The fate of Islamic parties at polls

The fate of Islamic parties at polls

By Santi W.E. Soekanto and Wisnu Pramudya

JAKARTA (JP): About 87 percent of the approximately 116
million voters in the general election were Muslims, but one
would not know it from looking at the results of 13 Islamic
parties during the June 7 polls.

Of the Islamic parties, only the United Development Party
(PPP), the Crescent Star Party (PBB) and the Justice Party (PK)
fared relatively well.

By last count on Monday, PPP won 9.75 percent of the vote, a
decent showing, thanks to its old infrastructure and outreach
built under the oppressive New Order regime. Besides, many people
still remember the redeeming show it put on during last
November's Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly
(MPR), when PPP politicians walked out of some sessions in their
fight against longtime military privilege and for neutrality of
civil servants.

The newcomer Justice Party took only 1.20 percent of the vote
while the PBB, which is not exactly new given its ties with
established modern Islamic political forces such as Masyumi, won
only 1.56 percent.

"I didn't realize that Muslims are actually a minority in
Indonesia," sighed an insider from the National Mandate Party
(PAN), who actually had no right to complain because his party is
not an Islamic one. "I mean, even in areas which are
traditionally PPP strongholds, it's PDI Perjuangan that won."

He mumbled something about how the Indonesian Council of
Ulemas (MUI) and Muhammadiyah's recent call on Muslims to vote
for parties which campaign for national interests and field
Muslim legislative candidates came too late to be effective.

Yet who could say the poll results would have been different
had the MUI call -- which originated from the belated public
revelation that Megawati Soekarnoputri's PDI Perjuangan fielded a
disproportionately large number of non-Muslim candidates -- been
issued earlier?

MUI chairman K.H. Ali Yafie said in a recent interview that
the body was merely carrying out its duty to remind Muslims of
the stance they should take in the face of a particular
situation, regardless of the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of
the call.

Some consider the Islamic parties' poor showing to be a heavy
blow, believing it is an indicator of the failure of Islamic
da'wah (propagation). This stance, however, was quickly refuted
by Syuhada Bahri, an ulema affiliated with the Indonesian Islamic
Propagation Council (DDII). He said in a recent interview with
the Sabili Islamic biweekly that there was no such thing as
failure in da'wah.

"As a duty, the da'wah has been carried out ... but da'wah in
the sense of a movement to build a society has yet to be
maximized. We have not been successful in (convincing Muslims)
that Islam is a way of life," he said.

"We have only been able to tell people that Islam is (merely)
ubudiyyah (ritual of worship) and hablumminallah (an interaction
between humankind and Allah) ... while (teaching about) rites
that have to do with hablumminannas (interaction among humankind)
in regard to economics and politics have yet to succeed.

"On the other hand, there are Muslims who try to segregate
religion from politics, thus the saying 'Islam yes, Islamic
parties no',".

Among the most reasonable responses may have come from Justice
Party presidential candidate Didin Hafidhuddin, who noted there
were ibroh (lessons) that could be taken from the defeat for
future endeavors. He cited how some Islamic parties only visited
their constituents when campaign time rolled around, and how some
Muslim leaders mistakenly segregated Islamic teaching from
politics when the Koran actually enjoins good leadership in the
same breath with strong faith.

Citing Prophet Muhammad's saying "Find me not in palaces but
in the dwellings of the poor", Didin urged that future
dissemination of Islamic teaching should be geared to touch
neglected segments in society, especially young people and the
poor.

"We will never be strong in the legislature when we don't have
strong support of society," he said.

K.H. Ilyas Ruchiyat, a leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, agreed.
Quoted in Sabili, he said Islamic parties were defeated because
Muslims still held poor understanding of their religion. "Some
think that it is enough to say their prayers, go on the haj,
fast, and that those are signs of Islamic progress here, (despite
not understanding) siyasah (politics), muamalah (social
duties), how to live as a nation, as a state," he said.

"(There should be effort to disseminate) Islamic teaching
about economics, politics ... state affairs ... "

Put in simplistic terms, the blame for why Islamic parties
suffered a defeat should be placed squarely at the doorstep of
those who used Islam and Muslims as mere political commodities.
They included leaders of certain political parties -- such as
Golkar, PAN, the National Awakening Party (PKB) or even PDI
Perjuangan -- who claimed they were not Islamic parties but
appealed to, even manipulated, their constituents' religious
sentiments.

Some political experts are apt to describe those party leaders
more as "politicking Muslims", in the sense that they play
politics without necessarily claiming to do so in the name of
Islam. This definition is contrasted with Islam politik or
"political Muslims" who explicitly use Islamic symbols. Under
such definitions -- which experts including Frans Magnis Suseno
used when explaining the phenomenon of the Association of
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) under Soeharto -- then
Yusril Ihza Mahendra of PBB, Hamzah Haz of PPP and Nurmahmudi
Ismail of PK would be categorized as political Muslims. Amien
Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid as well as PDI Perjuangan and Golkar
leaders would fall into the category of politicking Muslims.

