The dilemma facing Palestine's Yasser Arafat

LONDON: Israel's failed attempt to assassinate Hamas leader Khaled Mesh'al in Jordan on Sept. 25, 1997 has ironically slowed the downward spiral in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

Following the incident, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu felt compelled to refrain from further provocative actions, if only because of the damage inflicted on relations with Jordan.

Throughout October 1997, the tone, if not the substance, of official Israeli pronouncements became markedly less strident and accusatory towards Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (PA).

However, the current thaw should be viewed as a temporary phenomenon, unlikely to last very far into 1998.

The foundation for such a pessimistic outlook lies in the September 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self- Governing Arrangements (DOP) the 'Oslo Accord'.

This agreement between two highly unequal powers, was long on hope and short on substance. Its success depends almost exclusively on Israeli benevolence to end gradually its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and not on legally and politically binding commitments.

Despite the many obstacles to implementation, previous Israeli Labor leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres moved the peace process forward. With the narrow election in May 1996 of a Likud government in Israel, goodwill has vanished and an imbalance of power logic now prevails.

Caught between a recalcitrant Israel and an increasingly skeptical Palestinian populace, Arafat faces the toughest challenge in his 28-year career as PLO leader. His political survival depends on three factors:

* granting only essential concessions;

* sticking to his position whenever he can; and

* hoping that Israel's next general election comes as quickly as possible.

Given that Arafat will probably face similar political circumstances for at least two more years, even the question of social control in the West Bank and Gaza must be considered.

Palestinian tolerance towards a leadership that cannot deliver the desired political goals and is presiding over a marked deterioration in the standard of living is eroding daily.

Barring early general elections, it must be anticipated that Palestinian popular discontent will increase and be directed not only at Israel, but at the PA as well.

Arafat has been unable to stop Israeli moves designed to predetermine the outcome of the peace process. Three policies have been central in this regard.

First, Israeli colonization of the territory captured in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 continues unabated. Areas under construction include the huge Har Homa development on Jabal Abu Ghneim, and the small settlement at Ras al-Amud in east Jerusalem.

Har Homa completes a ring of exclusively Jewish settlements surrounding east Jerusalem. These developments cut the capital off from the West Bank, effectively denying Palestinian territorial claims to the city even prior to negotiations over its fate.

Colonization under Likud has not been limited to the Jerusalem area, but includes settlements in virtually all of the occupied territories. The PA currently controls only about 6 percent of the West Bank, leaving most of the area open to further development.

Before the next general election it is expected that as many as 200,000 Jewish settlers will reside in the West Bank and a somewhat lower number in east Jerusalem. This makes the prospect of significant territorial withdrawal by Israel unlikely.

Second, Netanyahu has abandoned any further 'land-for-peace' concessions pending final negotiations. The Oslo Accord as amended in January 1997 in the Hebron protocol called for a three-staged Israeli pull-out from the West Bank.

Phase one was to add about a further 2 percent of the occupied territory to the 6 percent already under direct PA control. Arafat rejected this proposal.

The second deadline passed in September 1997 without protest. The final stage is scheduled for mid-1998 and is supposed to leave the PA controlling between 40-50 percent (Israeli calculation) and 90 percent (Palestinian estimate) of the West Bank.

Given Netanyahu's statements on the issue, few observers expect this withdrawal to happen. Arafat and the PA will continue to rule over a few tiny 'Bantustans' dotted around small portions of the West Bank -- and a somewhat larger section in Gaza -- for the foreseeable future. Such a situation presages, it seems, a much more limited Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank in the final-status negotiations than envisaged by Arafat and his supporters.

Third, for the past year Israel has engaged in a policy of 'quiet deportation' of Palestinians from Jerusalem. This has been done by confiscating the identification cards that allow Palestinians to live and work in the capital.

Without this documentation, Palestinians -- even those born and raised in Jerusalem -- may not enter the city unless they have special permits, and they are certainly not allowed to live there. Identification papers are confiscated when the municipality determines that an individual has shifted his or her 'center of life' elsewhere.

