exception.

Daniel said this composition reflected that "technical capability was not a main criteria, compared to loyalty".

In anticipating the cabinet announced yesterday, many hoped ministers would be picked for their capability. Political professor Maswadi Rauf of the University of Indonesia added that more representation of provinces should also be taken into account.

Learning from history, both scholars separately said while the selection of ministers would likely remain the President's prerogative, the President should consult with more parties in the future.

Maswadi and expert in administrative law Yusril Ihza Mahendra disagreed with the idea of adopting a commission hearing of ministerial candidates with legislators.

Maswadi says the President should consult not only legislators but all necessary parties, "because we do not recognize an opposition party" which could hold the government to accountability.

Daniel, on the other hand, says a hearing with legislators could be made mandatory, as in the United States.

He adds it is high time for a "talent-scouting team", like in the U.S. and South Korea, where ministerial candidates are sought high and low in universities, companies or other institutions.

The widespread gossip facing each new lineup, while exciting, "is sad," he says, with nobody other than the President knowing the names of ministerial candidates.

So far, this has indeed been President's Soeharto's sole prerogative.

Sources close to old State Secretariat insiders and palace officials confirm that the President always prepared his cabinet a few months before the announcement.

He keeps files of potential candidates of different backgrounds, expertise and reputation, they said.

"The President closely studies the people he may need in the next cabinet. He follows their progress and tries to cross check his opinion with other people," a source said.

"When his wife Ibu Tien was still alive, it was natural that the couple sometimes discussed (candidates)."

However, she did not wish to interfere in her husband's decisions, sources added.

Often, the President reappoints a minister in the same position or in another post. Before a cabinet was dissolved, he would meet with some of them and tell them either indirectly or frankly whether he still wanted them.

One sign a minister may not be reappointed was when the President did not address he or she at the farewell party, a source said. "Some ministers felt that they would still be reappointed although the President had politely told them about his decision."

A few days before the cabinet announcement, he usually asks his adjutants to call the candidates and instruct them to come to his Jl. Cendana residence in Central Jakarta.

"They were asked to come alone. The President would tell the candidate his plan and ask him or her to keep the secret until the announcement. The President would also indicate that his final decision would only be known in the announcement," the official says, adding that secrecy was key in case of a change in plans.

The President, he says, would usually ask the candidate to consult with his or her family and inform him in the event of a decision to not accept the post.

The source adds: "There was a funny story five years ago, when a politician came to Jl. Cendana after receiving a call from someone claiming to be an adjutant of the President. He was very disappointed after officials at the residence told him that his name was not in the list of Pak Harto's guests."

In the absence of any visible talent-scouting, the Presidential telephone call remains the sure-fire sign. Formerly, those with a hunch or hope that they might be summoned would wait at home, or bar all from touching the phone for several days. Now, the mobile phone has changed all that.

When the fateful call comes, however, the chosen few may have to be careful about concealing a location unbefitting a new minister.

"The important thing," another official says, "is not to have any sounds in the background which could cast uncertainty in the mind of the President." (anr/prb)