The East Timor predicament

Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer may be correct when he describes his country's policy shift over East Timor as "historic". After all, almost from the instant Indonesian troops landed in the former Portuguese colony in late 1975, successive Australian Cabinets have -- though tacitly at first -- recognized Indonesia's sovereignty over the territory.

The fact is, however, that Canberra's policy change should have been long anticipated. Sad as it may be for all parties concerned, it has to be said that Indonesia's more than two decade-long presence in the territory has failed to bring the well-being promised to the people of East Timor.

Despite repeated official assurances that indigenous forces resisting integration have been reduced to almost nothing, reports of sporadic skirmishes between government troops and insurgent forces have continued to fill the pages of newspapers in Jakarta. Clashes between soldiers and local civilians, or between locals and transmigrants have also continued to occur.

Despite the undisputable fact that much physical and material progress has been made in the province under the Indonesian government, all of these warning signals should have alerted us to the fact that something is amiss in East Timor -- a fact which experts and observers have over the years attempted to bring to the authorities' attention through carefully worded statements.

Unfortunately, though the advisability of attempting to solve the problems in East Timor through a "cultural" approach appeared to have been realized in the past few years, little change has taken place in the official attitude toward the area. It was only after the fall of Soeharto in May of last year that the promise of a real and meaningful shift appeared to have dawned, as signaled by the government's offer of special autonomy status for the province and the withdrawal of troops from the area.

In the meantime, the outside world has been in a constant flux of mores and ideas. The shifting standards of international and interindividual conduct have drastically affected the workings and the psyche of the world community in which we live. A growing acceptance of universal humanitarian principles has brought to the surface of the global conscience such issues as the environment, democracy and human rights; turning these issues into international concerns which no government or organization can afford to disregard.

Sadly, Indonesia appears to have been oblivious to these developments. Only with Soeharto's downfall and the beginnings of a new era of reform did the authorities appear to begin to realize that brute military force is not, after all, the most effective means for pacifying a recalcitrant region.

The best that Indonesia can hope for under the present circumstances is that this realization will not have come too late to mend the damage that has been wrought by the excessive use of force over the past two decades. For Indonesia, obviously, the best solution to the present difficulties would be for East Timor to accept integration. This, however, must not and cannot be achieved by force. As more and more parties -- not only abroad but also in this country -- begin to realize that a referendum is probably the only means to achieve a lasting solution to the problem of East Timor, the authorities would do well to begin an earnest effort to repair the damage which it has caused.

In the meantime, the East Timor case may serve as a strong reminder to the authorities, the military in particular, that similar problems could well arise elsewhere in this country unless wisdom, rather than force, is applied in the solution of local conflicts, and problems are openly recognized and solved rather than swept under the carpet.