The approach may have held true during Soeharto's time, but
the current situation may call for a different explanation
because evidence abounds that politicking Muslims today have used
or misused, as the case may be, Islamic symbols.

Some clerics affiliated with the PKB, for instance, issued an
edict in West Java enjoining ahlus sunnah wal jamaah, virtually
all Muslims in Indonesia, to vote for PKB. An edict is a serious
matter; the followers of the clerics would certainly think they
committed a sin if they did not follow through.

Another instance occurred with clerics in villages of Central
Java who told voters that choosing PKB was an Islamic thing to
do, while choosing PDI Perjuangan would put food prices up.

Now, if millions of Indonesian Muslims voted for PKB, does it
mean they would reap the heavenly reward (pahala) as promised in
Islam for those who do good deeds and avoid sin? Is the PKB
victory identical to a Muslim victory?

If one is a loyal follower of the largest Islamic
organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), whose leader Abdurrahman
Wahid repeatedly insisted the PKB was "the egg" of NU while the
other parties were "the chicken droppings", one would certainly
vote for PKB, regardless of the fact those other parties made
Islam their ideology while PKB did not.

If one is an admirer of Amien Rais, the former Muhammadiyah
chairman, one would certainly be forgiven for thinking that
Islamic parties are simply not good enough for one. Why? Because
that was what Amien implied when he rejected the offer to head
PBB by saying "it's a shirt which is too small for me" and went
on to set up a non-Islamic party. Amien had every right to do so,
but the campaign by some people to portray the possible coalition
between PAN, PDI Perjuangan and PKB as justified Islamically
would be stretching matters because neither PAN nor PKB are
Islamic.

We are reminded that passing blame is passe, and therefore it
would apparently be more meaningful to advance the discourse to
other factors that may have contributed to the defeat of Islamic
parties. One such factor is the reason why Indonesian Muslims
voted for the so-called secular PDI Perjuangan rather than
Islamic parties.

Ask supporters of Megawati Soekarnoputri why they voted for
her party, and chances are they will say that they sympathized
with her "suffering" under Soeharto's New Order regime. In fact,
she has become the epitome of that suffering, and they identify
with her, never mind that countless Muslim leaders across the
country suffered even crueler fates, including torture, arbitrary
detention and even death at the hands of Soeharto, especially
during the first 20 years of his regime.

Unfortunately, Muslims here do not have their Islamic
equivalent of Megawati, a symbol of resistance against Soeharto.

To many people, whoever Soeharto hates is a hero, especially a
high-profile figure of founding president Sukarno's eldest
daughter. One might have been among those who helped topple
Sukarno in the 1960s, but times have changed. Suddenly one is
Marhaenis, dusting off old copies of Sukarno's Di Bawah Bendera
Revolusi (Under the Banner of the Revolution), putting up the
founding president's poster in the living room and supporting his
family.

Even the ultimate unlikely figure of Probosutedjo, a tycoon
and Soeharto's half brother, is now a Marhaenist after being a
Soehartoist for God knows how long.

Another, more honest reason why Islamic parties were defeated
is because they are either so new or so lacking in resources to
gain exposure that many Indonesian Muslims do not know about
them. Most Muslims know more or less about PPP, but Justice
Party's constituents are generally still limited among the
already devout Muslims, either inside or outside the campuses.

The PBB enjoys strong support from elements who have good
memories about Masyumi, but there are other parties which in fact
call themselves Masyumi. There are the PSII and PSII-1905, there
are Nahdlatul Ummat Party and Partai Kebangkitan Umat or Muslim
Community Awakening Party, all sharing similarities.

Another factor is that many of the Islamic parties, lacking
figureheads as powerful as Megawati, also lack the vision to make
up for their shortcomings. So far, only PPP, PBB and PK have at
least made their agenda loud and clear. PBB, for instance, has a
strong message for constitutional reform, which is a fundamental
step toward democratization, while PK promises a fight against
the military's dual function. The messages of the other Islamic
parties, on the other hand, have yet to reach Indonesian Muslims.

Now, PDI Perjuangan may not have a strong message for
political reform given its conservative outlook about important
reform agendas, such as the amendment of the 1945 Constitution
and the abolition of the military's social political role, but it
has an enemy called Golkar and the so-called status quo forces.
It is so much easier to identify with Megawati's fight against
Golkar, which to millions is the bringer of suffering. "As long
as she is against Golkar, then I support her," is an oft-heard
comment.

There are a host of other reasons why Islamic parties fared so
poorly in the June 7 elections, but if they managed to scrape
past the 2 percent threshold of vote earnings (any parties
gaining less than that will not be eligible to contest the 2004
elections), then they will have another five years to tell
Indonesians, Muslim or otherwise, that they exist.