The fine art of picking the nation's chosen few

The fine art of picking the nation's chosen few

JAKARTA (JP): When then Lt. Gen. Soeharto was entrusted by the
People's Consultative Assembly to form a cabinet in 1966, it was
the first time in years in which the process could be considered
devoid of bickering over who would get which ministerial post.

Installed in July of the same year, this was the "Kabinet
Ampera", named for the acronym Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat (Message
of the People's Suffering). The term, embodying demands for
reform, was coined in student demonstrations protesting what was
perceived as total neglect for the people's suffering amid years
of jockeying for political power.

Since that time, researcher Daniel Dhakidae says, the country
has seen what he describes as "business cabinets", a departure
from the era of the country's first president, Sukarno, when the
selection of ministers depended heavily on the lobbying of the
strongest parties in government.

As described in detail in Herbert Feith's The Decline of the
Constitutional Democracy, each brief cabinet period from 1949 to
1957, despite attempts at coalition, was ruined by politicians
and members of the military who disagreed with one policy or
another of the party in power.

The now defunct Indonesian Nationalist Party and the Moslem-
based Masyumi were among those fighting for strategic positions.

The most durable cabinet was the one under Prime Minister
Mohammad Natsir, which served from 1957 to 1959. Others had an
average of a year, and the shortest-serving one was brought down
in a matter of months. None had the opportunity to bring about
the programs urgently needed to address the frail condition of
the new republic.

Cabinets, Feith wrote, "... concerned themselves ... less with
the enforcement of law and more with the fashioning of ideology".

Eventually, the parliamentary system under which these
cabinets rose and fell was ended. Blamed for being too "liberal"
and largely responsible for the political chaos, the
administration in 1959 gave in to pressure to return to the
presidential system endorsed by the 1945 Constitution. No one, it
seemed, including the Armed Forces and Sukarno, had the patience
to stand by any longer.

This continued through the early years of the ensuing decade
and the formation of the "Ampera" cabinet. In 1968, the "Kabinet
Pembangunan" (Development Cabinet) was installed.

Base

Cabinets from that year to the one installed in 1993 -- named
in succession "Kabinet Pembangunan" I to VI -- were the subject
of a survey by Daniel and the research department of the Kompas
daily comparing their social base in the New Order years.

Cabinets were primarily recruited from the bureaucracy, Golkar
(referring to Keluarga Besar Golkar, or the Golkar "family",
including its affiliated organizations and ABRI) and academia.

Top people in Golkar's youth organization, KNPI, governors and
military chiefs of strategic areas, and high ranking officials in
ministries were the main potential candidates.

The survey concluded that the social base of the cabinets
increasingly narrowed to the bureaucracy, as indicated in the
composition of the 1993 cabinet.

Other sources of recruitment were rare; five years ago, the
Association of Moslem Intellectuals (ICMI) was a notable source.

The risk of a cabinet with members mainly from the
bureaucracy, Daniel wrote, was the lack of creativity which
outsiders could bring.

"Maybe this contributed to their lack of efficiency," Daniel
said this week. Although outsiders were rare, businessman Abdul
Latief, appointed manpower minister, was one exception.

Daniel said this composition reflected that "technical
capability was not a main criteria, compared to loyalty".

In anticipating the cabinet announced yesterday, many hoped
ministers would be picked for their capability. Political
professor Maswadi Rauf of the University of Indonesia added that
more representation of provinces should also be taken into
account.

Learning from history, both scholars separately said while the
selection of ministers would likely remain the President's
prerogative, the President should consult with more parties in
the future.

Maswadi and expert in administrative law Yusril Ihza Mahendra
disagreed with the idea of adopting a commission hearing of
ministerial candidates with legislators.

Maswadi says the President should consult not only legislators
but all necessary parties, "because we do not recognize an
opposition party" which could hold the government to
accountability.

Daniel, on the other hand, says a hearing with legislators
could be made mandatory, as in the United States.

He adds it is high time for a "talent-scouting team", like in
the U.S. and South Korea, where ministerial candidates are sought
high and low in universities, companies or other institutions.

The widespread gossip facing each new lineup, while exciting,
"is sad," he says, with nobody other than the President knowing
the names of ministerial candidates.

So far, this has indeed been President's Soeharto's sole
prerogative.

Sources close to old State Secretariat insiders and palace
officials confirm that the President always prepared his cabinet
a few months before the announcement.

He keeps files of potential candidates of different
backgrounds, expertise and reputation, they said.

"The President closely studies the people he may need in the
next cabinet. He follows their progress and tries to cross check
his opinion with other people," a source said.

"When his wife Ibu Tien was still alive, it was natural that
the couple sometimes discussed (candidates)."

However, she did not wish to interfere in her husband's
decisions, sources added.

Often, the President reappoints a minister in the same
position or in another post. Before a cabinet was dissolved, he
would meet with some of them and tell them either indirectly or
frankly whether he still wanted them.

One sign a minister may not be reappointed was when the
President did not address he or she at the farewell party, a
source said. "Some ministers felt that they would still be
reappointed although the President had politely told them about
his decision."

A few days before the cabinet announcement, he usually asks
his adjutants to call the candidates and instruct them to come to
his Jl. Cendana residence in Central Jakarta.

"They were asked to come alone. The President would tell the
candidate his plan and ask him or her to keep the secret until
the announcement. The President would also indicate that his
final decision would only be known in the announcement," the
official says, adding that secrecy was key in case of a change in
plans.

The President, he says, would usually ask the candidate to
consult with his or her family and inform him in the event of a
decision to not accept the post.

The source adds: "There was a funny story five years ago, when
a politician came to Jl. Cendana after receiving a call from
someone claiming to be an adjutant of the President. He was very
disappointed after officials at the residence told him that his
name was not in the list of Pak Harto's guests."

In the absence of any visible talent-scouting, the
Presidential telephone call remains the sure-fire sign.
Formerly, those with a hunch or hope that they might be summoned
would wait at home, or bar all from touching the phone for
several days. Now, the mobile phone has changed all that.

When the fateful call comes, however, the chosen few may have
to be careful about concealing a location unbefitting a new
minister.

"The important thing," another official says, "is not to have
any sounds in the background which could cast uncertainty in the
mind of the President." (anr/prb)