The legal criteria used in the decision-making process is vague. Furthermore, it applies only to Palestinians, not Jews, who may live and work outside the city indefinitely while still maintaining residency rights. Again, this policy seems designed for only one purpose: to limit the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem prior to final-status negotiations (and probably beyond).

The weakness of Arafat and the PA has been clearly illustrated in their inability to prevent or even effectively challenge these unilateral Israeli moves. Such political impotence has not gone unnoticed by the Palestinian population.

To pre-empt and contain expressions of popular discontent in Palestine, Arafat has built an authoritarian state backed by numerous security forces. Such autocratic policies are likely to continue and even intensify over the next two years.

Perhaps the most significant indicator of the growing authoritarian nature of PA politics has been the marginalisation of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). The much-publicized 1996 PLC elections have, in the end, produced a powerless debating club routinely ignored by the Executive Authority (EA), that is, Arafat and his cabinet.

In fact, the PLC's ineffectualness has become so evident that in September 1997 one key member, Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi, gave up his position because of the EA's routine dismissal of PLC legislation. 'Abd al-Shafi's resignation is noteworthy because of who he is: a widely respected statesman, the former head of the Palestinian negotiating team and the most popular contender in the 1996 PLC polls.

'Abd al-Shafi and the PLC have been particularly concerned with illegal activity at the highest levels of the PA government. The May 1997 Palestinian Inspector General's report detailing massive corruption in the PA gave the PLC the opportunity to press the issue.

All that happened, however, was the symbolic resignation of some cabinet ministers. Arafat did not accept their notice, thereby allowing the status quo to continue.

The recently adopted Basic Law, which defines Arafat's executive authority, will probably have the same result of marginalizing, in practice, if not in theory, the PLC's role.

There are virtually no legal checks on executive power in Palestine.

The failed assassination attempt against Khaled Mesh'al has resulted in increased popularity for Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza.

The incident has proved particularly embarrassing to Arafat in two ways. First, it came in the same week that he had begun a new crackdown on Hamas institutions in Palestine at the behest of Israel and the U.S.

Palestinian security forces shut down 16 establishments run by Islamic organizations in Gaza and a television station in Nablus. Most of the institutions that were closed -- like most Hamas facilities in general -- were charitable societies providing much-needed social services to an impoverished community.

They included the Moslem Girls' Association, the Islamic Welfare Association and the Society of Almsgivers.

The closure sparked outrage among Palestinian non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which noted that all of the charitable groups that were shut down were licensed to, and worked with, the Ministry of Social Affairs.

The nearly constant closure of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel makes such institutions particularly valuable in averting social catastrophe. In these circumstances, Arafat may well have to allow them to reopen quietly, perhaps under different names.

Second, Hamas sought to maximize Arafat's political embarrassment by using King Hussein of Jordan, rather than the PLO leader himself, as the intermediary with Israel.

King Hussein -- whom Arafat probably still believes harbors ambitions in the West Bank -- saved Meshal's life by obtaining the antidote for the Mossad assassin's poison.

In addition, he compelled Israel to release, on Oct. 6, 1997, 20 Palestinian and Jordanian prisoners, including Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, a founder of Hamas, who had been imprisoned for eight years.

King Hussein was also the person approached by Hamas to return Yassin to Palestine. Arafat and the PA were forced to watch from the sidelines as Hamas and Jordan reinvigorated their positions in Palestine, courtesy of Mossad's failed assassination.

However, Hamas' power should not be overestimated. The movement remains a spoiler, not a real challenger to Arafat and the PA. Hamas is still deeply divided over how to deal with the PA. Moreover, Sheikh Yassin is no Ayatollah Imam Khomeini, the late Iranian religious leader. Yassin comes from the moderate wing of Hamas and does not seek to destabilize Arafat and the PA.

All this could change, however, if the peace process continues its downward trajectory. Hamas' support has always been derived from those disenchanted with the results of the PLO's policies towards Israel. As Palestinian discontent with the Oslo Accord grows, Hamas could begin to transform itself from a spoiler to a challenger.

Arafat is under pressure from Israel and the U.S. to take action against Hamas. By doing so, however, he risks alienating more Palestinians, thereby increasing support for Hamas. This is the crux of his dilemma.