The failure of 'reformasi', and the 'little New Orders'
The failure of 'reformasi', and the 'little New Orders'
By Prapti Widinugraheni
SINGAPORE (JP): Indonesia is unlikely to recover from its
barrage of multi-crises in the near future, but will just manage
to muddle through with political, economic and social damage-
control measures for the next five to 10 years, one academic
predicts.
Vedi Hadiz from the National University of Singapore's
sociology department, said Indonesia had missed the only window
of opportunity that would have allowed for total reform, being
the period between May and November 1998.
"In history, such opportunities knock only once. We missed it
and now it's too late. The 'comma' that reformasi has fallen into
came long before Gus Dur's time," he said.
In November 1998, six months after Soeharto's resignation, the
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) agreed to "gradual reform"
instead of meeting the demands of student protesters who wanted a
total and radical restructuring of the system.
As a result, Vedi said, the system did not change radically
enough to drive out practices of Soeharto-style vested interests,
patronage and largess, which have been inherited by, and now
characterize President Abdurrahman Wahid's government.
"Solid leadership can only come about when Indonesia's social
powers can disconnect completely from such practices," he said.
This could not be easy, Indonesia had seen 32 years of a
system that had no mechanism for properly electing a leader of
the people's choice. Soeharto was also an expert at maintaining
his power.
"Soeharto never thought about how to transfer power through
institutional means, which explains why Habibie had hardly any
authority over state institutions, including the military and
even his own party, Golkar," Vedi said.
The same situation was passed on to the present government.
"We can see now that every state instrument, such as state-owned
companies, provincial governments and regency-level authorities,
has some kind of resistance against the central government.
"Within each state entity is a group that wants to control the
state instrument for its own advantage. They do this, as they
always have, through patronage, largess and repression.
"They are 'little New Orders' and they are a structural
inheritance from Soeharto's New Order," he said. Vedi predicted
that anyone in power in the near future would operate in the same
manner as Soeharto, meaning there would continue to be
corruption, collusion, nepotism, no accountability and no rule of
law.
"Things will be the same, only the actors will be different.
Right now, I believe that anyone who is a genuine reformer would
have no political vehicle," he said. To have political influence
in Indonesia, a person requires resources, and presently the only
way to have access to resources is by resorting to corruption,
collusion or nepotism.
But Vedi said he did not believe that "worst case" scenarios,
including anarchy and total disintegration, are likely to happen.
Except for Aceh and West Papua, he said, the elites in every
region would be happy enough if they had autonomy and more
control over their resources. Independence would only give them
new issues to deal with, such as defense.
"The anarchy which we see now is a part of the elite's
repositioning strategy which simply manipulates people's
anxiety. Once the elite have no interest to defend, anarchy will
subside," he said.
The writer is a free-lance journalist based in Singapore.